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This project focuses on the dynamics of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) as a non-binding 
multistakeholder debate about information policymaking. Using the theory of structuration and 
critical discourse analysis, I explore how the nation-state-centric and the internet-community-
centric perceptions of authority and approaches to decision-making manifest themselves in the 
forum and what political and cultural norms they reify.  
This study is based on participatory observations, personal interviews, and analysis of 
documents and meeting transcripts. It explains the inner workings of the IGF as a space where 
the historical tensions between the traditional methods of global policymaking and the 
unorthodox approach to governance developed by the Internet community are played out. It 
explains how the IGF functions as a UN forum that aspires to bring practices of collaborative, 
meritocratic, and bottom-up decision-making into the nation-state-focused, hierarchical 
environment of the UN system. My analysis demonstrates how the two worldviews on Internet 
policymaking coexist and collide within the formalized bodies of the IGF, and how they are 
enacted through practices that evolved around the IGF fixtures. It explains how the IGF 
manages to draw legitimacy from both the intergovernmental and the Internet community 
environments by incorporating elements of both during its meetings. It also explains the pivotal  
 
role of idea entrepreneurs at the nucleus of IGF as a group that deliberately engages in creation 
of IGF structures. 
This study puts forward three main concluding arguments. First, it argues that the main 
contribution of the IGF to Internet governance is mainstreaming the Internet community values 
within the UN system. The IGF engages in governance to the degree that it produces systems of 
consultative and decision-making processes that have constitutive effects for Internet 
policymaking. Second, it questions the notion of multistakeholderism by viewing it as a set of 
practices that enact ideological principles. It highlights the importance of recognizing the 
multiplicity of practices of multistakeholderism in the analysis of Internet governance. Finally, 
this study argues for the importance of viewing Internet governance as a system where analysis 
of one policy discourse space cannot be complete without the understanding of other spaces 
where Internet governance is debated. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Unresolved tension 
David Clark, arguably one of the founding designers of Internet architecture, famously said: 
“We reject kings, presidents, and voting. We believe in rough consensus and running code.”
1 
Clearly, the pioneers of Internet architecture were designing not just a computer network. They 
were also designing the means by which this network would be run, managed, and regulated—
and this governance was imbued with a set of powerful beliefs. Drissel (2006) explained that 
“*i+n the years since the genesis of the Internet in the late 1960s, pioneers of digital technology 
have described cyberspace as a unique electronic frontier, one that steadfastly resists all 
attempts at governmental control or state-imposed regulation” (p. 105). 
The governance structures informally developed during the design of the Internet were 
substantially different from the typical mechanisms of public policy decision-making. Huston 
(2002) observed a gulf that “exists between the typical method of constructing a public policy 
framework for the communications industry and the exigencies of the Internet;” he referred to 
it as an “unresolved tension (…) over the very nature of the Internet and its regulatory model.” 
The “Internet way” of policy formulation, reflective of the values of the academic community 
that engineered the Internet against the backdrop of the counterculture movement of the 
1960s and 1970s, was based on an ethos of collaboration and meritocracy. Traditional public 
policymaking centered around hierarchical procedures with the institutions of the nation-state 
                                                        
1 See: http://www.ietf.org/tao.html 2 
 
as the ultimate decision-making nucleus, and with a focus on maintaining the status quo 
(Huston, 2002; Uimonen, 2003). 
 This tension between different approaches to policymaking erupted with the 
commercialization of the Internet and emergence of the World Wide Web in the early to mid 
1990s. The unexpectedly broad and rapidly growing demand for “webified” domain names 
required a system capable of managing the technical, the operational, and the legal aspects of 
voluminous domain name registration. This led to tensions between the US government and 
the Internet community’s loose institutions, such as the Internet Society (ISOC) and the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), regarding the authority over the domain name system (DNS) 
hierarchy. These concerns were echoed by other, primarily intergovernmental, institutions with 
a stake in information policy, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) or the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), regarding the authority of these emerging 
institutions of the Internet community to handle issues of public policy (see Mueller, 2002, 
chap. 6 for detailed discussion of these developments).  
In this situation, neither the Internet community nor the nation-state apparatus could lead 
Internet-policy-setting unilaterally. On the one hand, by the time the governments entered the 
Internet policy debate, there were already well established governance institutions based in the 
private sector
2, the civil society, and to a degree academia, premised on principles of 
collaboration, meritocracy, and “rough consensus.” Moreover, these non-government actors 
                                                        
2 There is a growing body of literature arguing for the centrality of the private sector as the sphere where the 
governance of the Internet actually happens (DeNardis, 2010a; Mueller & van Eeten, 2011). 3 
 
held the technical expertise, which is critical to the governance of the Internet. On the other 
hand all these actors worked, and continue to work, within government established legal 
frameworks. As citizens of particular countries, different members of the Internet community 
are subject to the laws of their sovereign states, and many draw their financial and political 
resources from their government systems. 
The eruption of this tension between the traditional and Internet community approaches to 
policymaking highlights the gap between these distinct views on authority and decision-making; 
it also highlights the fundamentally global nature of Internet-related policymaking. For many in 
the Internet community, the growing interest of governments in issues of Internet governance, 
specifically the calls to implement a more nation-state focused and hierarchical decision-
making process, was an assault on the very spirit of the Internet and its normative foundations. 
The majority of the Internet community at the time resided in the US and was appreciative of 
the US government hands-off approach to the Internet. The creation of the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) —a private, US-based, not-for-profit 
corporation with authority over the critical Internet resources—was an institutional response of 
the Internet community and the US government to the international pressure. Mueller (2002) 
described ICANN as “a resource-based international regulatory regime” that is “a rough 
facsimile of an international treaty organization without a treaty” (p. 220). The clash between 
the two forms of policymaking has also fueled a series of global debates about Internet policy, 
which culminated in a UN-sponsored World Summit on Information Society (WSIS). The 
summit, which was held in two phases in 2003 and 2005, started as a meeting with purely 4 
 
developmental agenda, but quickly morphed into a high-level international debate about 
Internet governance.  
The WSIS made most apparent the global scope and the unorthodox notion of authority in 
informal Internet-related policymaking. Governments could not simply assert their authority 
through established intergovernmental channels, such as the ITU, because at that point most of 
the policy decision-making authority was already delegated to non-governmental institutions 
such as IETF and ICANN. Instead, the WSIS formalized the practice of “multistakeholderism,” 
where “representatives of public interest advocacy groups, business associations, and other 
interested parties participate in intergovernmental policy deliberations alongside governments” 
(Mueller, 2010, pp. 7–8). Yet, the tensions surrounding the legitimacy of the emerging 
information regime, with ICANN as its pivotal institution, as well as the fundamental 
disagreements about how the Internet should be governed, proved irresolvable. The summit 
produced its own general framework for global information policy, with a strong emphasis on 
development, but made no concrete policy decisions. The main “tangible” outcome of the 
summit was a decision to create a non-binding forum for multistakeholder Internet policy 
discussion—the Internet Governance Forum (IGF).  
Over the last six years, the IGF has since become a vessel for the unresolved tensions between 
the different cultures of authority and decision-making of the Internet community and the 
intergovernmental apparatus. It has also become a stage for enacting different normative 
schemes based on plurality of worldviews, as well as cultural, national, and institutional 
identities of the participants in the forum. Despite the presence of the phrase “Internet 5 
 
governance” in its name, the IGF is not the only, nor the most central institution of Internet 
governance. Yet it continues to attract participants and donors, and its mandate was extended 
for an additional 5 years in December 2010. Most importantly, the forum continues to evolve 
and interact with other institutions of Internet governance, which makes it a good space for the 
study of the structuration of Internet governance. 
1.2. Unanswered questions 
When I was first exposed to Internet governance I could not help but wonder: why do people 
participate in IGF? The forum does not lead to traditional policy outcomes in the form of 
treaties, standards, policy statements or even recommendations. Unlike the IETF, which 
produces standards—voluntary ones, but standards nonetheless—or the WIPO, which produces 
treaties, the IGF produces only non-binding discourse. Streeter (1996), for example, claimed 
that broadcast policy and law create the “fact of television (…) as a set of social activities” (p. 3). 
Getting to “create” a medium as an act of policymaking would be a compelling opportunity for 
interested individuals and organizations. But the same cannot be said for a non-binding policy 
deliberation spaces such as the IGF—non-binding debates do not “create” tangible outcomes. 
So, why do hundreds of government officials, industry executives, civil society activists, and 
academics spend substantive time and financial resources to take part in the IGF? Can non-
binding policy discourse contribute to the “fact” of the Internet? 
Beyond the question of why people participate is the question of whether the IGF matters and, 
if so, how? Scholars examining the IGF have offered a range of analytical responses. Some view 
it as one of the most important experiments in institutional innovation in the global 6 
 
policymaking environments in recent history, because it emphasizes open participation and the 
involvement of non-state actors in policy debates (Mathiason, 2009). Others view it as a red 
herring in the Internet governance process, because it lacks any substantive decision-making 
authority, which renders the IGF little more than a talk shop (DeNardis, 2009, 2010b). Both 
perspectives make a valuable contribution to the study of Internet governance, and raise a 
series of important questions.  
But, perhaps by focusing on the “tangible” deliverables of the IGF (or lack of thereof), they do 
not offer an in-depth analysis of the workings of the forum itself. A closer look at the people 
and practices of the IGF can help us better understand the complexity of bringing the nation-
states and intergovernmental apparatus to have an open conversation in the same space with 
the Internet community, particularly the civil society. The cultures of decision making, the 
sources of authority and legitimacy, and the structures of power that evolved in the 
intergovernmental settings and within the Internet community result in different world views 
about the social, political, cultural, and economic roles of the Internet and the ways it should be 
governed. When forced to co-exist within the IGF, mundane and “obvious” practices of one 
community are looked upon as novel by another; argumentative structures acceptable by one 
group are completely rejected by another; at the same time, neither party can act in isolation 
and completely disregard the other. How and why do these two cultures of policymaking co-
exist, even in a non-binding space? How exactly is any common ground reached – and at what 
cost for each of the participating parties? And what does this multistakeholder engagement 
mean for the broader Internet governance ecosystem? 7 
 
My puzzle, thus, is to understand the dynamics of the IGF as non-binding, multistakeholder 
debate on information policymaking. What is happening “under the hood” of the IGF? How do 
the nation-state-centric and the Internet-community-centric perceptions of authority and 
approaches to decision-making manifest themselves? What normative and cultural schemas do 
they reify? What meaning (if any) may they have for the politics of Internet governance? To 
what end do IGF participants engage in a recurring political struggle over the agenda of the 
forum and their right to participate?  
1.3. Goals and plan of the dissertation 
The goals of this project are twofold. First, I aim to provide a detailed analysis of the inner 
workings of IGF as a space that shapes the discourse about Internet governance. Most of the 
research about the IGF focuses on the forum as an institution, without paying close attention to 
what actually goes on within it. The small number of studies that have addressed some aspects 
of Internet policymaking practices have focused on the WSIS process and on the texts produced 
during the summit (as opposed to the practices of their production). In this work I will focus on 
the “nuts and bolts” of the IGF as a way to ask questions about the constitutive significance of 
the forum in shaping how the policymakers talk and think about the Internet. 
 My second goal is to advance social-theory-driven research within the institutional analysis of 
Internet governance. Social science studies of Internet governance, particularly those focused 
on the IGF and the WSIS processes, tend to be driven by the substantive, as opposed to the 
theoretical or the methodological, domain (in terms of Brinberg & McGrath, 1982, 1985); in 
other words, the inquiry is driven by changes in the studied phenomenon and from a rather 8 
 
applied perspective, but with limited theoretical insight. The developments are indeed 
important, so a lot of research focuses on the historical documentation of the process and its 
normative assessment (e.g. Berleur, 2008; Bygrave & Bing, 2009; Drake, 2004; Goldsmith & Wu, 
2006; Mathiason, 2009). Some studies make instrumental use of international relations 
theories to explain interactions between the institutions of Internet governance, but they are 
still driven primarily by substantive concerns (e.g. Dunn, Krishna-Hensel, & Mauer, 2007; Singh, 
2008). I will use the lens of structuration theory and critical discourse analysis as my starting 
point for questions about the practices of the IGF. Taken together, I anticipate this work to offer 
additional tools to analyze the IGF, and the Internet governance debates more broadly, as well 
as have new analytical insights about the IGF. 
I start Chapter 2 with an analysis of the theoretical importance of Internet governance, and 
information policy more broadly, in the constitution of contemporary society. Then, I review 
the international relations theories commonly used in the analysis of the Internet governance 
process. While each one of the international relations approaches is useful in its own way, 
there are questions that cannot be adequately addressed by each one of them separately. 
Venturing beyond international relations theory requires viewing the policymaking process as 
itself a form of discourse. To do that I draw on the theory of structuration, in order to articulate 
the “duality” of the policymaking process. Then I turn to critical discourse analysis, which views 
discourse as social practice, as a conceptual bridge between the theoretical argument and 
empirical observation of the phenomenon. In Chapter 3, I document the methodological 
approach I used this in project and the peculiarities of the IGF as a research site. 9 
 
Chapter 4 offers historical context for my analysis of the IGF practices. It describes the 
substantive and political changes that led to the establishment of the IGF. I begin with a 
description of the WSIS process, emphasizing how the two normative frameworks of authority 
and decision-making clashed over the questions of management of Internet names and 
numbers as well as questions of public policy concerned with the use of the Internet. I describe 
the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) as a constitutive experiment in global 
policy deliberation, where the multistakeholder model later embraced in the IGF was first 
enacted. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of the repercussions of the WSIS process for 
the IGF, its mandate, its people, and its practices.  
Chapter 5, then, builds off this historical context to analyze the people, practices, and 
procedures of the IGF. I describe the path dependencies established through the WSIS process 
and the challenging position of the IGF as a forum that aspires to institute an unorthodox way 
of conducting policy discourse within the UN system. The first sections of this chapter review 
the structural properties that emerge from the attempts to balance the UN heritage and the 
Internet community norms. Then I describe the structural fixtures of the IGF, such as its 
secretariat, the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG), its meetings, and the dynamic 
coalitions. My goal here is to demonstrate how the structural elements of the IGF and the 
practices that emerged around them enact a mix of values and principles brought into the 
forum by its participants. Then I turn to the participants themselves. Specifically, I discuss two 
groups I observed during my field work—the IGF celebrities and the IGF nucleus. I explain how 
government and tech-celebrities reify the legitimacy of the IGF in the eyes of different 
stakeholder groups; and how the nucleus has solidified multistakeholderism as a vessel for 10 
 
values such as openness, inclusivity, and individual freedoms, and made it a major organizing 
principle both for the forum and for the nucleus members’ vision of the Internet governance 
regime. I conclude this chapter with an analytical reflection about the link between the 
practices of the IGF and the discourse it produces.  
In Chapter 6 I conclude this dissertation with a discussion about the meaning of the observed 
practices for the constitution of the IGF, and more broadly for the constitution of governance in 
Internet-related policy discourse. 
 11 
 
2. GOVERNANCE, DISCOURSE, AND INTERNET 
The politics of the Internet are enacted through the numerous creative and disruptive ways this 
technology has and is being used. Some scholars argue that that the politics of the Internet are 
inherent in its design. Laura DeNardis (2009) explains how the engineering of the network 
embodied choices about civil liberties such as privacy and freedom of speech. She writes, 
“Internet architecture and virtual resources cannot be understood only through the lens of 
technical efficiency, scarcity, or economic competition but as an embodiment of human values 
with social and cultural effects” (p.96).Others focus on the enabling aspects of a network, 
which, based on libertarian ideas, trespassed traditional boundaries of state control of media 
and communication channels. The Internet allowed unprecedented political mobilization by 
realigning, the technical basis of what Braman (2009) labels “informational power”—the 
informational origins “of the materials, social structures, and symbols that are the stuff of 
power in its other forms” (p.26). The ability to innovate, whether politically, commercially or 
socially, on the edges of the network, shifted the balance of political power between the state 
and the individual.
3  
Governing the Internet is imposing politics on this complex sociotechnical system. Internet 
governance plays out as a politics of control, when it comes to management and distribution of 
domain names and IP addresses. As DeNardis (2009) described it, these politics stir “questions 
                                                        
3 Mueller (2010) explains that the Internet, “changes the polity. By converging different media forms and 
facilitating fully interactive communication, the Internet dramatically alters the cost and capabilities of group 
action. As a result, radically new forms of collaboration, discourse, and organization are emerging. This makes it 
possible to mobilize new transnational policy networks and enables new forms of governance” (p.5). 12 
 
about how access to resources and power over these resources are distributed or should be 
distributed among institutions, nation-states, cultures, regions, and among entities with a 
vested economic interest in the possession or control of these resources” (p. 16; see also 
Galloway, 2006). Internet governance also plays out as cultural politics in a debate about what 
values and core principles should be preserved as the network changes. Influencing the 
technical infrastructure of the Internet is influencing the civil liberties that are enacted through 
this technology. Yet, today Internet governance is referred to not only as governance of the 
technical infrastructure, but also as control of the online behaviors it facilitates, the very act of 
enactment of those liberties that the technology affords (Mueller, 2010). As such, Internet 
governance also plays out as global politics of domination. Nation-states, regional and 
international alliances are competing for the establishment of legal frameworks and public 
policy practices that preserve national interests and value systems of the parties involved. The 
long history of cultural, political, and economic tensions among nation-states are reinterpreted 
within the Internet governance debate thus making it also a debate about values of democratic 
participation, economic freedoms, and cultural hegemony (Hart, 2011). 
The Internet Governance Forum (IGF) is a space where politics are imposed on technology that 
has politics. While in the more technical fora, such as the study groups of the International 
Telecommunication Union Standardization Sector (ITU-T) or the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF), the debate focuses mostly on the technical aspects such as interpretability and 
scalability of solutions, in the IGF the participants also operate with normative concepts such as 
privacy and anonymity. Even the most technical debates in the IGF are linked to issues of 
development, civil liberties, and the role of the nation-state in Internet-related policymaking. 13 
 
Through discussions of norms and principles of the Internet as a socio-technical practice the IGF 
participants engage in a debate about information-centric social systems and their governance.  
For this project, I build on literature that views policymaking as a constitutive act and 
emphasizes the duality of social structures and human agency. In this project the notion of 
duality is an organizing principle tying together my views of the Internet governance, 
information governance, and constitution of society. This work also draws on discourse analysis 
literature that views discourse as social practice and thus policy-discourse as a space where 
actors consciously negotiate, reproduce, or challenge social structures. 
2.1. Why studying Internet governance? 
Law and policy
4 are constitutional social forces. They organize existing social categories and 
relationships, and they define new social categories within the context of already existing 
systems of rules and institutions. Thus the process of policymaking
5 is a continuous and 
conscious act of social construction or, in other words, “…a constant discursive struggle over 
the criteria of social classification, the boundaries of problem categories, the intersubjective 
interpretation of common experiences, the conceptual framing of problems, and the definition 
of ideas that guide the ways people create the shared meanings which motivate them to act” 
                                                        
4 In this text, I use the terms “law” and “policy” somewhat interchangeably. For the purpose of the argument made 
here, both refer to codified or discursively formulated rules (Giddens, 1984a, pp. 22–24) and have been employed 
in a similar fashion by others (e.g. Braman, 2009). As the chapter progresses I turn to using the broader term 
“governance” as it is further explained below. 
5 I also use the term “policymaking” quite liberally throughout this text. The goal is to cast a wide net that captures 
not only processes of production of binding rules and regulations, which belong to the sphere of government, but 
also processes of policy deliberation, discussion or policy discourse, which belong to the sphere of governance. I 
try to make these distinctions clear throughout the text, but I may occasionally use these terms interchangeably 
among themselves or with the term “governance” as it is described in footnote 7. 14 
 
(Fischer & Forester, 1993, pp. 1–2). Law and policy both trigger and react to social change, so 
“with a longer and wider view it is possible to see a specific law developing out of cultural 
practice, becoming a form of discourse, and ultimately being translated into technology” 
(Braman, 2009, p. 3).  
Information policy, or more broadly governance of information, adds a layer of complexity to 
the dualistic relationship between policy and society. This complexity stems from the 
omnipresence of information—it is both, a constitutive social force and a fundamental 
component of governance.  
Notions of information and communication as constitutive forces in society can be found 
already in the early writings on modernity. Durkheim, for example, conceptualized a causal 
chain of society formation that evolves from an effervescence moment, where social awareness 
and social cohesion emerge, to development of practices and believes, and their 
institutionalization (Rawls, 1996; Schmaus, 1998). For Durkheim, shared categories of 
knowledge and group cohesion, as the basis of society formation and change, are inherently 
informational; communication is also a pivotal mechanism through which these elements get 
institutionalized (Durkheim, 2003a, 2003b; Emirbayer, 2003). Other scholars conceptualized 
information and communication processes as being constitutive of the notions of bureaucracy 
(Beniger, 1986), nation-state (Braman, 2009), and culture (Adorno, 1991). Krippendorff (1996), 
as quoted in Braman (2009, pp. 19–20), also described the pivotal function of information as 
“superordinate to the economy,” because “*i+t guides, controls and rearranges the economic 
activities and has, hence, the characteristics of a meta-economic quantity that cannot easily be 15 
 
built into a system of analysis that is essentially flat and provides no opportunity for self-
reference.”  
The notion of the “information society” brings the centrality of information to the forefront of 
the discussion about information and communication as constitutive forces in society. Giddens 
(1985) argued that: 
modern societies have been ... ‘information societies’ since their inception. There is a 
fundamental sense ... in which all states have been ‘information societies’, since the 
generation of state power presumes reﬂexively gathering, storage, and control of 
information, applied to administrative ends. But in the nation state, with its peculiarly 
high degree of administrative unity, this is brought to a much higher pitch than ever 
before (p.178) 
Yet, the contemporary notion of information society is associated with the rapid change in 
technical abilities to store, manipulate, and retrieve information on the one hand, and cultural 
shifts that challenged the centrality of the nation-state in the hierarchy of power on the other. 
Castells (2004, 2010) labels this centrality of information and communication as 
“informationalism” and Silverstone (2007) refers to it as part of what he labels as “mediapolis,” 
or a global discursive and judgmental space where politics, public life, and the relationships 
between the self and the others are constituted. Webster (2006) offers five different 
approaches to defining our information society in comparison with earlier forms of society. 
Each approach is centered on a different element of newness—technological, economic, 
occupational, spatial, and cultural—all of which share “the conviction that quantitative changes 
in information are bringing into being a qualitatively new sort of social system” (p.9).  16 
 
Webster also mentions a sixth, qualitatively different, definition of the information society, 
which postulates that the character of information “is such as to have transformed how we live. 
The suggestion here is that theoretical knowledge/information is at the core of how we conduct 
ourselves these days” (p.10, emphasis in the original). To him, this is the substantive definition 
of the information society that captures the centrality of information in each aspect of social 
life. Similar systematic change, underpinned by the society’s improved ability to handle growing 
volumes of information in an ever-expanding number of ways, is also present in Bell’s (1999) 
notion of “post-industrial society,” with growing reliance on informational means of 
production, and Castells’s (2010) notion of “informational mode of development,” in which 
information is an integral part of all human activity (p.17-18; also see Castells, 2007). Braman 
concludes that “*t+he height of attention to the informatization of society has passed with its 
normalization, and the more detailed work of figuring out just what is going on is now under 
way” (p.332). According to her, any aspect of social enquiry today invariably touches on the 
processes of informatization either through theorization, topic choices or application of an 
information-centric analytical lens
6.  
Information and communication are also fundamental to the notion of governance.
7 Their 
prominence is rooted in the idea that the constitutive effects of decision-making processes (as 
well as their limits) are enacted through discourse. Giddens (1984a), who argued for the 
                                                        
6 Braman (2009)provides an interesting example of historical studies that are “revisiting the history of military 
organizations, tactics and strategy, and weaponry from the perspective of information and information 
technologies” (p. 332). 
7 I use Braman’s (2009, p. 3) distinction between: “government (formal institutions of the law); governance 
(decision-making with constitutive [structural] effect whether it takes place within the public or private sectors, 
and formally or informally); and governmentality (cultural predispositions and practices that produce and 
reproduce the conditions that make particular forms of governance and government possible).” 17 
 
centrality of mundane, tacit, and taken for granted practices in constitution of social conduct, 
described law as a “formally codified” rule of social practice, which implies an interpretation 
that “may in and of itself alter the form of *the rule’s+ application” (p.22-23). Law and policy, 
thus, are framing mechanisms, that codify the mundane and the tacit through normative 
interpretation. Inherent to this notion are ideas of power and domination, because, as Giddens 
explains, “frames of meaning incorporate differentials of power,” and domination “is the very 
condition of existence of codes of signification” (p.31). A fundamental function of the law is 
discursively defining normative behavior, even though laws as texts have limited capacity in 
determining it. As such, structures of domination are sustained and challenged through policy 
discourse, whether among the policymakers themselves or between the policymakers and their 
constituencies. To be empowered, thus, is to have the ability to reflect on the normative 
structures, to question the mundane, to participate in the process of codifying social practice, 
and to make the implicit explicit; communication systems in society can act to sustain or 
suppress this ability. 
The growing informatization of the society and the changing modes of communication alter the 
power basis. The power to govern does not lie solely with the state as a single entity anymore. 
Instead the power to govern lies with those bureaucracies that can comprehend, navigate 
through, and coordinate a myriad of social, political, technical, and economic institutions
8, as 
well as make the division of power obvious and commonsensical to those who are being 
governed (Foucault, 1970, 1989). In other words, the process of governance becomes a 
                                                        
8 Dean (2009) refers to such systems as an assemblages of elements of a regime of practice (p.22) and Law 
(1987)describes them in terms of “heterogeneous engineering” (p.95-100). 18 
 
knowledge-focused process, dependent on how information about the governed system is 
collected, classified, and used
9. Braman (2009) describes this type of power as the most 
fundamental to any other type of power. She labels it “informational power” and explains that 
it acts “by manipulating the informational bases of instrumental, structural, and symbolic 
power” (p.26). Informational power enacts normative mechanisms by drawing boundaries that 
define what is right or wrong and what can be discussed (as a policy matter) and what cannot.  
Information governance, as a nexus of the constitutive and governance roles of information and 
communication, represents a fairly complex construct. “While other types of law deal with 
relations within and between entities in categories as already defined, issues involving 
information and communication define the categories themselves and the relations enabled or 
permitted within and between them” (Braman, 2009, p. 19). Information governance, thus, is a 
form of structural intervention that has a direct impact on constitution of the fabric of social-
constructive processes. Yet, any decision-making process itself is situated within a given at that 
moment system of social structures, or, in Braman’s terms, in a set of categories with entities 
and relationships defined within and between them. Dean (2009, p. 18) captured this duality of 
governance in the following way: 
On the one hand, we govern others and ourselves according to what we take to be true 
about who we are, what aspects of our existence should be worked upon, how, with 
what means and to what ends. We thus govern others and ourselves according to 
various truths about our existence and nature as human beings. On the other hand, the 
ways in which we govern and conduct ourselves give rise to different ways of producing 
truth. 
                                                        
9 Statistics comes to mind as an example of an information-centric innovation that had profound impact on the 
way governance is arranged by enabling bureaucratic ways of knowing. 19 
 
Applying such view to the realm of information governance draws a picture where people who 
are involved in this process are in fact regulating ways of producing ‘truths’, or governing the 
governmentality, not only through enacting it, but also through consciously making it the 
subject of their decision-making. Borrowing from Bourdieu (1991), governance of information is 
about setting the rules for re-charting the boundaries of the field of symbolic power; and this 
governance process, just as any other governance process, is essentially discursive and rooted 
in the very same processes and fields of power it is asking to regulate. 
The Internet has come to mean more than just technical infrastructure (DeNardis, 2009). It is a 
sociotechnical basis for new forms of organizational structures, new forms of collective action, 
new forms of collecting and disseminating information, and new forms of polity. The Internet is 
commonly credited with challenging the established mentalities of government and redrawing 
the boundaries of governmentality. It offers communication capabilities of unprecedented 
scope and scale, while, at the same time, its decentralized architecture distributes control over 
the information flows in the network and does not necessarily align it with established nodes of 
power (Mueller, 2010). Taken together, practices that developed around the simplicity of the 
use of the network and the global and free communication that it offers are re-charting the 
boundaries of the field of symbolic power of the nation-state. The Internet, as a sociotechnical 
system, serves as an infrastructure for enabling forms of informational power that would not be 
possible otherwise (Braman, 2009). 
Internet governance, which “refers generally to policy and technical coordination issues related 
to the exchange of information over the internet” (DeNardis, 2009, p. 14), is about regulating 20 
 
this sociotechnical infrastructure of informational power. The Internet is not the only element 
of this infrastructure, but in recent years it has become a very influential one. Initially, Internet 
governance referred narrowly to the management of critical Internet resources, i.e. domain 
names and IP addresses, but over time the definition expanded to also include the uses of the 
Internet (DeNardis, 2009; Mueller, 2010). Thus, the debate is not merely about the technical 
functioning of the network, but also about the structures of domination enacted through 
differentiated use of the Internet. Muller (2010) explains that this is an “ongoing set of disputes 
and deliberations over how the Internet is coordinated, managed, and shaped to reflect 
policies” (p.9; emphasis added). Understanding Internet governance is revealing part of the 
puzzle that is information policy and its role in contemporary society. 
2.2. Theorizing the IGF 
Studies of the WSIS/WGIG/IGF
10 process constitute one of the main areas of inquiry in Internet 
governance research (DeNardis, 2010a). Although explicit references to social theory in this 
area are scarce
11, when present, theories of international relations appear as useful apparatus 
for analysis of the politics of the WSIS/WGIG/IGF process. Three schools of thought—realism, 
rational choice institutionalism and constructivism—offer different explanations for the IGF’s 
trajectory, based on various sets of assumptions about the contexts and the actors involved. 
   
                                                        
10 WGIG stands for the Working Group on Internet Governance, which I discuss in detail in Chapter 4. 
11 In Brinberg and McGrath’s (1982, 1985) terms, institutional research in Internet governance is driven primarily 
by the substantive domain, as opposed to being driven by theoretical questions or methodological challenges. This 
tendency can be explained by the young age of this field, where most participating academics are also practicing 
activists. 21 
 
2.2.1. Realism, rational choice institutionalism, and constructivism 
Realism and rational choice institutionalism are both state-centric approaches that explain the 
policymaking processes in terms of the self centered, rational behavior of states, based on their 
material interests and power. Realism focuses on rational states as the main actors in 
international relations. Those actors are primarily concerned with issues of security and 
survival, building on military and economy as their main sources of power. Yet, realism is not a 
single theory. For example, “classical” realists explain the behavior of states in terms of their 
desire to dominate, just like individuals do, so diplomacy is considered as the primary vehicle 
for international relations (Waltz, 1979). “Neorealists” focus on the international system, where 
each state acts to survive on its own. This approach explains why the weaker states tend to 
balance against the stronger instead of cooperating with them (Walt, 1998). The main criticism 
of realism, relevant to the context of this project, is that it asks to predict outcomes by 
assessing the capabilities of the players. Waltz (1979), for example, argued that the material 
capabilities of the states create a global hierarchy, which in turn explains the interests and 
motivation of the states. That logic fails to explain why states negotiate, when there are clear 
discrepancies in power, as in the case of the WSIS
12 (Singh, 2008). 
Rational choice institutionalism is part of what is considered the “new” wave of institutionalism 
in political science. Hall and Taylor (1998) explain rational choice institutionalism as part of a 
paradigm that also includes historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. All of 
these approaches focus on the role of institutions in determining social and political outcomes, 
                                                        
12 I discuss WSIS in detail in Chapter 4. 22 
 
as opposed to the behaviorist approaches, which focus on individuals. Contrary to realism, 
however, institutionalism views the international system as including not only the states, but 
also the nongovernmental and international organizations (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992). It views 
institutions as existing structures that not only constrain the behavior of the actors and their 
interests, but also serve as a domain through which interests are sustained over time
13 
(Keohane, 1984).  
According to Hall and Taylor (1998), there are four distinctive characteristics of rational choice 
institutionalism. First, it is based on a set of behavioral assumptions about human behavior: 
that people have fixed sets of wants, and that they at all times behave instrumentally and 
strategically in the pursuit of those wants. Second, rational choice institutionalism pictures 
politics as a series of collective action dilemmas, which means that while each individual 
pursues his or her personal wants, taken together their actions can produce a collectively 
suboptimal outcome. The “prisoner’s dilemma” and the “tragedy of the commons” are two 
classic examples where actors do not make collectively optimal decisions, because there is 
uncertainty regarding compliance of other participants in the collective. Third, rational choice 
institutionalism emphasizes the role of strategic interaction in political processes and 
outcomes. In other words, the theory postulates that people make utility-maximizing decisions 
on the basis of their expectations about the behaviors of others. In this context, institutions act 
                                                        
13 For example, in development literature, Przeworski and Limongi (1997) explain dependency theory in terms of 
exploitative institutions that were established in developing countries during colonialization, which have slowed 
the socioeconomic development of those places. Those institutions were established to expropriate resources 
from the colonies to the occupying state and they were used as a basis for establishment of governance 
institutions when those states received independence. As a result, the colonial interests are embedded in the 
governance structures of the developing world, to a degree that they hinder their development (for a complete 
debate see: Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001, 2005; Przeworski, 2004; Przeworski & Limongi, 1997). 23 
 
as stabilizing factors that limit the range of possible behaviors of other actors and thus decrease 
uncertainty. Finally, rational choice institutionalism explains the creation of institutions in 
rational terms as well. According to this theory, people form institutions through voluntary 
agreements among the relevant actors, based on an assessment of the potential gain from 
cooperation; if another arrangement has a higher potential of assisting individuals in attaining 
their personal wants, institutions can change or be replaced. 
The main criticism of rational choice institutionalism is aimed at the assumptions presented 
above. Particularly criticized is the view of fixed preference of the actors, which empties 
interactions between the actors from meaning. As Singh (2008) explained. “*i+f interests are 
specified by structure (systemic or issue-wise) and these interests never change, interactions 
cannot explain much beyond a few behavioral possibilities hoisted on top of these interests” 
(p.65). In other words, while the institutional approach helps understanding the process, it does 
not provide an explanation for how preferences that fuel that process form or change. Even 
when other approaches to institutionalism offer concepts such as “soft power”, or the ability to 
persuade and to lead (Nye, 2004), or focus on negotiation (Moravcsik, 2003) the underlying 
interests of the actors are held as constant. This approach fails to explain situations where 
actors take action that has actual repercussions on the final outcome, such as the decision to 
include non-state actors in the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) or the addition 
of the Government Advisory Committee (GAC) to ICANN. 
Constructivism focuses “on the role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, and argument in 
politics, stressing in particular the role of collectively held or “intersubjective” ideas and 24 
 
understandings on social life” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 392). It views human interactions 
motivated not only by material considerations, but also by ideology and shared beliefs that 
construct the basis for purposive action. Constructivism is concerned with how ‘social facts’, 
which are intangible (or social constructed) ‘things’ such as money, sovereignty, and rights, 
change—and how they influence politics (Katzenstein, Keohane, & Krasner, 1998).  
The constructivist approach focuses primarily on the agent with a number of underlying 
assumptions. Finnermore and Sikkink (2001) explained those assumptions: “(a) human 
interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not simply material ones; (b) the most 
important ideational factors are widely shared or “intersubjective” beliefs, which are not 
reducible to individuals; and (c) these shared beliefs construct the interests and identities of 
purposive actors” (p.392-393) (also see Wendt, 1995). In other words, this approach stresses 
that the meaning of physical or political constructs is derived from their perceptions and 
interpretations by the actors. Wendt provided an example of nuclear weapons, which may be 
the ultimate material capability: yet their political meaning is derived from who possesses them 
(e.g. North Korea or UK) and not from the artifact itself. Checkel (1998) claims also that nation-
states and human agents constantly interact, thus mutually constituting each other. In this 
interaction “rule-governed action and logic of appropriateness prevail” (p.236) or in other 
words, norms are at the basis of constructivist analysis.  
Constructivist thinking has been criticized for overemphasizing structures and norms at the 
expense of the agency of the actors (Checkel, 1998). Singh (2008) referred to this as an 
emphasis on the epistemic, as opposed to distributional, influences. “However,” he stated, “as 25 
 
epistemic effect resides in structures, it is unclear if the agents can do much.” This in turn 
empties this approach of any practical applications, as it does not provide guidance as to how 
“to trace agents that carry idea” (p.68). This lack of an empirical mechanism renders 
constructivism a more normative theory, rather than one that supplies testable hypotheses, or 
as Wendt (1999) wrote in his account of this approach: “Readers looking for detailed 
propositions about international system, let alone empirical tests, will be disappointed” (p.6). 
2.2.2. IGF through the lens of international relations 
The boundaries between different schools of thought in international relations can be fuzzy and 
as Walt (1998, p. 30) suggested, “a number of important works do not fit neatly into any of 
them, but debates within and among them have largely defined the discipline”. For example, 
situating his theory of negotiated interest in the international relations discourse, Singh (2008) 
explained that neither realism nor constructivism can explain entirely the role of negotiations in 
the processes of economic globalization, with particular focus on information industries. He 
wrote: 
“Material factors *usually highlighted in realism - DE] can specify actor capabilities but 
do not explain the process that translates these capabilities into outcomes. On the other 
hand, constructivist scholarship explains the world as shared ideas to explain the 
process by which actors ‘construct’ the world. However, beyond insights into alternative 
ways of constructing the world, constructivist scholarship still does not go far enough in 
explaining the process or the outcomes” (pp.63-64). 
Alternatively, the different approaches can be viewed as complementary to each other, when 
their respective strengths and weaknesses are acknowledged. For example, Finnermore and 
Sikkink (2001) wrote: 26 
 
“In a rational choice analysis, agents act rationally to maximize utilities, but the 
substantive specification of actors and utilities lies outside the analysis; it must be 
provided before analysis can begin. In a constructivist analysis, agents and structures are 
mutually constituted in ways that explain why the political world is so and not 
otherwise, but the substantive specification of agents and structures must come from 
some other source. Neither constructivism nor rational choice provides substantive 
explanations or predictions of political behavior until coupled with a more specific 
understanding of who the relevant actors are, what they want, and what the content of 
social structures might be” (p. 393) 
How can, thus, theories of international relations explain the dynamics of IGF as a non-binding 
multistakeholder debate on Internet-related policymaking? Taken separately, each theoretical 
lens falls short of providing a comprehensive explanation, particularly to the tension between 
the two cultures of Internet policymaking—that of nation-states and that of the Internet 
community. Yet, each of the schools of thought presented above can be helpful in explaining 
part of the IGF puzzle.  
The realist approach, for example, can help understand the position of the state actors when 
they first entered the Internet governance debate. If the Internet is viewed as a strategic 
resource in a continuously changing political environment, the rational desire of a state actor 
should be to build up that capacity and have it under its control. Thus, realism can explain the 
shift of the WSIS from discussing a broad set of issues dealing with information technology and 
development, to focusing on Internet governance. This approach resonates with the policy and 
academic discussions about the Internet as a strategic resource and the centrality of cyber-
infrastructure for national security (e.g. A. H. Cordesman & Cordesman, 2002). Furthermore, 
the neorealist approach can explain the formation of blocks of states within the IGF, which 
opposed the US unilateral control over the Internet through ICANN.  Within a paradigm where 27 
 
each state is acting selfishly for its own survival, it is impossible to distinguish between Internet 
governance issues and the global balance of power among the states more broadly. This 
explains the opposition of the block of developing countries within the WSIS/WGIG/IGF process 
to what they perceive as US hegemony. The focus on material capabilities can also explain why 
states other than the US are willing to engage in policy dialogue with non-state actors—the 
latter, particularly the private sector and the technical community, possess substantive material 
Internet-related resources. 
The realist approach, however, does not explain other aspects, such as the US position within 
the Internet governance debate. Singh’s (2008) book raised the question about the concessions 
that the US had to make in the process of WSIS by entering in negotiations with other state- 
and non-state actors, eventually allowing greater flexibility in reforming ICANN. On the face of 
it, as an incumbent and as a superpower, the US did not have to take those steps, as they might 
have been counterproductive to its dominant global status. In other words, all these steps 
cannot be explained with the realist approach alone. More fundamentally, however, the tenets 
of the realist approach do not explain the participation of governments in the IGF. As a non-
binding policy discussion forum, the IGF does not directly affect the material capabilities of the 
states and thus has no effect on their aspirations to dominate. 
The lens of rational choice institutionalism helps explain the historical trajectory of the IGF and 
to a degree answers why states may choose to participate in a non-binding policy discussion 
forum. On the one hand, rational choice institutionalism suggests that the initial institutional 
settings, where states actually did not play a significant role as regulators, proved to be fruitful 28 
 
as they enabled the Internet to flourish and become the dominant social, economic, and 
political factor it is today. Institutional arrangements that enable the global reach and the 
interconnectivity of the Internet offer enough collective value to the participating actors, so no 
single player can unilaterally replace these arrangements. On the other hand, the same 
institutional arrangements (bottom-up, private sector led) caused some actors (both states and 
intergovernmental organizations) to seek alternative institutions in order to adequately address 
their respective interests. The fundamental mistrust between the US and intergovernmental 
organizations such as the ITU, as well as the mutual mistrust between the various country 
blocks and the fundamental differences in policy logics of the nation-states and the Internet 
community, brought about instability in the Internet governance with a threat of fragmentation 
of the Internet itself. In other words, the institutional arrangements prior to the formation of 
the IGF lacked a stable equilibrium.  
Rational choice institutionalism is helpful in explaining why an institutional arrangement such as 
the IGF was formed, but it falls short of explaining the dynamics that underline that 
development. Rational choice alone cannot explain how the disparities in perceptions of utility 
among the stakeholders evolved so that the initial system became unstable or how these 
perceptions changed to enable the IGF. Holding the preferences and the interests of the actors 
fixed and predetermined, limits the ability of rational choice institutionalism to describe 
organizational dynamics, especially young and constantly changing phenomena such as 
multistakeholderism. While rational choice institutionalism helps in understanding the IGF as an 
institution that accommodates the fundamental disagreement between the nation-state-29 
 
focused and the Internet communities, it does not account for the source and for the dynamics 
of the preferences fueling it. 
The constructivist approach offers a more nuanced explanation of the dynamics of preferences 
and perceptions of people participating in the Internet governance debates. By focusing on 
situated practice and local meaning enacted in Internet policy discursive spaces, it goes beyond 
the idea of fixed preferences or purely material considerations, and thus it is better situated to 
explain the tensions that constitute the IGF as a discursive space. Constructivism helps link the 
ideas, norms, and cultures of participants in the Internet policy discourse with the institutional 
arrangements that emerged around it. Its ideological lens rationalizes the existence of a purely 
discourse space such as the IGF, where people actively and consciously engage in the act of 
“construction.” It could be particularly useful in explaining the gap between the two cultures of 
authority and decision making that clashed during the WSIS process and led to the 
establishment of the IGF. Yet, in Internet governance research, constructivism is rarely used as 
a theoretical lens. For example, Mathiason (2009) and Kleinwächter (2008) refer to the sense of 
ownership that both the US government and the technical community had over the governance 
system of the Internet, but the question was never asked in terms of intersubjective ideas.  
In a way, the constructivist approach requires the researcher to focus on individual level social 
interactions in order to explain macro processes of institutionalization. However, relying on the 
constructivist approach alone may be insufficient for explaining the dynamics of the IGF as non-
binding multistakeholder debate on information policymaking. Constructivism tends to 
downplay the importance of material sources of power and material constraints for 30 
 
participation in international policy debates. Moreover, the constructivist approach not only 
dismisses the fruitful explanations offered by realism and rational choice institutionalism, it also 
detaches one’s work from a broader discussion about institutional analysis of Internet 
governance.  
2.2.3. Beyond international relations 
The analysis above suggests that no single school of thought in international relations can 
provide an adequate explanation of the WSIS/WGIG/IGF process, and that a comprehensive 
theoretical explanation may lie in a constructive combination of a number of those approaches 
(for example: Drezner, 2004; Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001). While rational choice institutionalism 
can be a useful lens to think about the purpose and rationale behind the IGF process, it does 
not explain the mechanisms that put the Internet governance debates in motion. The realist 
approach provides us with a theoretical explanation of how considerations of power and the 
pursuit of ‘survival’ interests fuel the behavior of states in the WSIS/WGIG/IGF process, 
however, it does not explain how these interests are defined, how material power is perceived, 
and it does not account for the behavior of the non-state actors. Constructivist thinking helps 
us consider potential answers to the qualitative questions of perceptions and ideologies, and 
better explain multistakeholderism and the value of non-binding policy discussion. Yet, standing 
alone, it may still draw an incomplete and relatively isolated picture that does not account fully 
for material constraints and selfish political interests enacted in the IGF. 
There has been a recent shift in the international relations theoretical thinking whereby, while 
acknowledging the theoretical contributions of realism and liberalism, including that of rational 31 
 
choice institutionalism, scholars are asking to add more reflective elements such as those 
presented in the constructivist school of thought (Keohane, 2002; Walt, 1998). Those shifts are 
fueled primarily by changes in the substantive domain, where observations of political behavior 
have seemed to contradict existing theoretical explanations. The constructivist argument has 
been credited with pushing the international relations thinking in new directions (Keohane, 
2002) and Internet has been recognized as an excellent case to test those (Drezner, 2004; 
Singh, 2008).  
One of the emerging questions from the discussion above concerns the link between individual 
actions and the structural arrangements that were developed around Internet governance. The 
history of the Internet and its governance is woven around names of specific individuals who 
shaped both the substance and the discourse surrounding this medium. One of the most iconic 
names in this regard is John Postel, who single-handedly managed names and numbers in the 
early days of the Internet. At the same time, those individuals often represented or had to 
confront veteran institutional structures such as nation-state governments, the UN system, or 
the private markets. Looking into this tension, between pivotal individuals and the changing 
governance structures, may hold a potentially valuable lesson not just for understanding of the 
WSIS/WGIG/IGF process.  
Current discussion of constructivism in international relations research does not focus on the 
dynamics of this micro-macro link. There are no well established tools to reflexively study the 
relationship between individual action and institutionalization on the one hand, and maintain a 
conversation with other approaches, such as neo-realism or the “new” institutionalism, on the 32 
 
other. This gap requires studying the ‘mechanics’ of the IGF process to complete the macro 
institutional observations of other researchers of the forum. This gap also requires paying 
closer attention to the individuals driving the IGF process, their institutional identities and 
personal views on the Internet and its governance. I suggest drawing on tools and concepts 
developed in interpretive policy analysis, structuration theory, and critical discourse analysis to 
bridge that gap. Interpretative policy analysis approach allows viewing policymaking as a 
discursive constructivist act, which is a product of human activity. The theory of structuration 
offers a conceptual framework to link the practices of policymaking to processes of 
institutionalization of Internet governance in what I label as duality of policymaking. Finally, 
critical discourse analysis offers tools and frameworks for empirical analysis of this duality. 
2.3. Policymaking as discourse 
Law and policy, in any field, are products of human activity. As such, the process of creating 
policy is subjected to historical and temporal macro, meso, and micro level influences, e.g. 
social norms, group dynamics, rhetoric, and cognitive processing. This observation holds true 
for governance in any substantive area; the level of focus will largely depend on one’s 
epistemological framework. Fischer (2003), for example, who draws on many of the same 
theoretical constructs as I do here, emphasizes the role of ideas
14 as a set of organizing beliefs 
that guide the decision-makers’ rationalization process. For Fischer, introducing “ideational 
prisms” into policy analysis allows going beyond materialistic explanation of policymaking and 
                                                        
14 My reading of Fischer (2003) suggests that his use of the word “idea” comes to replace the word “ideology” in 
order to avoid the interpretive baggage that ideology carries as “propaganda and mystification” (p.24). At its core, 
however, his notion of idea is very close to that of ideology as a worldview. 33 
 
to account for its subjectivity. He writes, “*t+he problems that political systems attempt to deal 
with are not seen, in this view, as having altogether objective foundations in the material or 
economic base of society; rather, they are in significant part constructed in the realm of 
political discourse” (p.23). In other words, policies, as products of human activity, are both 
influenced by and influencing the societies they regulate.  
Similar to other members of their societies, policymakers are carriers of values, norms, and 
ideas they have acquired in particular social, cultural, and political settings, and at a specific 
point in history. However, unlike most members of their societies, policymakers belong to an 
elite, whose job is to reflect on, deliberate, and codify the very same values, norms, and ideas 
(Genieys & Smyrl, 2008). For example, DeNardis, arguing for technical standards being a form of 
policy, showed that the engineers, who set most of the basic standards for the Internet, came 
from similar backgrounds and how their libertarian ideas became encoded in the Internet’s 
underlying protocols. Braman (2010), in her recent work, analyzed the documents produced by 
this group of engineers under the auspice of the IETF. She found the engineers getting engaged 
in public policy debates about notions of citizenship, civil liberties, democratic practice, and 
human rights. These debates produced not only normatively loaded technical standards, but 
also public policy discourse.  
Public policy discourse as a constructivist practice is at the heart of this project. The 
“argumentative turn” in policy analysis recognizes the importance of discourse and issue 
definition as a strategic and constitutive processes (Fischer, 2003; Fischer & Forester, 1993; 
Parsons, 1995). Fischer and Forester (1993), in their, now seminal, work, explain why discourse 34 
 
is a fundamental property of policy and should be considered as part of policy analysis. They 
write: 
“…policymaking is a constant discursive struggle over the criteria of social classification, 
the boundaries of problem categories, the intersubjective interpretation of common 
experiences, the conceptual framing of problems, and the definition of ideas that guide 
the ways people create the shared meanings which motivate them to act” (pp. 1-2). 
In this view, policy is about “meaning making“ (Bacchi, 2000, p. 46) , because “decisions always 
mark a choice between different opinions and meanings, decisions transform one argument to 
another through specific operations, they decontextualize and recontextualize items” (Wodak, 
2000, p. 74). 
The overarching theme of this discursive take on policy analysis is that policymaking represents 
a process of intentional construction of social reality and an appropriation of norms (Apthorpe, 
Gasper, & Gasper, 1996; Gasper & Apthorpe, 1996; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994; Throgmorton, 
1991). As such, this approach is particularly attentive to the contexts of policy discourse 
production such as the underlying power structures, framing efforts, and negotiation of 
authority (Bosso, 1994; Yanow, 1999). The stakeholders participating in policy debates bring 
with them social structures that represent their individual perceptions of the topic at hand 
(technology), institutional identities, and national and cultural perspectives, which get worked 
into policy language
15 (Dutton & Peltu, 2009; Phillips & Hardy, 2002). In other words, the 
discursive lens acknowledges the dual nature of the policymaking process—while exercising 
their agency in deliberate creation of norms, the policymakers are constantly enacting social 
                                                        
15 The differences in cultural and national identities are particularly evident in international settings such as the UN 
where those differences are both celebrated and leveraged for political purposes (e.g. Muehlebach, 2001; Rao, 
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structures that limit or enable that agency (for additional discussion see: Chouliaraki & 
Fairclough, 2010; Leitch & Palmer, 2010).  
At the basis of the discursive take on policymaking is the recognition of discourse as social 
practice. It is not just the text itself that matters
16, but how it was created, and the social 
structures enacted in the process and reified through the actions of those who participated in 
the debate (Wodak, 2009). This approach requires taking a long view on formation of policy 
discourse routines over time and calls for a thick description of the institutional settings where 
those routines have formed.  
Critical discourse analysis (CDA), particularly its historical orientation (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009), 
offers both a theoretical approach and a methodological framework to unpack policymaking 
discourse as social practice (Bacchi, 2000). First, it offers rich conceptual insight into the 
workings of discourse as carrier of social structures and power. Second, over the years, critical 
researchers of discourse assembled an arsenal of methodological tools that are helpful in 
studying social structures through the practice of discourse. Wodak, Muntigl, and Weiss (2000), 
for example, used CDA to analyze the European Union debates on employment. They used a 
combination of observations, interviews, and text analysis to reveal tensions between what 
they labeled “supranationalists” and “intergovernmentalists” within the Union and explain how 
conflicts between interest groups and lobbies as well different institutional settings impacted 
                                                        
16 I am relying on Fairclough’s (2003) distinction between language, text, and discourse. Fairclough describes 
language in the most straightforward way as words, sentences, etc. He defines text as any use of language, as well 
as visuals or sound effects. Finally, discourse according to Faircough is a particular view of text “as an element of 
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the emerging language of (un)employement. As a whole, CDA helps to link the structural 
properties of the policymaking environments and the agency of individual policymakers 
through an analysis of the policy discourse as social practice.  
Policy discourse spaces, such as the law making and law deliberating bodies, are designed 
explicitly for the purposes of reifying and challenging social structures through discourse, and 
systematizing them in codified rules. As social institutions, these spaces are expected to be 
publically accountable and adhere to certain principles of representativeness, openness, and 
inclusivity. Yet, policy is also de facto shaped through the actions of the governed, sometime as 
individuals, groups or institutions. In the context of Internet governance, for example, technical 
standards-setting spaces are considered by many as spaces where public policy is being made 
through the development of protocols and standards (Braman, 2010; DeNardis, 2009). 
Similarly, corporate decision-making can be viewed as a space that shapes Internet governance 
through implementation of proprietary standards, terms of service, peering agreements, 
network and security management, etc. (DeNardis, 2010a). Unlike spaces designed explicitly for 
public policy deliberation, standards-setting bodies and the corporate world are not held to the 
same standard in terms of accountability and transparency. While this work focuses on a space 
designed explicitly for public policy deliberation, it is important to keep the broader context of 
Internet-related policymaking in mind. The IGF is primarily discursive space, but it should be 
analyzed in relation to those, external to the forum, developments. 
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A key element of policymaking discourse as social practice is the relationship it encapsulates 
between the agency of the policy-makers and the social structures that both limit and enable 
that agency. This is the duality of the policymaking process. Structuration theory (Giddens, 
1984a) helps conceptualize a link between the agency of individual actors and the social 
structures that the actors, many times unconsciously, are reifying or altering through their 
mundane actions. It offers a language to describe the kind of messy constructs that come under 
the umbrella of information and Internet governance as constitutive processes. It also has 
conceptual links to CDA, which makes it possible to use the latter as a methodological lens for 
unpacking the duality of political decision making imposed on the Internet as a technology that 
itself has politics. 
Two of the core elements of the theory of structuration are structures and systems. Contrary to 
the traditional view of structure as an external factor constraining the agency of individuals 
(constructivism), here the structure is at least partially an internal attribute of the agent, which 
represents possibilities depicted in human practice and in the agents’ memory. Giddens (1984a) 
refers to it as the “structural order of transformative relations”, which exhibits “structural 
properties”, i.e. rules and resources that allow the “binding of time-space in social systems” 
(p.17). He describes structural properties as consisting of rules and procedures of action that 
are deeply rooted in our tacit, practical consciousness, and of resources as power, or the ability 
of the agents to exercise their “transformative capacity” (Kaspersen, 2000, pp. 42–43). 
Structures can be observed primarily through practice, such as adoption of information 
technology in organizations (Orlikowski, 2000). 38 
 
Unlike structures, social systems can be viewed as more explicit manifestations of structural 
relations (Giddens, 1984a). They refer to the actual relations and activities of the agents in 
various contexts, or more specifically: “relations between actors or collectives that are 
organized as regularized social practices and continually produced and reproduced” (Kaspersen, 
2000, p. 45). Thus, we can consider law and policy as examples of social systems, as well as a 
system of public transportation, or any other explicitly organized relationship within a society. 
Social systems can be viewed as formalized or institutionalized versions of the actual or desired 
routines of social practice. This conceptualization, for example, supports DeNardis’s argument 
about technical protocols being a form of public policy insofar as they encapsulate ideas about 
freedom of expression, privacy, etc. 
Interacting with structures and systems are knowledgeable agents, who are purposeful and 
intentional in their actions; and are capable of reflexively monitoring their behavior and 
rationalizing their action (Giddens, 1984a). In the context of policymaking, discursive 
reflexivity—the ability of the agents to reflect on their and others’ behavior and explicitly 
express their knowledge—is particularly interesting. Policymaking is a process of discursive 
reflexivity deliberately aimed at altering the behavior of actors in society. Through discourse, 
the policymakers affect the public, but doing so, they also affect the policymaking process itself. 
Policymaking is a system of making decisions that impact the public; by employing this system, 
the policymakers reify its structural base regardless of the content of each decision. In an 
emerging field of Internet governance, this aspect is particularly salient, as developing policy for 
the Internet also reifies the emerging structures of Internet governance in the process.  39 
 
The different elements of the theory of structuration—primarily structures, agents, and 
systems—are inherently tied together and mutually influential. This leads to the central 
concept in Giddens’s theory – the duality of structure – which suggests that the structure is 
both the medium and the outcome. As such, contrary to the traditional notion of structure, it is 
not a steady, external factor that limits the agency, but a constantly changing component that 
can limit as well as enable agency and is continuously challenged through practice. 
Giddens (1979, 1984a) describes the groups of structures that explain the constitution of 
society. McLennan (1997) summarized them as: 
(1) Structures of signification – They operate through framing or through interpretative 
schemes and also involve the taken-for-granted knowledge, which is assumed to be 
possessed by the ‘competent’ members of the society. These structures are used to 
identify typical acts, situations, and motives in a sustainable interaction. Through this 
interactional skill, which is essentially communicative, agents also recognize the 
intended and unintended meanings of acts. 
(2) Structures of legitimation – They operate through the modality of norms (or rules in 
regulatory sense), which are based on rights and obligations. If frames are used to 
identify acts, norms are used to assess how appropriate those acts are. This in turn 
constitutes the duality of normative structures, because agents have room for 
interpretation of normative structures and each normative assessment has an array of 
behaviors it can evoke. As such, acceptance of norms is based on pragmatic assessment 
of normative and institutional alternatives or, in other words, the agents have room “to 
produce a normative order as an ongoing practical accomplishment” (p. 355).  
(3) Structures of domination (power resources) – This is the third structure used in praxis. 
The social life is produced through frames and norms, as well as through mobilization of 
power resources that allow the agents to secure their interpretation and normative 
claims, in light of potential opposition from others. Such resources would include 
interactional skills “involving high degrees of discursive penetration into the structures 
of signification and legitimation (such as the ability to argue successfully through the use 
of superior rhetorical skills or skills at normatively justifying one’s position), forms of 
technical expertise, the authority accompanying one’s institutional position, and the 
ability to use force” (p. 356).  40 
 
The process of policymaking works through enactment of these three types of structures across 
time and space. At the same time, policymaking is an explicit attempt to systemize a 
relationship between the three structures as applied to a particular domain. This relationship is 
manifested in policy discourse as a form of social practice. For Internet governance, it is not 
only the substantive topics, such as management of Internet names and numbers, that matter, 
but also the way decisions regarding these resources are made and the way the ‘correct’ or the 
‘fair’ way of making these decisions is portrayed. A policy, or a policy arrangement, offers a 
“rhetorical closure” in Pinch and Bijker’s terms, as in “whether the relevant social groups see 
the problem as being solved (Pinch & Bijker, 1987, p. 44).  
However, policy and the process of policymaking are never static. Building of Orlikowski’s 
(2000) argument about duality of technology, policy, as well as the process of policymaking, is 
enacted through practice. As Giddens (1989), explained, “*h+uman actors are not only able to 
monitor their activities and those of others in the regularity of day-to-day conduct; they are 
also able to ‘monitor that monitoring’ in discursive consciousness” (p.29). The policymaking 
process, thus, is an exercise in discursive reflexivity, as it is a conscious attempt to encode 
norms and values in texts, an attempt to reflect, debate, and decide what is normative and 
what is not so it could be made explicit. In this context, policymaking and policy-debating 
spaces are where agency is explicitly exercised and where structures of decision-making are 
crafted (for example see Genieys & Smyrl, 2008 for discussion of the role of elites in 
policymaking).  41 
 
As a discursive space, a forum that is explicitly dedicated to policy deliberation is an 
institutionalized form of these modalities of structuration (Macintosh & Scapens, 1997, p. 362). 
“Actors,” according to Giddens (1989), “draw upon the modalities of structuration in the 
reproduction of systems of interaction, by the same token reconstituting their structural 
properties” (p.28). Figure 1 offers a graphic representation of the duality of structure taken 
from Giddens’s (1989) discussion of forms of institutions. The main point of this 
conceptualization is the interconnectedness between the structures and their practice. A non-
binding policy deliberation forum formally focuses on structures of signification, but those 
“always have to be grasped in connection with domination and legitimation” (p.31). A policy 
discursive space, as primarily a modality of interpretive scheme, exists as a reification of 
structures of domination and legitimation and at the same time it reproduces and reconstructs 
these structures through policy discourse as a social structure. More generally, “*w+hen social 
systems are conceived of primarily from the point of view of the ‘social object’, the emphasis is 
placed on the pervasive influence of a normatively coordinated legitimate order as an overall 
determinant of or ‘programmer’ of social conduct” ( p.30). 42 
 
 
Figure 2 represents a conceptual framework for explaining the relationship between the 
process of policymaking and its outcome.
17 The four types of links in the diagram represent 
influences between policymakers as agents, policy as a social system, and the context of 
policymaking, which includes other social structures where the policymakers operate and the 
policy is being implemented. More specifically, the four types are:  
(a) Policy as an outcome of human activity, such as international policy debates and 
negotiation. 
(b) Policy as a factor that facilitates and constrains policymaking activity through the 
existing structures of signification, legitimation, and domination. 
(c)  Influences of implementation of policy on other social structures. 
(d) Structural conditions of policymaking, such as national and institutional identities, 
perception of technology, organizational settings of the debate, etc. 
Viewing policymaking or, more broadly, governance, through the lens of the structuration 
theory, highlights the role of policy discourse, or the structures of signification, in shaping the 
way we, as a society, come to think about information and communication technologies and 
                                                        
17 For this style of representing this framework I am in debt to the work of Orlikowski (1992). 
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their social role. In this view, policy debates constitute instances of deliberative attempts to 
produce social systems through discursive reflection on competing social structures as those 
are manifested by the various stakeholders. As discussed before. in the case of information and 
communication policy, the social systems in question deal with socially constitutive powers, 
which are central to the processes of challenging and reproducing social structures (for example 
see: Banks & Riley, 1993; Braman, 2009; Leeuwis, 1993). 
 
 
The work of Orlikowski (1992) and others (such as: Borg, 1999; Leeuwis, 1993) helps to see how 
the argument about the duality of the policymaking process, applies to information and 
communication technology policy. Similar to the creation of technology itself, technological 
policy is deliberately and consciously constructed by actors (policymakers) working in a given 
social context. However, the policy is also socially constructed outside of that particular context 
through the different meanings other actors (i.e., the public) attach to the technology and the 
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various interpretations of the technological policy they emphasize and utilize for their daily life. 
In the field of communication technology this process of construction involves both the 
designers who build the technology and the users who utilize it in their daily routines—all of 
them translate policy into practice. Specifically for Internet governance, this speaks to the 
notion that policy deliberation spaces are only one layer of Internet governance decision-
making; decisions pertaining to the governance of the Internet are also made in other settings, 
such as the corporate world or communities of tech-activists. It is also the case that once 
developed and made public, the policy discourse tends to become reified and institutionalized 
(as laws, regulations, standards, programs, etc.), losing its connection with the human agents 
that constructed it or gave it meaning, and it can come to appear part of the objective, 
structural properties of the society.  
The proposed structurational view of policymaking is a step towards a comprehensive, 
conceptual framework of information governance through the regulation of technologies that 
mange its flow. It is not a predictive model in the positivist sense and it is not a critical theory 
that offers a normative judgment, but rather a prism that helps to ask questions about the 
dynamics of the policymaking process itself and the way that process may alter social structures 
pertaining to communication. For example, we can ask: How does policy establish the meanings 
and norms of technology and at the same time reify assumptions about technology? How are 
previously non-normative views made normative in the process of policy deliberation? What 
forces lead to the systematic obfuscation of what may have been considered normative? 
Alternatively, viewing policymaking as a duality allows us to ask questions about the actual 
agency of the policymakers: How do policymakers act as carriers of normative structures across 45 
 
different fora, geographic location, and institutional settings? How often do public policymakers 
actually reflect on and rationalize activities and meanings that have already become 
commonplace, or do they accept and embrace meanings offered to them by private actors? 
What role do the structural properties of the policymaking process itself play, compared to the 
individual attributes of the agents in terms of their interpretation of priorities, opportunities, 
and constraints? Moreover, having conceptualized the duality of policymaking process, we can 
now discuss the role of policy discourse in constitution of social structures. 
The IGF is an interesting space to explore the duality of policymaking. It is an institution 
designed explicitly and exclusively for Internet policy deliberation. Interpretive schemes are the 
key modality enacted in the forum, which draws its legitimacy from a variety of sometimes 
competing normative bases. Yet, as a discursive nexus for Internet-policy debates it attracts a 
variety of actors who, in turn, bring with them a variety of structural elements from other 
organizations, policy settings, cultural environments, and national identities. It is an institution 
in the making, and as such offers a space where one can observe constitution of a governance 
systems and structures ‘in real time.” 
2.5. Critical discourse analysis and the study of duality 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) offers a framework for the study of duality of Internet 
governance as it unfolds in the IGF. In a recent volume Wodak and Meyer (2009a) described 
CDA as having a “constitutive problem-oriented approach” and being interested “in studying 
social phenomena which are necessarily complex and thus require a multidisciplinary and multi-
methodical approach” (p.2). Although the roots of CDA are in linguistics, this approach focuses 46 
 
on large units of analysis (e.g. texts, speech acts, communicative events, etc., as opposed to 
single sentences or words) and on language use occurring naturally (as opposed, for example, 
to the study of invented hypothetical examples). As such, scholars working in the CDA approach 
pay special attention to the social, cultural, situative, and cognitive contexts of language use 
(Fairclough, 1995; Wodak & Meyer, 2009a).  
CDA has an ambitious claim related to the study of structures. One of the basic promises of this 
approach is that through the study of semiotic data it is possible to “de-mystify ideology and 
power” (Wodak & Meyer, 2009a, p. 3). CDA views language as a social practice and pays 
particular attention to the context of language use—the two are viewed as complimentary 
parts of the yin and yang symbol; it is impossible to understand one without studying the other 
and at the same time, studying one will necessarily teach you about other. Fairclough and 
Wodak (1997) offered the following definition of discourse as it implies in CDA: 
CDA sees discourse—language use in speech and writing—as a form of ' social practice'. 
Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a 
particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), 
which frame it: The discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, 
discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned—it constitutes situations, 
objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and 
groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and 
reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. 
Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power. 
Discursive practices may have major ideological effects—that is, they can help produce 
and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women 
and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they 
represent things and position people (p.258).  
There are apparent similarities between what CDA describes as the social practice of discourse 
and what the theory of structuration describes as duality. The dynamics of the two processes 47 
 
are similar, but the difference lies in the components. There is no explicit reference to agency in 
the description of discourse, although it is implied in the notion of practice. At the same time, 
practice of discourse can itself constitute a structure in Giddens’s terms; structures of 
signification for example. CDA also employs a limited view of social structure, one that Giddens 
(1979, 1984a) has criticized for its focus on limiting human agency, while neglecting its enabling 
powers. At the same time, by focusing on discourse as the mechanism of interaction between 
structures and practice, CDA offers a very specific lens on the dynamics of duality.  
CDA, especially its historical arm, has been used for the study of policymaking as a lens on the 
dynamics of reproduction and transformation of the social status quo (Wodak et al., 2000). 
Muntigle (2000) explains: 
(…) emphasis on policy-making implies that in order to understand the workings of a 
polity, it is not sufficient to merely examine policy as an outcome. Of more importance 
is to examine the (organizational) practices involved in how polities come to produce 
policies. These organizational practices involve the use of discursive resources and 
technologies by organizational member to produce and reproduce the organization (p.1; 
emphasis in the original). 
He further clarifies: 
Policies are (…) rhetorical in that they, through they naturalness and completeness, 
achieve a common ground with their addressees. Policies, however, do not solely 
perpetuate control over their subjects. Policies may also enable. They do not act 
deterministically, producing a single set of outcomes (p.2; emphasis in the original) 
One conclusion relevant to this project is that CDA and structuration can be compatible in 
terms of conceptual view of enactment of duality in the context of policymaking, with CDA 
offering a focused perspective on unpacking it.  48 
 
Building on the notion of discourse presented above, scholars of CDA typically take a normative 
stand, with the purpose of changing social practices through their scholarship. Wodak and 
Meyer (2009a) state that the goal of CDA as a critical theory is “to produce and convey critical 
knowledge that enables human beings to emancipate themselves from forms of domination 
through self-reflection” (p.7). In other words, the way CDA scholars enact social change is 
through discursive reflexivity or through making implicit aspects of social life explicit. 
“*R+evealing structures of power and unmasking ideologies” (Wodak & Meyer, 2009a, p. 8) has 
traditionally been the ‘bread and butter’ of the critical theorists. CDA as a school is not different 
in this sense, but the way CDA scholars ask to achieve this goal is by focusing on “the more 
hidden and latent type of everyday beliefs” (Ibid). It is also through the discussion of structure 
that the CDA scholars are able to debate power, which, inspired by Foucault (e.g. 1970), they 
view as a derivative of structures that constitute our daily lives. CDA highlights the substantively 
linguistic and discursive nature of social relations of power in contemporary societies. This is 
partly a matter of how power relations are exercised and negotiated in discourse. It is fruitful to 
look at both ‘power in discourse’ and ‘power over discourse’ in these dynamic terms (Wodak, 
1996). It is by focusing on the mundane and the ‘obvious’ that CDA scholars are able to expose 
social systems (referred to as structures) and social structures (referred to as practice) in the 
very same sense meant in structuration theory. 
In addition to conceptual compatibility, CDA offers a well developed set of methodological tools 
and approaches for the study of discourse, with the focus on practice and its various contexts. 
Since the meaning of discourse is created and interpreted through practice, studying discourse 
implies studying both the text and the ways in which it created and interpreted (Fairclough, 49 
 
2003). As such, CDA calls for a multidisciplinary approach to research, for mixed methods 
research design, and for attention to genres and intertextuality (Wodak, 2008; Wodak & Meyer, 
2009a). It has been used to study institutional history, political discourse, as well as more 
broadly ideology (for discussion of CDA and DA use for specific purposes see the collection of 
essays in Wodak & Krzyzanowski, 2008). More specific to the goals for this project, CDA, 
particularly its historical arm, has been used to study processes of policymaking (Wodak et al., 
2000). 
The theory of structuration has been criticized for its limited empirical applicability for two 
main reasons. First, social researchers are part of the social realities they are asking to analyze 
(an issue that Giddens (1993) himself referred to in length as “double hermeneutics”). Second, 
translating the concept of duality into methodological terms requires abandoning it in favor of 
the dualism of the method (Craib, 1992). To answer this criticism, Giddens highlights the 
reflexive nature of the research practice and offers two methodological brackets, or moments 
where the researcher intercepts the process of structuration in order to analyze its 
components. One way to approach this challenge, or the first methodological bracket, is to 
focus on the institutionalized properties of the systems; the other, or the second bracket, is to 
focus on the strategic conduct of actors to identify their social practices that enact the 
institutionalized properties of systems thus regenerating or altering them (Cohen, 1989).  
CDA offer s a methodological approach that is systematic, but broad and versatile, which should 
be helpful in establishing a methodological bracket. For example, it can be used to study 
ethnographic data collected in a particular field (Abell & Myers, 2008; Oberhuber & 50 
 
Krzyzanowski, 2008), such as Internet policy discussion space, or texts collected across distinct 
substantive domains, various media, and with different methods (Reisigl, 2008; Reisigl & 
Wodak, 2009). In the Internet governance research, however, CDA has so far had a limited 
application. Some scholars, such as Pickard (2007), used critical approaches to discuss the neo-
liberal bias of the debates arising around information governance primarily in the context of 
WSIS.
18 Padovani and Tuzzi (2004) conducted a textual analysis of WSIS output documents to 
explain conceptual gaps between the different stakeholder groups’ visions of information 
society. Yet combining the focus on discourse and a critical perspective are lacking from 
analysis of Internet governance, particularly from analysis of the IGF. 
2.6.Conclusion: IGF as a policy discourse space 
The aim of this project is to explain IGF as a space where politics are imposed on the Internet, 
as a technology that has politics. Approaches from international relations theory while useful, 
provide limited explanation to the trajectory that the IGF process took in the past six years, 
specifically when it comes to the practices of the forum. Focusing on states and organizations, 
realism and rational choice institutionalism offer explanations of the external dynamics of the 
IGF. Based on a valid premise that “any complex sociotechnical system, especially one that 
touches as many people as the Internet, control takes the form of institutions, not commands” 
(Mueller, 2002, p. 11), these approaches explain how the forum can be understood in terms of 
inter-institutional dynamics. The explanations provided by these approaches are lacking insofar 
                                                        
18 Others, who explicitly employed critical discourse analysis procedures, had similar observations when analyzing 
the discourse about information technology and development in settings such as the World Bank and Egyptian 
government policy (Avgerou, 2010; Stahl, 2008; Thompson, 2004a, 2004b). 51 
 
as they do not account for the intra-institution dynamics. The constructivist approach in 
international relations focuses on the internal dynamics of institutions by placing the individual 
actor in the center of the scholarly inquiry. Yet doing so, it neglects the institutional and extra-
institutional settings of one’s behavior. As a result, the analyses of the dynamics of the IGF 
process that rely solely on an international relations theoretical basis run into the traditional 
tension of agency-structure dualism. To bridge this tension, I argue for applicability of the 
structuration theory with an emphasis on the duality of policymaking. 
The IGF is particularly suitable space to study the duality of policymaking. Although it has no 
formal “policy‐making authority or traditional powers such as taxation, judicial recourse, or 
enforcement mechanisms” (DeNardis, 2010a, p. 3), the IGF can be regarded as a nexus of 
practice in the Internet governance discourse (see Figure 3). Oberhuber and Krzyzanowski 
(2008) described the nexus of practice as a social and political locus “where different discursive 
practices meet to create practice-bound networks” (p. 192). For the IGF this means that the 
forum serves as a space where actors from various policy fora, such as ICANN, ITU, national 
governments, civil society, the private sector, etc. engage in discourse production. Observing 
such interactions allows one “to see how the individual agency (..) may influence the 
production of discourse within particular social and political conditions” and  “it furthermore 
allows one to see how the individual experience of social (or political) actors may influence the 
form of such a practice in general, and its constitutive discourses in particular” (Oberhuber & 
Krzyzanowski, 2008, p. 192).  52 
 
The discourse of the IGF, in the broad sense of discourse as a social practice, is the medium 
through which the politics of Internet governance are enacted. Macro institutional analysis 
alone is inadequate to capture the internal dynamics that both challenge and reproduce of 
structures of signification, legitimation, and signification as those are reified in this 
conceptualization of Internet governance and the processes of Internet-policy-related decision 
making. It requires an in-depth analysis of the practices that are emerging in the IGF as the 
forum matures (and as those practices are exported into national and regional settings through 
the participating actors and, more recently, through local IGF events). Unpacking those 
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practices will help us better understand the politics that are imposed on the Internet as well as 
the political significance of the medium itself. 
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3. STUDYING THE IGF: DESIGN, DATA, AND ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 
The decisions about the design of the study, the data collected, and the analytical strategy were 
driven by a pragmatic approach, which suggests that all of the above should be a function of 
the research questions and the context of the study (Patton, 2002; Yardley & Bishop, 2008). 
Neither structuration theory nor critical discourse analysis offer a theoretical apparatus that 
lends itself to testing pre-defined hypotheses. Instead, both theoretical approaches offer a 
framework for asking questions about complex and tacit phenomena. As such, both approaches 
rely primarily on in-depth, qualitative, iterative, and semi-inductive inquiry (e.g. Bryant & Jary, 
1991, 2001; Fairclough, 2003; Orlikowski, 1992; Wodak, 2009; Wodak & Meyer, 2009b; Wodak 
et al., 2000). Similarly, the research that makes up the argumentative turn in policy analysis as 
well as institutional and discursive analyses of Internet governance, all of which deal with hard 
to quantify, messy political issues, all draw primarily on qualitative methods (e.g. Braman, 2010; 
DeNardis, 2009; Fischer & Forester, 1993; Genieys & Smyrl, 2008; Kleinwächter, 2007; Padovani 
& Tuzzi, 2004). In this project I used the case study as an analytical approach that captures 
variability in the observed phenomenon. In the service of this case study I employed 
participatory observations, collected and examined historical documents and transcripts, and 
conducted personal interviews, all of which were inductively analyzed in light of the research 
questions guiding this study.  
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3.1. The case study framework 
I followed the single-case embedded design approach as described by Yin (1994).
19 The 
rationale for analyzing the structuration processes in IGF as a single case is two-fold. On the one 
hand, the IGF serves as a discursive nexus in international Internet-policy debates and is unique 
in terms of its institutional arrangements, compared not only to actual policymaking spaces but 
also other policy deliberation spaces. On the other hand, in the Internet governance discourse, 
the IGF process is many times equated with Internet governance itself, which makes it 
representative of a rather typical way of thinking about this domain. Moreover, the IGF is an 
ongoing process continuously impacted by its historical trajectory; as such, studying the IGF 
requires a longitudinal approach.  
The rationale for conceptualizing my analysis of the IGF as a single-case embedded study
20 is the 
need to pay attention to the sub-units that constitute the IGF as a policy discourse space. 
Specifically, my analysis focused on the IGF secretariat, Multistakeholder Advisory Group 
(MAG), preparatory and annual meetings, dynamic coalitions, and groups of people active in 
the IGF. From an analytical perspective each of these sub-units has a systemic impact on the IGF 
as a whole. It is through the analysis of practices that developed around these sub-units that I 
was able to identify the variety of structures of legitimation and domination. 
                                                        
19 As opposed to multiple-case design, which is based on the logic of replication over multiple independent cases 
where the phenomenon in question occurs, a single case design is applicable when the case is extreme, unique or 
typical for the phenomenon in question; furthermore, single-case design is applicable when the case is revelatory 
of the phenomenon and when the study of the phenomenon can benefit from a longitudinal analysis of the same 
case (Yin, 1994). 
20 According to Yin (1994), whenever we focus on a number of units in a single case, we employ an embedded 
design, as opposed to a holistic design, which refers to examining “the global nature of the program or of an 
organization” (p.42) or in other words, one, generally defined unit.   56 
 
In the process of identifying the boundaries of the case, I observed other fora where Internet 
governance discussions, both binding and non-binding take place. I observed deliberations of 
the World Telecommunication Policy Forum (WTPF) and the World Summit on Information 
Society Forum (WSIS Forum), both organized by the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), and a meeting of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). 
These observations helped contextualizing the IGF processes as a bounded set of practices 
shaped by the developments in these external fora and, in way, shaping them as well. 
3.2. Participatory observations 
I started participatory observations as part of a summer internship in June-August 2008 with a 
small consulting boutique in Washington, DC. My motivation for this work was known to the 
management of the company and they agreed that my work could also be part of my research. 
During this internship I participated in the preparatory processes of the US industry for 
international Internet and telecom policy deliberations in a number of different fora. Although 
the non-disclosure agreement prevents me from using any of the observational or other data 
obtained during the internship in my analysis, this was an important experience in terms of 
entering the field and establishing rapport with some of the key actors in the Internet 
governance debate. This experience was also an opportunity to learn the language of the 
international telecom policy community, which is rich with acronyms, professional jargon, and 
nomenclature. Finally, this experience helped me better understand the institutional and 
individual actors involved in the Internet governance debate, and the relationships between 
them.  57 
 
The decisions to attend particular meetings were guided by the need to engage with IGF in a 
meaningful manner on the one hand, and to develop good understanding of the context in 
which IGF functions on the other. Box 1 lists the meetings I observed as part of this study, 
chosen based on these two principles and subject to logistical constraints (i.e. funding and 
academic schedule). Meetings that are directly related to the global IGF are marked in bold.
 21 
 
The first formal meeting I observed was the WTPF in April 2009, which is a non-binding, policy 
agenda-setting session of the ITU, in preparation to the plenipotentiary conference of the 
Union.
22 Although formally focused on telecom, the meeting had Internet governance as the 
pivotal theme of the debate (see Epstein, 2010 for an analysis of that meeting). For the current 
project, this was a pilot observation, which allowed me to further develop my interview 
protocol and observation practices. The meeting offered an opportunity to observe the formal 
and informal practices of an ITU-hosted meeting; I attended the sessions of the forum and 
participated in social events organized by the host country, as well as by individual participants. 
                                                        
21 Internet Governance Forum – USA is a national, primarily Washington, DC-based, meeting. Although its 
discussions are US-focused, they tend to address global issues, and the outcomes of the meeting are presented at 
the global IGF. 
22 See WTPF website at: http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/wtpf/wtpf2009/about.html. 
  World Telecommunication Policy Forum (April 21-24, 2009; Lisbon, Portugal) 
  Internet Governance Forum (Nov. 15-18, 2009; Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt) 
  World Summit on Information Society Forum (May 10-14, 2010; Geneva, Switzerland) 
  Internet Governance Forum Open Consultations (May 10-11, 2010; Geneva, Switzerland) 
  ICANN meeting 38 (Jun. 20-25, 2010; Brussels, Belgium) 
  Internet Governance Forum – USA (July 21, 2010; Washington, DC) 
  Internet Governance Forum (Sept. 14-17, 2010; Vilnius, Lithuania) 
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Conducting observations in such a meeting is an around-the-clock immersion into the field; I 
made an effort to take notes periodically throughout the day (mostly hand-written notes) and 
especially at the end of each day (typed up syntheses of the notes from the day)—a practice I 
kept for all of the observations I made during this study (J. Lofland & Lofland, 2006). In addition 
to providing rich observational data, this experience has further sharpened my understanding 
of the issues and the language of Internet policymaking. I was able to continue building rapport 
with government and private sector participants, and to conduct my first personal interviews 
(both formal and informal) with a number of participants. 
In November 2009 I attended my first IGF
23 meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt.
24 A day before 
the IGF started, I presented a paper based on my WTPF research in the annual symposium of 
the Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GigaNet), which takes place annually 
before the meeting of the IGF. Many of the GigaNet participants are also academics active in 
the IGF and other Internet governance fora. My presentation was a trigger for a number of 
informal conversations about this dissertation project, and the fact that I presented at the 
symposium helped me later in building rapport with my interviewees. None of my interviewees 
during IGF 2009, however, were present during my talk.  
During the four days of the forum I collected observational data, conducted formal interviews 
with IGF participants, and interacted with them in more informal settings. I attended main 
sessions of the forum, workshops, and a variety of social events organized by the IGF 
                                                        
23 See Chapter 4 for a detailed description of the IGF. 
24 See IGF 2009 website at: http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/2009-igf-sharm-el-sheikh. 59 
 
Secretariat and the host country, as well as other entities taking part in the IGF.
25 The strong 
rapport I established with some of the participants
26 helped me initiate contact with forum 
participants for the purposes of formal and informal interviews. However, as I started 
identifying the nucleus of active IGF participants, continuous rapport building became more 
challenging—the fact that I had numerous conversations with participants from a variety of 
stakeholder groups confused some IGFers, who could not pin me down as belonging to a single 
stakeholder group. I was open about research being the main purpose of my participation and 
overall it worked to my advantage—the interviewees felt less threatened and more open to 
voice critical comments about other stakeholder groups, which normally they might refrain 
from. On a number of occasions I was approached with offers for greater involvement with the 
activities of one group or another; in all those cases I explained that for I prefer not to do that 
for the duration of my research.  
At the same time, not being an insider of either group probably precluded me from access to 
some of the intra-group dynamics, particularly when it came to the business and the 
government sectors (the civil society tend to be more transparent by working through publically 
available mailing lists and open meetings). Most of the academics who attend the IGF are also 
active in the forum, but they do not necessarily treat it as a site for primary data collection the 
way I did. There was an expectation that a researcher studying the IGF would also be actively 
                                                        
25 Social events are an important component of the IGF experience as Kieren McCarthy wittily described in his 
reflections to the first IGF: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/11/08/igf_in_pictures/. 
26 During 2009 I also participated in an online capacity building program ran by the Diplo Foundation. In addition to 
learning another perspective on the history and the substance of the Internet governance debate, this was a 
rapport building activity as well, because Diplo Foundation is very active in a number of Internet governance fora, 
particularly in the IGF. 60 
 
involved in the forum. Being actively involved in the IGF is a rite of passage, so that you and 
your research would be taken seriously by other participants in the IGF. This insight led me to 
submit a workshop proposal for the following IGF in 2010
27, which helped me to build rapport 
with potential interviewees and also exposed me to the aspects of inner workings of the IGF, 
which are not immediately apparent when one only participates in the annual event as a 
spectator. 
In addition, national identity appeared to be very important in the IGF community. Thus, being 
a Russia-born Israeli studying in the US has further complicated my perceived identity by some 
of the forum participants. Similarly to my position in relation to the various stakeholder groups, 
the hybrid national identity worked mostly to my advantage. It made initial contact with some 
of the IGF participants easier, as speaking the same language or being able to relate to one’s 
experiences in Russia, Israel, or the US, was an important ice-breaker.  It also allowed some of 
the participants with whom I interacted, to choose a national identity to relate to, especially 
since Russia and USA symbolize two extremes in terms of nation-states’ attitudes towards 
Internet regulation and more broadly in global politics. Although it was not the most significant 
factor in most of my interaction, in some cases, having no strong association with a single 
nation-state or culture helped my interviewees to be more open and critical.  
                                                        
27 I also volunteered to serve on the program committee of the annual symposium of GigaNet for the following 
year, but I don’t think this had impact on my data collection efforts. 61 
 
In May 2010 I attended two events running in parallel. First, I attended an ITU-organized WSIS 
Forum
28; second, I participated in the IGF Open Consultations
29; both held in Geneva. Attending 
the WSIS Forum provided me with an opportunity to observe a different ITU event, formatted 
after the IGF in terms of nominal practices and procedures. Attending the Open Consultations 
was pivotal to my understanding of the practices of the IGF. As before, I took notes during and 
after my observations, and I conducted another series of formal and informal interviews. Being 
present in Geneva was an opportunity to interview a number of ITU officials, who were unable 
to talk to me otherwise; it also exposed me to actors in the Internet governance field who do 
not take an active role in the IGF process, but prefer the intergovernmental route in 
policymaking. 
In the summer of 2010 I attended an ICANN meeting
30 which, in addition to providing me access 
to another segment of actors in the IGF for interviews, was an opportunity to observe the 
practices of an organization that is more representative, in a way, of the Internet community’s 
normative structures. Comparing notes from my observations of the ITU-hosted meetings with 
observations during the ICANN meeting helped me better situate the practices of the IGF as a 
function of two competing cultures within the Internet governance debate. Later in the summer 
of 2010 I attended the IGF-USA event held in Washington DC.
31 There I observed a translation of 
the IGF practices for the needs of the local organizers. As with other non-main-IGF meetings I 
                                                        
28 See WSIS Forum 2010 website: http://www.itu.int/wsis/implementation/2010/forum/geneva/. 
29 Some additional information is available at: http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/2010-igf-vilnius/the-preparatory-
process. 
30 See ICANN no.38 meeting website: http://brussels38.icann.org/. 
31 See IGF-USA 2010 website: http://www.igf-usa.us/page/2010-igfusa. 62 
 
observed, participating in IGF-USA helped me contextualize my observations of the annual IGF 
event and its preparatory process. During this one day event I was also able to conduct two 
informal interviews. 
In September 2010 I attended my second annual IGF event in Vilnius, Lithuania.
32 My 
participation in this meeting was funded through a fellowship from the Internet Society (ISOC), 
which required me to identify myself as part of the ISOC’s delegation. I did not observe this 
label causing me difficulties during my observations and interviews, but carrying an ISOC-
affiliated name-tag had two implications. On the one hand, it potentially placed me more 
clearly within the “Internet community” stakeholder group in the eyes of some IGF participants. 
On the other hand, being affiliated with a fellowship program known for its selectivity and 
appreciation of Internet-governance-related activism improved my IGF credentials. As with the 
Sharm el-Sheikh event, I again participated in the annual symposium of the GigaNet, thus 
strengthening my identity as a researcher within the IGF. In addition, I led a workshop 
discussing core Internet values and principles of Internet governance
33 and was also invited to 
be part of a panel in a workshop on youth and Internet governance
34.  Actively participating in 
workshops and their organization gave me first-hand, intimate experience with the practices of 
the IGF. This strengthened my presence in the IGF and enabled me conducting additional 
                                                        
32 See IGF 2010 website: http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/2010-igf-vilnius. 
33 Additional information about the workshop is available at: 
http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/component/chronocontact/?chronoformname=WSProposals2010View&wspid=
119; transcript of the workshop is available at: http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/component/content/article/102-
transcripts2010/723-119.  
34 Additional information about the workshop is available at: 
http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/component/chronocontact/?chronoformname=WSProposals2010View&wspid=
69; transcript of the workshop is available at: http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/component/content/article/102-
transcripts2010/719-69.  63 
 
formal and informal interviews with IGF participants. In other words, my active participation 
exposed me to observations that I would not have been able to get exposed to otherwise (J. 
Lofland & Lofland, 2006). 
In sum, my participatory observations covered seven meetings where Internet-related policy 
was discussed, which amount to a total of 24 days or about 300 hours of observations, and 
constituted a pivotal component in data collection for this project. Today, I continue to 
maintain a level of activity within the IGF community through assistance with workshops in the 
annual event and serving on the steering committee of the IGF-USA. This involvement should 
help me conducting future research in this domain. 
3.3. Documents, transcripts, and video recordings 
Attending the meetings and actively participating in them was invaluable for documenting and 
analyzing the practices of the IGF, gaining exposure to the informal aspects of the forum 
dynamics, as well as accessing the interviewees. In addition, this experience allowed me to 
better utilize the documentation of those meetings I was not able to attend in person. I relied 
on available video recordings and live transcripts of the annual meetings prior to 2009 and the 
Open Consultations other than the one that I attended. Table 1 lists all the documents, video 
recordings, and transcripts reviewed during this project; they constitute the entire population 
of publically available documents of the IGF process. All the materials are available through the 
IGF website; some of them were retrieved using the Internet Archive’s “Wayback Machine”
35 to 
                                                        
35 Available at: http://wayback.archive.org/web/. 64 
 
access earlier versions of the IGF website
36. Not every document and transcript is cited in the 
final manuscript, but review of the entire body of materials was essential for the analytical 
process.  
Table 1: Transcripts, video recordings, and documents analyzed for this project 
Meeting  Transcripts  Video  Documents 
OC-2006/02  Entire meeting  None  Preliminary questionnaire 
Responses to questionnaire 
Written contributions 
OC-2006/05  Entire meeting  None  Comments on the establishment of 
MAG 
Comments on agenda 
Written contributions 
IGF-2006/10  Main sessions 
only 
None  Secretariat’s summary 
Synthesis of contributions 
Written contributions 
OC-2007/02  Entire meeting  Entire meeting  Written contributions 
OC-2007/05  Entire meeting  None  Written contributions 
OC-2007/09  Entire meeting  Entire meeting  Written contributions 
MAG-2007/09  None  None  Summary report 
Draft IGF agenda 
IGF-2007/11  Main sessions 
only 
None  Secretariat’s summary 
Written contributions 
Event reports 
OC-2008/02  Entire meeting  Entire meeting  Written contributions 
Synthesis of contributions 
MAG-2008/02  None  None  Summary report 
OC-2008/05  Entire meeting  Entire meeting  Draft Agenda and revised Program 
Paper 
MAG-2008/05  None  None  Summary report 
OC-2008/09  Entire meeting  Entire meeting  Written Contributions 
Final program 
MAG-2008/09  None  None  Summary report 
IGF-2008/12  Main sessions 
only 
None  Synthesis of contributions 
Chairman’s summary 
Event reports 
                                                        
36 The IGF website does not use a systematic organization of information. In fact, the information has been piling 
up since the beginning of the forum and material related to each annual event and its preparatory process are 
organized differently each year. Also, as one can observe in Table 1, over time, the IGF processes became more 
transparent and better documented. I discuss these processes in greater depth in Chapter 4.  65 
 
Meeting  Transcripts  Video  Documents 
OC-2009/02  Entire meeting  Entire meeting  Written Contributions 
Synthesis of contributions 
MAG-2009/02  None  None  Summary report 
OC-2009/05  Entire meeting  Entire meeting  None 
MAG-2009/05  None  None  Summary report 
OC-2009/09  Entire meeting  Audio only  None 
IGF-2009/11  Main sessions 
only 
Entire meeting  Written contributions 
Synthesis of contributions 
Background paper 
Chairman’s summary 
Event reports 
OC-2010/02  Entire meeting  Entire meeting  None 
MAG-2010/05  None  None  Summary report 
OC-2010/06  Entire meeting  Entire meeting  None 
IGF-2010/09  Entire meeting  Entire meeting  Program paper 
Background paper 
Chairman’s summary 
Report on discussion about 
continuation of the IGF mandate 
Event reports 
OC-2010/11  Entire meeting  Entire meeting  None 
MAG-2010/11  Entire meeting  Entire meeting  Summary report 
Questionnaire 
OC-2011/02  Entire meeting  Entire meeting  Draft program paper 
Synthesis of contributions 
MAG-2011/02  Entire meeting  Partial  Summary report 
The combination of participatory observations with document analysis allowed me to use each 
to contextualize the other—on the one hand, having observed the meetings in person, I was 
able to better interpret the video recordings and the transcripts of other meetings; on the other 
hand, having read the input documents and reviewed previous meetings, I was able to 
understand better the events I observed during meetings I attended in person. The verbatim 66 
 
transcripts provided by the secretariat are mostly unedited
37 and not all the speakers are clearly 
identified. Thus, I had to review the transcripts together with the available video recordings, in 
order to establish who exactly spoke on behalf of each entity; spending time in the field and 
getting familiar with the active participants in the IGF was invaluable for that purpose as well. 
Since 2008, the IGF secretariat has been also releasing proceedings of the forum. The first book, 
presented at the at the annual IGF event in Hyderabad, summarized the first two annual IGF 
events (Doria & Kleinwächter, 2008). The book included brief essays from the UN Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), ITU, UNESCO, the IGF secretariat, and the host 
governments’ officials; a series of short essays from representatives of the different 
stakeholder groups; basic statistics about participation in the IGF events in Athens and in Rio de 
Janeiro; and edited verbatim transcripts of the main sessions of the two events. The second 
book was presented in Sharm el-Sheikh (MacLean, 2009) and included primarily the verbatim 
transcripts of the main sessions and summaries of all the workshops. The third book was 
presented during the annual event in Vilnius (Drake, 2010). It followed closely the format of the 
first volume, with fewer endorsements from the government and UN officials. These books 
serve as the official record of the IGF.  
Over the course of the study, I collected the transcripts and the video recordings in a 
chronological order for later analysis (see section 3.5 below); I used the proceedings of the IGF 
primarily to historically contextualize my analysis. 
                                                        
37 The transcripts of the main sessions of the annual event do undergo some editing process, but the transcripts of 
the Open Consultations are not edited at all. Transcripts of the workshops during the annual IGF event are 
sporadically edited by the workshop organizers, but largely remain in their raw form. 67 
 
3.4. Interviews 
Interviews were an important component of data collection for this research. Over the course 
of the study I conducted 26 formal and 12 informal interviews. The formal interviews were 
scheduled in advance, took place in a secluded and quiet place and each lasted for about an 
hour, during which I had the undivided attention of the interviewee. These interviews were 
recorded and later transcribed. Informal interviews happened mostly during social events or as 
corridor conversations triggered by attending a panel or an introduction by another participant; 
alternatively, informal interviews happened when a potential interviewee asked to talk off-
record. For emergent interviews, I would emphasize that my questions are related to my 
research and I would always obtain the interviewee’s consent. Informal interviews were not 
recorded, but I took notes based on them as soon as possible after the encounter. 
 I started by employing a reputational snowball sampling in order to identify the key IGF actors 
(Farquharson, 2005). I asked each interviewee to list 5 people whom they considered the most 
authoritative and pivotal individuals within the IGF. Unexpectedly, this proved to be a harder 
task for my interviewees than I anticipated and the resulting pool of potential interviewees was 
relatively small. Starting from the ICANN meeting in 2010, I also relied on my observations in 
order to “obtain instances of all the important dissimilar forms in the larger population” (R. S. 
Weiss, 1994, p. 23) or to maximize the variation of the stakeholder groups I interacted with 
and, to a lesser degree, the levels of activity of the interviewed participants (e.g.: Fairclough, 
2003; Huberman & Miles, 2002; Marshall & Rossman, 2006; Patton, 2002; R. S. Weiss, 1994). 68 
 
Among my interviewees, ten came from the technical community, eight from the business 
sector, eight from the civil society, five from the government, four from intergovernmental 
organizations, two from academia, and one from the IGF secretariat. Most of the interviewees 
played an active role in the IGF and could be considered members of the IGF nucleus. Yet I 
made an explicit effort to interview a number of participants whom I perceived as not 
belonging to the nucleus, and who did not come up in the reputation snowball sampling. 
Moreover, by participating in meetings other than IGF, I was able to interview a number of 
people who were critical of the forum, including one interviewee who had participated actively 
in the early days of IGF but then scaled down his own participation and that of his institution. In 
the interview process I reached saturation in terms of the variety of opinions about the IGF. 
Three people whom I approached with a request for an interview refused to participate. One of 
these people explained that as a general policy her agency does not allow staff participating in 
academic research; the other two did not want to participate in the study formally, but offered 
an informal conversation instead. 
All formal interviews but two were conducted face to face during the meetings; two interviews 
were conducted later over Skype. On average, interviews lasted about an hour, and typically 
throughout the meetings the interviewees would approach me to share information they 
recalled after our session or to introduce me to one of the people they had suggested I should 
interview next. All the interviews were conducted in English. Unlike some other UN fora, English 
is clearly the dominant language in the IGF. In one case, however, this posed a difficulty, when I 
interviewed a French-speaking person. This interview took longer and required more exchange 
for each question and more rephrasing and restating of both my questions and the 69 
 
interviewee’s answers. The interviews followed a semi structured protocol based on prompts 
aimed to elicit rich information about the practices and the dynamic tensions of the IGF 
(APPENDIX A). The interviews were recorded using a digital recorder (or Call Graph software
38 if 
the interview was conducted via Skype) and later transcribed with the help of undergraduate 
research assistants at Cornell. 
I used an IRB approved procedure to obtain consent of the interviewees. In most cases they 
opted for verbal consent, but some preferred to have it in a written from (APPENDIX B). 
Although anonymity was not promised to the interviewees, I decided not to use their names 
other than in places where it is absolutely necessary.  
3.5. Data analysis 
In my data analysis I relied on my field notes, transcripts of the main sessions of the annual IGF 
events, transcripts of the open consultations, and interview transcripts. Phillips and Hardy 
(2002) explain that there is no single recipe for data analysis in discourse analysis studies. 
Instead, they argue, “researchers need to develop an approach that makes sense in light of 
their study and to establish a set of arguments to justify the particular approach they adopt” (p. 
74). In discourse analysis, social linguists and critical linguists focus on the text and have a set of 
procedures focused on individual parts of speech and phrases, but critical discourse analysis 
focuses on the critical assessment of the context in which discourse happens (p.19-29). Viewing 
                                                        
38 See: http://scribie.com/free-skype-recorder. 70 
 
discourse as social practice, critical discourse analysis lends itself to ethnographic work and 
inductive approaches to data analysis (Oberhuber & Krzyzanowski, 2008). 
Focused on the context and practice of discourse production in the IGF, this project is 
dominated by ethnographic research. In other words, my data analysis started from the day I 
entered the field in the summer of 2008 and continued in an iterative fashion until the summer 
of 2011. I continuously worked with my field notes and analyzed transcripts and documents to 
reflect on my conduct in the field and to revise the emphases in my observations and interviews 
(Abell & Myers, 2008; Oberhuber & Krzyzanowski, 2008). In working with the data, I drew on 
the practices of critical discourse analysis and the constant comparative method, borrowed 
from the grounded theory approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This strategy implies iterative, 
inductive reading of the documents, transcripts, and field notes in order to identify emerging, 
mutually reinforcing patterns that demonstrate the structural elements of the IGF. I utilized 
Atlas.ti to implement this strategy across the large body of documents and transcripts (di 
Gregorio & Davidson, 2008). The first pass included open coding of the interview and Open 
Consultations transcripts to develop categories of information in light of my theoretical lens of 
the duality of policymaking. Next, I applied axial coding whereby I reviewed links between the 
categories in the context of my field notes from participatory observations. Finally, I applied 
selective coding as part of constructing the narrative presented in this manuscript. 
I also turned to quantitative techniques to identify simple patterns in the meetings transcripts. 
Fairclough (2003) noted that essentially quantitative approaches can be useful at initial stages 
of discourse analysis, but more on the technical level. I used a Perl script to count the number 71 
 
of interventions made by each participant in a single meeting as well as the volume of each 
participant’s interventions in each meeting, measured as the number of words. The rationale 
behind applying this quantitative lens is to map the levels of activity of the various actors. In a 
setting where meetings are limited by time and other resources, such as captioning or 
interpretation, participation is a zero sum game—if a single participant is taking the floor more 
often or speaks for longer periods of time, he or she is necessarily taking away from other 
people’s opportunities to participate. In other words, those who take the floor more often or 
speak more during their intervention are dominating the discussion. In this analysis, I focused 
on what I viewed as “substantive” contributions, meaning interventions about the subject 
matter as opposed to coordinating exchanges focused on the immediate logistics (such as 
malfunctioning microphones or minor clarifications such the number of the workshop discussed 
at the moment). To eliminate the noise, only interventions longer than 15 words were counted 
towards one’s participation. Preliminary analysis of a sample of transcripts showed that the vast 
majority of coordinating interventions fell below the 20 words limit, while substantive 
contributions were longer than that. 
Taken together, prolonged participatory observations, formal and informal interviews, and 
review of extensive set of documents allowed me to draw and interpret a complex picture of 
the IGF practices. Using the case study analytical approach helped me to capture the variability 
of IGF practices across different types of meetings (e.g. Open Consultations, annual IGF), within 
each meeting (e.g. workshops, main sessions), as well as to contextualize IGF practices in 
comparison to other Internet governance meetings. Relying on multiple methods of data 
collection I was able to compare, contrast, and question my own interpretation of the data. The 72 
 
inductive approach to data analysis was well suited for the goals of this study and for the 
research questions in hand. 73 
 
4. THE HISTORY OF THE INTERNET GOVERNANCE FORUM 
In his analysis of the IGF Mueller (2010) describes it as a space shaped by three kinds of politics: 
the politics of agenda setting (what should be talked about and who should speak), the politics 
of representation (stakeholder groups pushing to maximize their presence in the decision-
making bodies of the IGF), and the politics of principles (or the outcome of the other two 
political struggles in terms of a dominant set of norms and values within the IGF). This typology 
is particularly useful for viewing the IGF as a policy-discourse space where the political struggle 
focuses on shaping the discourse (the politics of participation and agenda setting) that 
embodies a particular set of power structures in relation to the question of Internet governance 
(the politics of principles). Unpacking these politics, using the concepts of structuration and the 
tools of critical discourse analysis, is at the heart of this project. 
Understanding the IGF as shaped by and as shaping these three kinds of politics described by 
Mueller (2010) requires historical context. These forces and their particular shapes are a result 
of a lengthy and highly politicized process that brought together two very different cultures of 
authority and decision-making—that of the nation-state-oriented UN system and that of the 
Internet community. As an institution, the IGF carries markers of this political process and any 
analysis of its discursive practices should take its historical context into account (Reisigl & 
Wodak, 2009).  
The purpose of this chapter is to review the historical trajectory that led to the establishment of 
the IGF and the dowry that this process left for the forum to carry on, in the form of unresolved 74 
 
tensions between different stakeholder groups. It starts with a discussion of WSIS as a process 
that established the IGF. The WSIS was not only a stage where tensions between the traditional 
and Internet community approaches to policymaking played out; it was also an outlet for 
political tensions within the UN system and among the member states. This review tracks the 
internal tensions and exogenous influences that impacted the two phases of the WSIS and the 
practices that developed over the course of the summit. It pays special attention to the 
Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), which developed the general formal 
framework for the IGF and played a pivotal role in establishing practices that later shaped the 
way the IGF conducts itself. 
4.1. First, there was change… 
The growth of the Internet and realization of its cultural, social, political, and economic roles 
altered the international balance of power around the governance of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs). There were three trends underlying this change: the 
growing prominence of non-state actors such as the private sector and the technical 
community in the de-facto governance of ICTs, global connectivity of the Internet that 
challenged the territorial sovereignty of the states in governance of the ICTs, and the 
dominance of the US in potential control over the technical hierarchy of the Internet (Braman, 
2009; DeNardis, 2010b; Dutton & Peltu, 2007; Kleinwächter, 2008; Mathiason, 2009; Mueller, 
1999, 2002, 2007, 2010; Shahin, 2007).  
The WSIS emerged as a response to those trends. It represented a clash of two models of global 
governance: a traditional model based on agreements between states and non-traditional one, 75 
 
based on private contracts between non-state actors. The first model was based on principles 
of territoriality, while the second was inherently transnational, but dependent on the de facto 
control of the US over the technical aspects of the implementation of the private agreements 
(Mueller, 2010); the first model was based on traditional, state-focused decision-making 
mechanisms, while the second was a relatively new set of informal practices of decision-making 
that evolved in the technical community that engineered the Internet (Uimonen, 2003). 
Summits like the WSIS are a tool occasionally deployed by the UN to address global and broadly 
defined issues. Death (2011) explains that such summits play “symbolic, performative and 
theatrical roles (…) in persuading global audiences that political elites are serious about issues 
such as sustainable development or climate change” and they have “a number of political 
implications, including the reinforcement of dominant hierarchical, state-centric, elitist and 
rationalist models of politics, as well as for shifting relationships between the rulers and the 
ruled” (.2). In the context of challenges posed by the Internet and its evolving institutions to the 
traditional policymaking mechanisms, the WSIS was supposed to serve a similar role. It was 
initiated by a UN specialized agency—the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)—and it 
served a number of overlapping interests of those who supported the traditional, state-centric 
model of global governance. 
Mathiason (2009) explains that the WSIS emerged as part of the process of the ITU trying to re-
discover its identity and re-establish its role in the new and rapidly changing telecommunication 76 
 
environment.
39  On the one hand, this process was fueled by a foresight of the ITU leadership 
about a threat stemming from the new institutions of Internet governance to its bureaucracy, 
even though up to that point the ITU was involved in Internet-related issues only on the 
margins, primarily through the Union’s work on standards. On the other hand were the 
member states, the primary driving force behind the ITU and its Counsel, who considered the 
Union as a suitable vehicle for ensuring their decisive role in the emerging ‘multistakeholder’ 
environment of Internet governance (Mathiason, 2009).  
In forming the WSIS the ITU had to react not only to developments taking place externally to 
the UN and threatening the authority of the Union
40, but also to pressures from within the UN 
system and even from within the Union itself. In the process leading up to the summit, the ITU 
faced three main challenges. First, it had to consider internal UN politics and account for the 
interests of other UN agencies, which claimed some jurisdiction over information and 
communication technology (ICT)
41 “business,” particularly in the areas of development and 
                                                        
39 The ITU has a history of dealing with changes in technological and institutional environments through 
reinventing itself as an organization. George Codding dedicated a significant part of his career following the 
evolution of the ITU (1991a; 1982), and changes in its structure (1991b; 1991) and in its governing bodies (1983). In 
other words, addressing external threats to its authority and legitimacy, or the sphere of its political influence, is 
not new to the ITU. Over its long history the Union has demonstrated a notable ability to adapt to the ever-
changing techno-political realities (Codding, 1995).  
40 The principle decision to hold the WSIS was made during the Plenipotentiary Conference of the ITU in October-
November 1998, just about a month after the incorporation of the Internet Corporation for Assignment Names 
and Numbers (ICANN)—an organization the authority of which many of the proponents of the summit, including 
the ITU, wanted to challenge. 
41 I decided to use the term ICT, for Information and Communication Technology, throughout this manuscript, but 
this was not an automatic choice. Part of the complexity that constituted Internet governance as a political issue 
was extension of the debate beyond the questions of telecommunication infrastructure into the realm of norms, 
rights, and the meaning of information transferred via communication networks (Mueller, 2010). Boczkowski and 
Lievrouw (2007) coined the term media and information technology (MIT) to reflect the changing nature of ICTs 
with a particular emphasis on centrality of the content (as opposed to technical components) in the mediated 
communication processes. I see this as an important distinction, particularly relevant to the Internet governance 
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bridging the digital divide. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), for example, emerged as an important contender for authority over some of the 
public policy issues surrounding the Internet, such as access to knowledge, content, and 
linguistic diversity.
42 The second challenge of the ITU was the growing involvement of non-state 
actors in relevant UN activities. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), for example, has 
experimented with participation of the civil society in its discussions, since the early 1990s, 
albeit primarily in a consultative capacity.
43 This practice was particularly relevant for the WSIS 
in light of the ITU’s third challenge—it had to consider shifts in power among the Union’s own 
membership, where the prominence of corporate members, vis-a-vis the state actors, 
constantly grew, primarily due to privatization of previously government-owned telecom 
companies worldwide (Kleinwächter, 2008; Mathiason, 2009).  
The ITU succeeded in creating the WSIS, but it had only partial success in addressing the 
internal challenges and asserting the leadership role it desired. Resolution 56/183, adopted by 
the General Assembly in December 2001
44, placed the summit under the patronage of the UN 
Secretary General; the ITU was granted primarily an organizational role, without the decision-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
debates. Yet, most of the academic and professional discourses in the field use the traditional term—ICT. 
Originally, I planned on using the term media, information, and communication technologies (MICT) as an umbrella 
term trying to encompass both the technical and the content aspects, but I opted out to the use of ICT in order to 
maintain focus. I would like to use this opportunity to highlight that I am using this term in its broad, MICT, 
meaning and not in the narrow sense of reference to telecommunication infrastructure. 
42 UNESCO has a rich history of hosting debates about media, communication, and globalization. It is most famous 
for hosting the New World Information and Communication Order debates, which tackled the question of cultural 
imperialism, and the Mac Bride report, which led to the US and UK withdrawal from UNESCO on the grounds that 
the report endangered free speech (Mansell & Nordenstreng, 2007; Padovani & Nordenstreng, 2005). 
43 Kleinwächter (2008) refers to the “Earth Summit” in 1992, which addressed environmental issues, as the starting 
point of non-stat actor participation in the UN debates. 
44 The resolution can be found at: http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/resolutions/56_183_unga_2002.pdf  78 
 
making authority it desired. Kleinwächter (2008) explains that the final agenda of WSIS turned 
out to be broader than the initial proposal to discuss the digital divide. The broad approach 
“went beyond the mandate, competence, and expertise of the ITU” (p.545). In addition, the 
resolution acknowledged the multi-stakeholder fashion of the envisioned Summit as well as 
openness of the consultations to include actors other than the nation-states. Kleinwächter 
(2008) explains this as a UN response to parallel initiatives that were undertaken at the time by 
the OECD and G7, which opened their doors to participation of both the private sector and the 
civil society in discussions of information policy.
45 
Resolution 56/183 endorsed the Summit to be conducted in two phases in Geneva (2003) and 
in Tunis (2005)—a decision atypical for UN summits of this nature, but reflective of some of the 
internal tensions that had emerged around the Internet between the global North and the 
global South. On the face of it, the WSIS was given a mandate to discuss the potential links 
between the diffusion of ICTs and socioeconomic development. However, the debate quickly 
turned to addressing issues of Internet governance (Mathiason, 2009). As such, the first phase 
of the WSIS focused primarily on delineating the substantive domain to be addressed during 
the summit and on working out discursive settings that could accommodate participation of 
both state and non-state actors. This phase also produced a particular social configuration with 
                                                        
45 Kleinwächter (2008, p. 544) writes:  
The debate on the relationship between state and non state actors in the information age was broadened 
when an OECD ministerial conference in Bonn in 1997 invited not only governments and industry leaders 
but also representatives of users and consumers. (…) This new “trilateralism” was reﬂected later when the 
G7 launched in 2000 the Digital Opportunity Task Force (DOTForce) which got a mandate to turn the 
digital divide into digital opportunities and was constituted by a membership representing governments, 
the private sector, and civil society. 79 
 
individual leaders, interest groups, and power hubs that had a profound impact on the WSIS 
discourse and practices.  
This phase resulted in the establishment of the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), 
which was a surprisingly successful experiment in collaboration between the state and the non-
state actors, who drafted a consensual text through a rather open and transparent process. 
Tasked with defining Internet governance and suggesting potential models of governance, the 
proscriptive power of the WGIG was not as much in its document as it was in the practices 
developed in the process of writing it.  
The second phase of the WSIS was a scene for political drama where the advocates of the 
different worldviews on Internet governance clashed. The disagreements were so fierce that 
the only recommendation of the WGIG report that survived was that of establishing a non-
binding Internet Governance Forum (IGF) to continue deliberations started during the WSIS. In 
a way the WSIS passed on to the IGF all the unresolved tensions surrounding Internet 
governance; but it also passed on a genesis of new structures of legitimation and domination, 
which are pivotal to the discussion of political significance of the forum. 
4.2. The clash of two cultures 
Traditionally, international intergovernmental organizations have been reluctant to allow 
participation of non-state actors; the most they typically agree to is participation of non-state 
actors in a limited, consultative capacity. Mathiason (2009, p. 103) explains this reluctance as 
the governments’ concern that some of those actors may be hostile to them. Yet, in the case of 80 
 
WSIS intergovernmental bodies had limited choice, because governments were the latecomers 
in the Internet arena (Shahin, 2007).
46 By the time the ITU had identified Internet governance 
as a strategically important area, the debate was already in fairly advanced stages and the non-
state actors already played a pivotal role in it (Mueller, 1999).
47 Taken together, the historical 
reluctance to include non-state actors in the UN deliberations and the necessity to reckon with 
already existing, non-governmental institutions of Internet governance, explain why the 
primary focus of the preparatory debates for the first phase of WSIS was on the rules of 
participation for the non-state actors (Kleinwächter, 2008).  
To accommodate the voices of the non-state participants, the Bureau of the Summit held an 
informal intersession and made special arrangements during the preparatory process. Such 
amendments were possible only after a number of clashes between the private sector and the 
civil society representatives with the government delegations which were slow to adjust to the 
new arrangements (see Kleinwächter, 2008, pp. 548–551 for a specific example). The fact that 
                                                        
46 Markus Kummer (2005) voiced a similar sentiment, albeit in a more diplomatic voice, in his explanation of the 
emergence of the multistakeholder approach in relation to Internet governance: 
In the context of discussions on global governance, Governments have been confronted with other 
stakeholders requesting to be allowed to participate in decision-making arrangements. The debate on 
Internet governance, however, followed a different pattern. Here, Governments wanted to obtain a say in 
the running of the Internet, which has developed outside a classical intergovernmental framework (p.1). 
47 Singh (2008) explains the accommodation of non-state actors as a function of the incumbency status of the US, 
which “gives countries, companies or groups, which already benefit from rules designed to maintain their market 
share, an enhanced ability to set agendas or choose to exit negotiations” (p.234). As such, the US was in a position 
to lay the foundations of Internet governance according to philosophies of deregulation, private sector leadership, 
and self-regulation (Mueller, 2010 makes a similar argument). Singh goes as far as accrediting the foundational 
principles of Internet governance to the personal philosophy of Jon Postel and a community of technical people he 
was a part of and who built IANA around three principles: “consensus, private sector involvement, and 
interoperability” and “always looked to the Internet community as a whole, even when the Internet was primarily 
a government project” (p.235). In other words, by the time the UN “family” and the rest of the international 
community joined the debate, there was a set of rules, procedures, and institutions of Internet governance already 
in place, and the latecomers had to pick up the discussion from that advanced point. 81 
 
the summit was a UN meeting imposed additional difficulties for bridging the ideological 
divides. Although by the time the WSIS preparations took place, there was a growing tendency 
for civil society participation in UN meetings, there was no agreement on the extent to which 
non-state actors could participate in negotiations, which was considered a prerogative of the 
sovereign states. The strategy employed by numerous NGOs at the time was influencing their 
country delegations to support their positions or to place active people on their country 
delegations. However, during the third PrepCom an even more liberal model of NGO 
participation in WSIS was adopted. The non-state actors were not only invited to the plenary as 
observers, but were also invited to make brief interventions (Mathiason, 2009).  
However, not only the government delegations had to adjust. To make their voice heard and 
taken seriously in the WSIS, the non-state actors, particularly the civil society, had to go 
through a rapid process of institutionalization.
48 The structures that emerged were reflective of 
the decision-making cultures and perceptions of authority characteristic to each stakeholder 
group: some of them were reflective of the bottom-up and inclusive approaches of the Internet 
community, while others were reflective of the top-down and selective practices of the 
intergovernmental settings. Yet all these structures were forced to co-exist in a single discursive 
space, thus shaping and being shaped by this interaction. 
                                                        
48 For example, during PrepComm 2, hundreds of civil society delegates had to figure ways to get organized and 
produce interventions and contributions according to the UN meetings protocol. This resulted in establishing of 
structures such as the WSIS Civil Society Content and Themes Group, which was responsible for coordinating 
content-related issues, the Civil Society Plenary, which was the de facto civil society authority in the WSIS settings, 
and WSIS Civil Society Bureau, which was coordinating the procedural issues (Kleinwächter, 2008; Mueller, 2010). 
While the first two bodies have evolved in a ‘bottom-up’ fashion out of the practice of the civil society organization 
within the WSIS setting, the last one was a ‘top-down’ structure created by the UN bureaucracy (Mueller, 2010). 82 
 
In terms of substance, during the preparatory stages the outlines of the conflict around Internet 
governance started to emerge with a particular focus on the management of critical resources 
(e.g. the root server system). On the one hand, the governments (with a notable exception of 
the US) demonstrated an apparent consensus about a need for an intergovernmental 
organization to manage the root server system, domain names, and the Internet Protocol 
address assignment. On the other hand, the civil society and the private sector could not reach 
a consensus, though numerous actors (e.g. ISOC) voiced their support of the ICANN regime or 
advocated for variations of thereof, but not for an intergovernmental organization taking over 
the management of critical resources. To a degree, at this stage, the civil society took on a 
blocking role, guarding the private sector from government intervention (Mathiason, 2009). 
This division demarcated what I view as the main tension of the WSIS and later the IGF 
debates—the tension between two cultures of Internet policymaking. The intergovernmental 
solution symbolized a centralized, state-centered, exclusive antithesis to the ethos of 
distributed, meritocratic, and open policymaking mechanisms of the Internet community. 
In addition to debates about participation of the non-state actors and discussions of the 
substance of the WSIS, another important process evolved during the preparatory process—
institutional and personal hubs started to form within the WSIS community. Mueller (2010) 
presents a number of social network analyses, two of which are particularly relevant in the 
context of this discussion. In the first analysis, Mueller mapped organizations of the civil society 
as nodes and actors as links, which allowed him to identify the Association of Progressive 
Communication (APC) as a hub of the civil society transnational advocacy network (p.91-94). In 
another analysis, Mueller mapped individuals in terms of their centrality and their function as 83 
 
an intermediary in the civil society network; this analysis allowed him to identify Karen Banks of 
APC as the single most central and most influential individual in terms of mediating the flow of 
information (p.93-95; for a more detailed report on these data also see Mueller, Kuerbis, & 
Page, 2007).
49 These findings, particularly the second analysis, illustrate the genesis of the WSIS 
core—a collective of idea entrepreneurs who became passionate and committed to the WSIS, 
and later the IGF. 
When the first phase of the Summit actually took place, there was already a clearly emerging 
set of conflicts regarding governance of the Internet. First, while there was a consensus about 
the need for multilateral and transparent Internet governance, there was no agreement 
whether it should be a multi-stakeholder or government driven process. Second, there was a 
broad recognition that Internet governance involves more than just technical management and 
that it has broad social implications. However, while the civil society stakeholders pushed for 
defining the Internet as a “public good”, they faced opposition. The final compromise was to 
define the Internet as a “global facility”. This compromise was driven by governments and the 
private sector alike, who tried to avoid defining the Internet as inherently public and thus 
subject to policy regulation or shift the financial responsibility for infrastructure development 
from the private to the public sector. Third, the role of the non-governmental sector in Internet 
governance itself was up for discussion. The main question was whether Internet governance 
should be limited to the technical and/or commercial aspects of the network, or if it extended 
                                                        
49 While no other study attempted to map out the other networks that constituted the WSIS community (i.e. 
business, government, and intergovernmental organizations) or the WSIS network as whole, my observations of 
spaces of this nature suggest that the dynamics would be roughly similar in terms of the presence of a limited 
number of central organizational and individual hubs. 84 
 
into other spheres, which governments considered their prerogative. The former framing of 
Internet governance would picture the Internet as primarily a technical and economic resource, 
while the latter would acknowledge the network as a cultural and political tool as well. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, the “nature” of Internet governance was not defined. Instead, 
there was a decision to establish a Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), which 
would take on the responsibility of drafting the framework for Internet governance 
(Kleinwächter, 2008; Mathiason, 2009; Mueller, 2010).  
The first phase of the WSIS passed two main tasks on to the next phase: discussions of Internet 
governance and financing of ICT for development. Establishment of the WGIG was the initial 
step towards addressing the first question and in itself constituted an institutional innovation 
within the UN system. The revolutionary aspects of this decision were: (1) the working group 
was set up to be multistakeholder and include non-state actors together with governments as 
equals and (2) the group was organized by the Secretary General, which gave it the legitimacy 
of the UN, despite the formal status disparities between the state and the non-state actors 
(Kleinwächter, 2008; Mathiason, 2009). These two principles will later prove to be pivotal for 
the establishment of the IGF and for the shaping of its practice. 
4.3. The political laboratory of the WGIG 
There is a broad agreement among the analysts of the WSIS process that the WGIG was unique. 
Substantively, it aimed to address the gaps in knowledge and perceptions of Internet 85 
 
governance and the resulting political conflicts.
50 Symbolically, it embodied and enacted the 
idea of multistakeholderism both through the composition of the group and the operating 
principles it adopted, including extensive use of open, public consultations and the application 
of Chatham House Rules
51 for the internal workings of the group (e.g. Mathiason, 2009; 
Mueller, 2010). 
The WGIG was tasked with developing a working definition of Internet governance, identifying 
policy issues that should come under its umbrella, and mapping the roles of various 
stakeholders (Geneva plan of action, 2003, para. 13b) (see Box 2). The task turned out to be so 
complex and controversial that WGIG participants ended up with a “creative compromise” 
(Dutton, Palfrey, & Peltu, 2007, p. 5) in terms of defining the domain of Internet governance 
and even more so, the processes necessary to develop global policy in this domain. To a degree, 
the discussion of the Internet governance topics became the mechanism for Internet 
governance itself; the discussion became both the process and the goal of decision-making.  
                                                        
50 In a preface to William Drake (2005) edited volume of recollections from people who were part of the WGIG, 
Nitin Desai explained:  
The first challenge was to ensure a genuine dialogue in the group. When a group with very divergent views 
converses, the biggest hurdle is to get people to listen rather than just talk. Ideally, one wants a good faith 
dialogue that each person joins not to convert, but to be converted. The WGIG’s discussions did not quite meet 
this standard. But the conversation definitely moved beyond a dogmatic statement of set views. Everyone made 
an effort to explain the logic behind their view and put their argument in terms that could convince others. To do 
that they had to listen and respond to the doubts and questions raised. Instead of talking at one another, the 
members started talking with one another (Desai, 2005, p. vii). 
51 According to MacLean (2005), “*u+nder Chatham House rules, reports of meetings do not attribute statements or 
positions to individuals in order to preserve the freedom of participants to speak their minds on the subject under 
discussion” (p.12). 86 
 
 
WGIG reports and records of its consultation process suggest that the group did not shy away 
from the political complexity of bringing the nation-states and intergovernmental organizations 
to have a policy dialogue with the Internet community, particularly the civil society.
52 On the 
one hand, the cultures of decision making, the acceptable sources of authority and legitimacy, 
as well as the structures of power, all of which were fundamental to the identity of each camp, 
were noticeably different.  
On the other hand, neither party could act in isolation and completely disregard the other 
camp, because they depended on each other. Members of the Internet community, and the 
institutions they created, lived and worked within systems of rules and norms set by their 
respective nation-states. As such, not only they enacted state-centric norms and values, 
including perceptions of legitimate authority and acceptable policy decision-making, but many 
                                                        
52 The WGIG process took place primarily between September 2004 and July 2005, when the final report of the 
working group was presented. The process included a meeting for consultation on establishment of WGIG, four 
meetings of the group, and presentation of the final report. The documentation of the WGIG process can shed 
additional light on the path of emergence of IGF institutions, at this point I will accept them as a given point of 
departure, so that I could focus on the current processes, leaving this historical investigation for future research. 
13.b) We ask the Secretary General of the United Nations to set up a working group on Internet 
governance, in an open and inclusive process that ensures a mechanism for the full and active 
participation of governments, the private sector and civil society from both developing and 
developed countries, involving relevant intergovernmental and international organizations and 
forums, to investigate and make proposals for action, as appropriate, on the governance of the 
Internet by 2005. The group should, inter alia:  
i)  develop a working definition of Internet governance;  
ii)  identify the public policy issues that are relevant to Internet governance;  
iii)  develop a common understanding of the respective roles and responsibilities of 
governments, existing intergovernmental and international organizations and other 
forums as well as the private sector and civil society from both developing and 
developed countries;  
iv)  prepare a report on the results of this activity to be presented for consideration and 
appropriate action for the second phase of WSIS in Tunis in 2005. 
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of the members and institutions of the Internet community drew their formal authority and 
resources from the same state-centric systems. For the states, the distributed architecture of 
the Internet and its reliance on cooperation in order to function—the procrastination and the 
trust-your-neighbor principles described by Zittrain (2009)—made them dependent on the 
cooperation of the Internet community, if they meant to continue deriving value from the 
Internet as a global communication network.  
In addition, the US played an important role in forming this complexity. The US national 
interests mostly aligned with those of the Internet community, primarily US based at the time. 
This US position gave an important governmental support to the Internet community within the 
UN system, but at the same time enacted numerous global North-South tensions. Yet another 
facet of the complexity stemmed from the group being housed in the UN and acting based on a 
Secretary General sanctioned mandate, which implied a certain compliance to the 
intergovernmental way of doing things. 
This complexity required the WGIG to come up with creative compromise solutions that set a 
path towards the current practices of the IGF discourse. The WGIG working definition of 
Internet governance, as it is stated in its final report (Report of the working group on Internet 
Governance, 2005, para. 10) and has been widely cited since then, states: 
Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the private 
sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, 
decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the 
Internet. 
On the face of it, this definition may sound like boiler plate policy talk, but it is reflective of 
important conceptual shifts that impacted the institutionalization of Internet governance on a 88 
 
number of fronts. First, it acknowledged the role of the non-sate actors in Internet governance, 
which was one of the cornerstones of the disagreement during the first phase of the WSIS. This 
acknowledgement, however, came at the cost of implicit recognition of the nation-states’ claim 
for exclusive authority over public policy making.
53 Second, this definition extended the scope 
of Internet governance beyond questions of management and control over critical Internet 
resources. As Mueller (2010) described it, “*t+he overall effect was to make it possible to define 
practically any communication-information policy issues as Internet governance” (p.67). 
While broad in terms of the issues it covers
54, the WGIG definition of Internet governance is 
rather specific about the functional role of the “governance,” which is “development and 
application” of systems of governance, i.e. principles, norms, and decision-making procedures. 
To this end, the report offered a number of mechanisms. First, it suggested creation of “a space 
for dialogue among all stakeholders” (p.10) with an emphasis on including participants from the 
developing countries. Then, it offered four models for implementing systems of governance, 
tackling some of the core political tensions in this debate. The models were built around the 
                                                        
53 Following a traditional UN division, the WGIG report focused primarily on the roles of the governments, the 
private sector and the civil society. The governments were described as possessing the ultimate binding decision-
making such as national, regional, and international policymaking and implementation as well as development and 
adoption of laws, regulations, and standards, among a set of other activities. The private sector was charged, 
among others, with self-regulation and development of best practices. The list of responsibilities of the civil society 
included, inter alia, capacity-building, bringing perspectives of marginalized groups, and engaging in policy 
processes. The report also recognizes the academic and the technical communities as having “a permanent and 
valuable contribution to the stability, security, functioning and evolution of the Internet,” but it does not go in 
depth defining their roles in potential future Internet governance arrangements (see Report of the working group 
on Internet Governance, 2005, para. 29-34). 
54 WGIG report identified four areas that constitute the Internet governance domain. These are: issues of 
infrastructure and management of critical Internet resources (e.g. management of the Domain Name System), 
issues related to the use of the Internet (e.g. spam), issues that go beyond the Internet and have existing 
institutions addressing them (e.g. copyright), and the link between Internet governance and development. The 
format of the IGF is built very much around the same clusters of topics, although many of the specific issues are in 
a continuous flux, because of the changing “realities” of the Internet. 89 
 
creation of new governance bodies, such as a UN-anchored and national-governments-led 
Global Internet Council (GIC), as a vehicle to set global Internet public policy and hold the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) accountable; enhancing the 
Government Advisory Committee (GAC) or replacing it by an International Internet Council (IIC), 
both of which would give national governments an oversight authority over ICANN; or a 
combination of the above to result in establishment of Global Internet Policy Council (GIPC) and 
replacing ICANN with WICANN (World Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) 
anchored at the UN. Each of the mechanisms was a response to interests represented by the 
diverse group of participants in the working group, yet all of them acknowledged that neither 
an exclusively nation-state-centric or and exclusively non-state-actors-led approach was a 
feasible political solution. 
Substantively, none of the concrete proposals for decision-making mechanisms in WGIG report 
were enacted. The only actionable recommendation that survived the second phase of the 
WSIS was the establishment of a “global multistakeholder forum” with no binding decision-
making authority (Report of the working group on Internet Governance, 2005, para. 40-47). The 
WGIG, however, in its own conduct, had developed a blueprint for such a forum, with an 
emphasis on multistakeholder participation and inter-sector dialogue as a vehicle for bridging 
gaps in the understanding and perception of contested political issues. While participants in the 
group came from a diversity of backgrounds and represented an array of often competing 
interests, both the report and the public conduct of the group were a front stage performance 
in Goffman’s (1963) sense. Just as scientific reports “dramatize their own authority” (Hilgartner, 90 
 
2000, p. 42)  the WGIG celebrated a new kind of authority within the information policy 
space—an authority drown from multiplicity of institutional identities of the participants. 
Symbolically, in the absence of US representatives in the group, the WGIG agreed that, “*n+o 
single Government should have a pre-eminent role in relation to international Internet 
governance” (Report of the working group on Internet Governance, 2005, para. 48). This 
agreement would later become an important rhetorical device in the politics of Internet 
governance, as those are manifested not only in the IGF but also in other fora including the ITU 
and ICANN; yet, it preserved the top-down approach to Internet governance with the nation-
state as a pivotal decision-maker. More importantly, “there was no agreement on the basic 
principles and norms that [specific organizational arrangements for Internet governance put 
forward by the WGIG+ should reflect and implement” (Mueller, 2010, p. 68; see also Mueller, 
Mathiason, & Klein, 2007).  
In addition to establishing the conceptual and thematic bases for what will later grow into the 
IGF, the WGIG also brought to light a number of important features of the Internet governance 
debate as a political space. First, the WGIG process was built around 40 individuals, who were 
chosen from across the stakeholder groups, and supported by a small secretariat. Without 
observing the selection process, it is difficult to make claims of why these particular individuals 
were chosen to represent their particular sectors
55 (see Mueller, 2010, chap. 5 for a partial 
                                                        
55 Based on my time in the field and interviews with some of the participants, there was a mixture of luck, personal 
ambition, and initiative. Many of the participants entered the WSIS process without a clear vision as to where it 
was heading; in fact the focus of WSIS has shifted as the summit progressed (Mueller, 2010, chap. 5 shares similar 
observations in relation to the participation of the civil society in WSIS). As such, the selection was based on WSIS-
specific merit, which was developed over a rather short span of the first phase of the summit and its preparatory 
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discussion), but their personalities were an important factor in what shaped the WGIG 
dynamics and its outcomes. Nitin Desai, the chair of WGIG, Markus Kummer, the WGIG 
executive coordinator, and other group members, have repeatedly highlighted the fact that 
these were the participating individuals who created WGIG from scratch and gave the process 
its particular shape (see Drake, 2005).
56 Many of the members of this group of enthusiasts, 
which started forming during the first phase of WSIS, would later continue on to form the IGF. 
Second, the WGIG process created a series of practices for multistakeholder discussion, which 
would later become the operating principles of the IGF; in fact, the group spent a substantive 
amount of time on developing its own working practices (e.g. MacLean, 2005). For example, the 
multistakeholder ethos put a great emphasis on the openness of the process. One of the main 
critiques of a national-state-centric decision-making process was (and still is) the lack of 
transparency. Numerous accounts of the WSIS process have highlighted the fact that the civil 
society participants in particular found it difficult to insert themselves into the state-centric UN 
processes (e.g. Kleinwächter, 2008; Mathiason, 2009; Mueller, 2010). As a reaction to this, the 
WGIG adopted a model of periodic open consultations, which provided input to the working 
group and, at the same time, helped it develop its own identity (MacLean, 2005). As Nitin Desai 
(2005), reflected on this:  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
process. To a degree, people who joined the group had to buy into the validity of a multistakeholder approach to 
policy debate. 
56 For example, Nitin Desai emphasized that, “*t+he members of the group were there as individuals. But they had 
been chosen to reflect a balance across regions and interest groups” (p.vii); Markus Kummer, referred to the group 
as “people from different geographic, cultural and professional backgrounds. Individuals gathered with their 
different outlooks on life, different ideas and different ways of interacting, and in the process became a group with 
a common purpose” (p.1). 92 
 
The open consultations had the paradoxical effect of reinforcing the WGIG’s sense of 
self-identity. Group members did refer to the views presented at the open 
consultations. They were influenced by the weight behind different positions as 
evidenced in these open meetings. But they became increasingly conscious that their 
job was to write their report, not a report on the views expressed in the consultations 
(p.ix). 
In other words, the WGIG was a consensual interpretation of the bottom-up input through the 
individual lenses of the members of the WGIG. While accepting input from open consultations, 
the drafting of the final documents was conducted in closed sessions. At one point, the group 
went into a two-day retreat using the Chatham House Rule, which allowed the members to 
discuss issues in private settings, speaking as individuals. These discussions could then be used 
later in the process, but without attribution in order to promote a more open debate. Within 
the UN system that was the first time this rule was applied with a group that included not only 
state, but also non-state actors (Desai, 2005). The WGIG participants assembled a new set of 
practices that drew on the legitimacy of both the Internet community and the UN system as a 
way to bridge the two cultures of decision making. 
Yet, at the end of the day, WGIG was not a negotiation body. On the one hand, this relieved the 
group from the pressure of reaching consensus on every contested topic and allowed it to 
present an array of opinions. On the other hand, it also prevented the group from taking stands 
on issues and brought the scope of the report to making suggestions that “recognized that 
neither governmental top-down regulation nor private sector or civil society bottom-up self-
regulation alone can manage the totality of Internet issues” (Kleinwächter, 2008, p. 569). In 
terms of practice, however, the group laid down the foundation for new structures of 
domination for Internet policymaking. 93 
 
When the WGIG was originally formed there was no debate regarding its funding. That 
omission was intentional in order to ease the adoption of the idea by the participants of the 
first phase of the WSIS. As a result, the working group had to receive funding from numerous 
entities including governments (Switzerland, Netherlands, Norway, France, and Japan) and non-
governmental organizations (Numbers Resource Organization, Swiss Education and Research 
Network - SWITCH, ICANN, and Foundation for MultiMedia Communications). In other words, 
the funding of the WGIG secretariat was itself “multi-stakeholder” (Mathiason, 2009, p. 116). 
Moreover, the group was composed based on the guiding criteria of balance, in terms of 
“regional representation, stakeholders, gender, developed and developing countries, and 
different schools of thought” (Mathiason, 2009, p. 117). The final nominal composition of the 
group seemed to achieve relatively good results in terms of most of these criteria, but gender. 
Also, the governments still constituted the largest group of stakeholders. 
Finally, the WGIG process also highlighted the complex relationships between the policymaking 
environments and the substantive field they were asking to regulate. For example, two weeks 
prior to the public release of the final WGIG report, in July 2005, the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the US Department of 
Commerce (DOC) released “US Statement of Principles on the Internet’s Domain Name and 
Addressing System.”
57 In the document the US government reaffirmed its intention to maintain 
its authoritative role in the management of critical Internet resources, which was one of the 
core issues fueling the Internet governance debate. During the same summer, the US 
                                                        
57 See: http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/USDNSprinciples_06302005.htm 94 
 
government intervened in the decision-making process at ICANN when the assistant secretary 
for communication and information at DOC sent a letter expressing the US opposition to 
approval of the .xxx top level domain. This incident is generally viewed as the US government 
abusing its formal authority over ICANN (e.g. Lightfoot, 2007; Mueller, 2010); coming soon after 
the formal release of the WGIG report, the .xxx controversy gave more ammunition to those 
arguing for the further internationalization of the Internet governance; those who challenged 
the US Internet governance hegemony called for more involvement of other governments, 
while their opponents argued for minimizing all government intervention. Events like these 
illustrate how lengthy policy deliberation processes are inherently embedded in ever evolving 
social systems and social structures, and they are constantly reacting to and interpreted 
through the ‘real world’ developments. 
The final report of the WGIG laid the foundation for both the second phase of the WSIS and the 
IGF. The report was by no means perfect and has been criticized both for not being specific 
enough in terms of its recommendations and for not tackling the heavy conceptual tasks, such 
as agreeing on the basic norms and principles of Internet governance.  Nevertheless the report, 
and even more so the policy-discourse practices that developed in the course of the WGIG 
negotiations, was an important stepping stone towards the institutionalization of the Internet 
governance debate. It was the first time representatives of the two different cultures of 
policymaking worked together to produce a result that the international policy community 
viewed as tangible and constructive. Notwithstanding the political tensions that became 
evident within the group, the ability to produce a consensus document was an important step 95 
 
towards the formation of new structures of legitimation and power within the Internet 
governance sphere. 
4.4. The birth of a compromise 
As the WSIS was moving into its second phase, other fora, within and outside the UN, started to 
pick up the discussion about Internet governance (see Kummer, 2005, p. 4 for a list of events).
58 
Many individuals who participated in WSIS, especially the idea-entrepreneurs of the WGIG, also 
participated in those meetings, with some individuals taking part in all of them. The common 
feature of these spaces was the adoption the multi-stakeholder ethos and the broad definition 
of Internet governance.  
Even though governments continued to challenge the legitimacy of non-state actors’ direct 
involvement in drafting of diplomatic language, there was a noticeable shift in the overall 
attitude. Kleinwächter (2008) wrote, “*g+overnments could and would continue to discuss and 
negotiate among themselves in closed shops, but this diplomatic mechanism became partially 
embedded in a broader development process that was more open and transparent and 
included more actors” (p. 564). In other words, multi-stakeholderism was moving into the 
mainstream of the WSIS discussions. Nine out of forty articles of the Tunis Commitment 
document reference multistakeholderism (Tunis commitment, 2005), which was a substantial 
                                                        
58 There is an ongoing debate about the relative importance of Internet governance-focused fora and events to the 
overall Internet governance-discursive ecology. Hart (2008), for example, is arguing for the importance of G8 and 
EOCD in shaping the global Internet governance regime, when viewed through the lens of political economy. Yet it 
is nearly impossible to distill the importance of a standalone event without considering within the context of other 
IGF developments. All these fora should be viewed in relationship with each other, as well as in relationships with 
the continuously changing environments of socio-technological affordances and practices. 96 
 
growth in visibility, compared to the Geneva phase (Geneva declaration of principles, 2003, 
Geneva plan of action, 2003). At the same time, while there was recognition of the multi-
stakeholder principle in the Tunis documents (also see Tunis agenda for the information society, 
2005), there was no agreement about the extent to which the involvement of non-state actors 
was possible and how it should be conducted. 
Soon after the first phases of WSIS, two other competing initiatives were launched within the 
UN system. In February 2004, the ITU conducted an “expert meeting on Internet governance,” 
which highlighted the multi-institutional and the multidimensional character of the Internet 
governance debate. In March of the same year, the UN ICT Task Force organized the Global 
Forum on Internet Governance, which was considered a counter-conference to the ITU expert 
group meeting.  This meeting enacted a version of multistakeholder participation by opening up 
the debates to non-state participants and highlighting the debate about Internet rights 
(Mathiason, 2009). Both meetings, however, enacted the traditional structures of legitimation 
and domination by the very virtue of taking place under the auspice of the UN and thus reifying 
the intergovernmental decision-making mechanism. Inputs from these two meetings together 
with the WGIG report, served as the basis of the second phase of the WSIS, which took place in 
Tunis in 2005. 
Mueller (2010) states that the second phase of the WSIS “pitted the United States against the 
rest of the world” (p.76) and it was only due to procedural constraints and the bureaucratic 
need to produce some results in order for the summit to be considered successful, that the 
diplomats were able to reach a consensus. According to Mueller, the final document (Tunis 97 
 
agenda for the information society, 2005) contained consensus on three main points. First, it 
acknowledged the viability of existing Internet governance arrangements, with the private 
sector in the leading position regarding most of the day-to-day management and future 
development of Internet technologies; by doing so, it reaffirmed the public authority of ICANN 
over the management of critical Internet resources. Second, it made a dent in the US’ unilateral 
authority over ICANN, not necessarily in formal terms, but in pragmatic ones. The WSIS 
achieved that by emphasizing the policymaking role of nation-states and their sovereignty over 
the management of their country code top level domains, thus setting a path towards changing 
the ICANN itself, particularly the role of its GAC. As Mueller summarized it, “*i+f the US position 
was animated by an attempt to defend ‘the soul of the Internet’ from governments, it lost” 
(p.78).  
Finally, the WSIS mandated the creation of the IGF. According to Mueller (2010):  
The creation of the IGF was widely understood to be the kind of agreement that could 
get the WSIS out of its impasse; it allowed the critics to continue raising their issues in 
an official forum, but as a nonbinding discussion arena, could not do much harm to 
those interested in preserving the status quo (p.78). 
Indeed, numerous unresolved issues left the definition of the goals and authority of the forum 
unclear. There was no agreement about the oversight function over the process of Internet 
governance. In other words, the question of “who controls the Internet” or more precisely 
“how?”, remained unanswered (for example, see the following debate: Al-Darrab, 2005; Hu, 
2005; Kleinwächter, 2005; Sha’ban, 2005). While the US supported the ICANN regime, a 
number of alternative solutions were put on the table, including an option to hand over the 
ICANN function to an intergovernmental organization such as the ITU. For example, the 98 
 
chairman’s “Food for thought” document called for establishment of “an Inter-Governmental 
Council for global public policy and oversight of Internet governance” within the UN system 
“based on the principles of transparency and democracy with the involvement, in an advisory 
capacity, of the private sector, civil society and the relevant inter-governmental and 
international organizations” (“Chair’s ‘food for thought’,” 2005, para. 68).  
Yet, the IGF was more than just a creative compromise to preserve the status quo. The WSIS 
process challenged the way global policymaking community thought about Internet governance 
by promoting a more “expansive” view of this domain. It also provided an experimental space 
to test preliminary forms of institutionalization that emerged around these new ways of 
thinking and allowed the cultures of the Internet community and intergovernmental 
policymaking to co-exist in a productive fashion. In a way, the IGF was a vessel that absorbed 
both the unresolved tensions of the WSIS and the experimental ways of thinking about and 
practicing Internet governance. 
4.5. The IGF: Process or Substance? 
To reiterate the opening remarks of this chapter, WSIS and its outcomes were a result of 
negotiations between two distinctive worldviews. In his reflection on the WGIG process, 
Markus Kummer (2005), Executive Coordinator of the IGF Secretariat, described WSIS as “a 
confrontation of two visions of the world, or two schools of thought,” which clashed on the 
issue of “private sector leadership versus intergovernmental cooperation” in Internet 
governance (p.2). Kleinwächter (2008) described it as clash between worldviews: a view of 
globalization, which anticipated a decline of the system of sovereign states in favor of global 99 
 
institutions and transnational corporations, much due to the evolution of media and 
communication technologies; and a view of glocalization, which highlighted the centrality of 
physical space and left the governments a central role, while redefining the concept of 
sovereignty. Mueller (2010) portrayed the WSIS as a clash between two models of global 
governance: one focused on the private and the other on the nation-state leadership. The 
WSIS, WGIG, and eventually the IGF were born out of this tension between communities that 
frequently misunderstood and mistrusted each other, but were forced to search for a common 
ground because they were intertwined and in a way dependent on each other (also see: 
MacLean, 2005). 
The way the Internet and the institutions of its governance have evolved created a somewhat 
surreal situation. On the one hand, sources of technical and financial control over the medium 
lie with non-state actors; at the same time, non-state actors are formally subjected to the 
authority of their sovereign governments (Kummer, 2005). Kleinwächter (2008) made a similar 
observation emphasizing that the eventual focus of WSIS on the Internet, and not a broader 
take on telecommunications, made it a unique case. The Summit dealt with a domain that was 
already established as an inherently global network of networks, run by numerous 
organizations, and with a clear presence (if not to say dominance) of the private sector and 
nonprofit technical bodies. Moreover, back in the late 1990s when the G7 and OECD had 
undertaken a number of attempts for global debates about the Information Society, they also 
introduced the users as a side that should be directly involved in Internet governance 
discussions. 100 
 
The uniqueness of the IGF is often viewed through the lens of the process, particularly the 
involvement of the non-state actors in the Internet policy debates. Kleinwächter (2008) lists 
two primary factors that led to the establishment of the IGF as a multi-stakeholder forum. First, 
although the Internet evolved in the shadow of the US government, its phenomenal growth and 
openness to innovation were attributed to the lack of active regulation at its early stages. 
Second, the question of the global information infrastructure came to the attention of the 
international community at a time of growing legitimacy of non-state actors in international 
diplomacy. It was that unique constellation of historical factors that created the context for 
establishing a framework where state and non-state actors could supposedly debate as equals 
in order to work out their differences (also see Braman, 2009; Mueller, 2010). The focus on 
multistakeholderism is so significant that some criticize it for becoming an ideology, rather than 
an ideologically-laden organizational principle (Mueller, 2010). 
The IGF mandate (see Box 3), as it is set out in Paragraph 72 of the Tunis Agenda
 (Tunis agenda 
for the information society, 2005), was a compromise between those who wanted a proactive, 
authoritative and intergovernmental institution to oversee the Internet and those who wanted 
a private-sector-led, inclusive, and meritocratic arrangement. The underlying assumption of this 
compromise is that an open and multi-stakeholder discussion of relevant policy questions will 
lead to an order that can be supported only through a partnership between governments, the 
private sector, the civil society, as well as the technical and the academic communities 
(Mathiason, 2009, p. 126). According to Markus Kumar:  
“… the Tunis Agenda for Information Society (WSIS 2005), which established the IGF’s 
mandate, was ‘a diplomatic compromise, the beauty of which is that it is full of creative 
ambiguity that allows everybody to find something to satisfy their own wishes. As the 101 
 
agenda was based on a decision-making Summit, the text on controversial topics such as 
the IPR was carefully balanced in a way that avoided going into details that could be 
divisive and difficult to resolve’” (Dutton et al., 2007, p. 5). 
 
Through the compromise mandate the WSIS handed the IGF a set of tensions between the two 
cultures of Internet policymaking, as those were enacted through the politics of principles. At 
the same time, through its practices, the WSIS also handed to the IGF a genesis of new 
structures of legitimation and domination, which were enacted through the politics of agenda 
setting and participation. This dowry was fundamental to the shaping of the IGF as an 
institution and in defining its significance within the Internet policy space. The practices of the 
IGF are reflective of WSIS, and especially the WGIG, processes. The Summit set a path for the 
72. We ask the UN Secretary-General, in an open and inclusive process, to convene, by the 
second quarter of 2006, a meeting of the new forum for multi-stakeholder policy dialogue—called 
the Internet Governance Forum (IGF).The mandate of the Forum is to: 
a.  Discuss public policy issues related to key elements of Internet governance in order to 
foster the sustainability, robustness, security, stability and development of the Internet;  
b.  Facilitate discourse between bodies dealing with different cross-cutting international 
public policies regarding the Internet and discuss issues that do not fall within the scope 
of any existing body;  
c.  Interface with appropriate inter-governmental organizations and other institutions on 
matters under their purview;  
d.  Facilitate the exchange of information and best practices, and in this regard make full use 
of the expertise of the academic, scientific and technical communities;  
e.  Advise all stakeholders in proposing ways and means to accelerate the availability and 
affordability of the Internet in the developing world;  
f.  Strengthen and enhance the engagement of stakeholders in existing and/or future 
Internet governance mechanisms, particularly those from developing countries;  
g.  Identify emerging issues, bring them to the attention of the relevant bodies and the 
general public, and, where appropriate, make recommendations;  
h.  Contribute to capacity building for Internet governance in developing countries, drawing 
fully on local sources of knowledge and expertise;  
i.  Promote and assess, on an ongoing basis, the embodiment of WSIS principles in Internet 
governance processes;  
j.  Discuss, inter alia, issues relating to critical Internet resources;  
k.  Help to find solutions to the issues arising from the use and misuse of the Internet, of 
particular concern to everyday users;  
l.  Publish its proceedings. 
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IGF in terms of relationships between the Internet and the intergovernmental communities. It 
also solidified a nucleus of idea entrepreneurs, who saw in the IGF process an important 
political vehicle towards resolving the tensions around Internet governance; these people 
played an important role in shaping the practices and the character of the IGF. 
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5. PEOPLE, PRACTICES, AND PROCEDURES 
There is a growing appreciation that to study discourse as a constitutive force requires focusing 
on “social practices, conventions, rules and norms governing certain sets or groups of speakers 
and hearers  (viewers/listeners)” (Wodak, 2008, p. 17). Text
59 in itself has no agency, it becomes 
a vehicle of power only through practice—only when it is part of discourse. Yet, enactment of 
text as social practice does not happen in a vacuum either—discourse is both socially 
constitutive and socially constrained. In a way, discourse enacts structures of signification, 
legitimation and domination, but these structures are also challenged through discourse or 
discursive reflexivity. Fairclough and Wodak (1997) explain that “*d+escribing discourse as social 
practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the 
situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it: The discursive event is shaped 
by them, but it also shapes them” (p.258). In other words, it is only through the interaction 
between discourse and its context that meaning and power can be created. One can describe 
this as an interaction between structures internal to the agent, expressed through text in 
practice, and the external systems, which embody structures external to the given discursive 
moment. To study power, one needs to observe how social structures enacted through 
discourse interact with structural elements embodied in the settings of the discourse.  
                                                        
59 To reiterate, I am relying on Fairclough’s (2003) distinction between language, text, and discourse. Fairclough 
describes language in the most straightforward way as words, sentences, etc. He defines text as any use of 
language, as well as visuals or sound effects. Finally, discourse according to Faircough is a particular view of text “as 
an element of social life which is closely interconnected with other elements” (p. 3). 104 
 
The IGF is not unique in a sense that it acts as a space where social structures are enacted 
through discourse. Any institution, particularly one tasked with policy construction, constitutes 
such space. What makes the IGF interesting is its explicit focus on non-binding policy discourse. 
The IGF was created with shifting notions of governance and governmentality in the 
background, all attributed to drastic changes in information environment. The forum is a result 
of intense debates about Internet governance, UN, and international politics. It represents a 
compromise of many different worldviews about the Internet and how it should be governed. It 
was given an extremely broad mandate to discuss everything related to information and 
information policy, but no formal authority to influence the policymaking process. It also 
received neither tools nor guidance as to how to conduct itself. The result is a space that 
produces discourse and is shaped by discourse at the same time. Many of the IGF resources are 
dedicated to (re)shaping its own context, negotiating the scope of issues to be addressed under 
its roof, and the ways in which they can be talked about. The forum is a space where the politics 
of agenda setting, of representation, and of principles (Mueller, 2010) are played out. It is a 
space where the culture of the Internet community meets the culture of intergovernmental 
politics, and arguably new ways of thinking about the governance of the Internet are being 
shaped. 
Trying to understand the political significance of the IGF means trying to understand its 
discourse as social practice. What perceptions of information technology are embodied in the 
IGF texts? What visions of governance are enacted through its practices? What cultural 
elements do these practices reify? What power structures do they enact? The practices of the 
IGF, however, are a constantly moving target. As a primarily discursive space, which spends a 105 
 
lot of its resources on re-contextualizing itself, there is a recursive loop of mutual influences. 
Capturing this dynamics requires taking a long view on the evolution of the IGF structures and 
practices; it also requires looking into both the structures that have evolved within the IGF 
through discursive reflection, as well as exogenous to the IGF structures and systems brought 
into the forum by the various key participants; finally such inquiry requires placing analytical 
spotlight on one cause of change. Given the available information and prior scholarship on the 
IGF, I am placing that spotlight on the context that emerged out of the WSIS and WGIG 
processes.  
5.1. Path dependency 
  5.1.1. WGIG and WSIS legacy 
Numerous accounts suggest that IGF was, as Mueller (2006a) described it, a “longer term 
continuation of the WGIG” (p.4).
60 Mathiason (2009) listed those organizational principles that 
were borrowed from the WGIG experience for the IGF; among them are “multi-stakeholder” 
extra-budgetary funding, a small secretariat, and an open consultative process. However, the 
path ploughed by WGIG runs deeper than organizational principles. On the practical level, the 
donors who supported WGIG, such as the governments of Switzerland, Norway, and 
Netherlands, as well as the Swiss Education and Research Network (SWITCH) and ICANN, 
continued to support the IGF. Also, the leadership of the WGIG continued as the leadership of 
                                                        
60 The WGIG report warned against the envisioned forum function becoming a continuation of the WGIG (see 
Report of the working group on Internet Governance, 2005, para. 46). However in practice, the IGF adopted many 
of the organizational and conceptual frameworks developed during the WSIS processes and carried on many of its 
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the IGF, which had direct implications on the discourse of the forum. For example, individuals 
who were pivotal to WGIG, such as Nitin Desai and Markus Kummer, were appointed to equally 
pivotal roles within the IGF; in fact, they continued carrying out at the IGF the same functions 
they carried out at WGIG.
61 Finally, people who were particularly active within and around the 
WGIG, such as Wolfgang Kleinwächter, Ayesha Hassan, Bertrand de la Chapelle, Milton Mueller, 
William Drake, Jovan Kurbalija, Izumi Aizu, Karen Banks, Jeanette Hoﬀman, and others, became 
the main forces shaping the IGF (Mathiason, 2009); “It's my pleasure to meet many old friends 
all over again,” was Nitin Desai’s opening of the first meeting of IGF consultations.
62  
On the conceptual level, the WGIG offered new ways of thinking about and deliberating 
Internet policy in international settings. The continuity of the WGIG was not merely nominal in 
terms of who came along. Interested institutions and motivated individuals, who continued 
supporting and participating in the IGF, did so because they viewed it as worthy their time and 
resources. In a way, they subscribed to the normative framework of openness, inclusivity, 
multistakeholderism, and also the importance of the personal relations among the participants, 
all of which emerged out of the WGIG. The conceptual link between the working group and the 
IGF has been constantly stressed in the early consultative process. For example, during the first 
open consultations, Heather Dryden from the Canadian government, said: “Building on the 
spirit of the Working Group on Internet Governance, Canada believes the IGF must be based on 
                                                        
61 During the early consultation processes the participants expressed unanimous enthusiasm and appreciation for 
Nitin Desai and Markus Kummer continuing in their leadership positions. The participants viewed WGIG as very 
successful (also see Mueller, 2010) and voiced expectations that Desai and Kummer will replicate that success in 
the IGF (see transcripts of the first open consultations on IGF in February 2006, available on 
www.intgovforum.org).  
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principles of openness and inclusiveness.” Another example is UNESCO intervention, which 
voiced similar sentiments: “The structure of the IGF could build on the experiences of the 
Working Group on Internet Governance, particularly as regards the participation of 
stakeholders.” The references to WGIG, and to a degree WSIS, were universal across 
stakeholder groups. World Forum for Civil Society Networks, for example, stated that they were 
“extremely satisfied and interested in the heritage [the IGF has] from Geneva and Tunis.”
63 
The WGIG placed three concepts at the core of its report that provided the foundation of IGF; 
to date these concepts continue to contextualize the discourse of the forum by impacting what 
gets to be talked about, how it is addressed, and with what consequences. First, the WGIG 
adopted a very broad definition of Internet governance. This definition is rooted in the 
recognition that “it is impossible to separate the technical from the political issues with regard 
to Internet governance” (Kleinwächter, 2010, p. 80), which extended the scope of topics that fit 
the IGF agenda to include practically any communication policy issue (Mueller, 2010). As 
opposed to a narrow view of Internet governance as the technical management of Internet 
resources, the WGIG report was heavy on public policy issues that constituted Internet 
governance as a domain for decision-making (Mathiason, 2009). By adopting this broad 
interpretive scheme for Internet governance, the IGF positioned itself as a forum suitable for 
discussion of any Internet-policy related topic (in Giddens’s terms, a structure of signification). 
At the same time, this broad definition channeled many of the IGF preparatory discussions 
towards delineating thematic boundaries of the forum. Not only is it impossible to address the 
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entire, constantly changing policy domain in a single meeting, but the IGF was also obligated 
not to duplicate efforts already undertaken in other fora.
64 
Second, the WGIG emphasized multistakeholderism as a pivotal principle for future Internet 
governance debate. It went beyond the frequently quoted “*n+o single Government should 
have a pre-eminent role in relation to international Internet governance” statement in its 
report, stating that the “organizational form for the governance function will be multilateral, 
transparent and democratic, with the full involvement of Governments, the private sector, civil 
society and international organizations” (Report of the working group on Internet Governance, 
2005, para. 48). Multistakeholderism became central to both the organization of the IGF
65 and 
the rhetoric of the forum activists (e.g. Kleinwächter, 2008, 2010; Mathiason, 2009; Mueller, 
2006a, 2010). In structuration terms it was the pivotal norm or the structure of legitimation 
that enabled this new form of authority in international Internet policy discussion. Wolfgang 
Kleinwächter (2010, p. 76) noted that “*t+he UN Secretary General’s report on the IGF from May 
2010 uses the words ‘multistakeholder’, ‘stakeholders’, or ‘government, private sector, civil 
society and technical community’ 57 times in 11 pages, which to him is an “indication that the 
controversial concept of ‘multistakholderism’ (…) is now a more or less accepted guiding 
                                                        
64 One example of such a debate took place during the early planning stages of the IGF when the question of 
intellectual property proved to be divisive. On the one hand, the private sector participants argued for leaving this 
topic under the umbrella of World Trade Organization (WTO) that was already treating this topic. On the other 
hand, participants from the civil society argued that intellectual property should be discussed at the IGF as it is an 
important part of issues such as freedom of speech and openness (e.g. Mathiason, 2009). 
65 One of the criteria for assessing IGF workshop proposals is inclusion of representatives of the multiple 
stakeholder groups; the advisory group that acts as the IGF program committee is also defined as 
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principle of global Internet governance.” One of the interviewees extended that claim to 
suggest that multistakeholderism is the future synonym for Internet governance. He explained: 
[Governance] clearly gained traction the last few years, let’s say the last twenty or thirty 
years, as corporate governance and good governance in developing countries.  But if 
you think about it, with insight now, corporate governance, good governance, or 
democratic governance, and multi stake and Internet governance, are actually talking 
about exactly the same thing.  The involvement of the multi stake holders in the 
decision making process.  Period.  And so if you look at the WSIS definition, I’ve always 
made the exercise to show people that first of all the definition of Internet governance 
is a very detailed and long one.  But it can be shortened as follows.  Internet governance 
is the multi stake holder elaboration and application. 
Finally, WGIG described the forum functioning as a non-binding discourse space, aimed at a 
“dialogue among all stakeholders” (Report of the working group on Internet Governance, 2005, 
para. 40), but not at decision-making. Stripping the forum of any decision-making power 
allegedly contributed to its flexibility and allowed it to adapt to the ever-changing substantive 
policy domain the forum would be addressing. This offered a set of structures of domination (or 
structures of subordination when viewed from the non-dominant side) that facilitated a 
peculiar power relationship within the IGF and between the IGF and other spaces of 
international information policy deliberation. On the one hand, lowering the stakes allowed 
governments to give more freedom to their representatives. As a diplomat I interviewed 
explained it, “if it is an organization with teeth, like the WTO, the governments usually make 
sure they have a consolidated position that is solidly defended. The less high the stakes are the 
more likely it is that you’ll get, I’m not going to say a rogue operator, but a little bit, you know 110 
 
you are given as a government representative maybe more leeway, more freedom.”
66 On the 
other hand, the formal ‘toothlessness’ of the forum placed it in a relatively inferior position in 
terms of intra-fora agenda setting. For example, technological innovations are announced at 
trade shows such as the Consumer Electronics Show, standards are developed in venues such 
as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) or the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), and decisions pertaining to public policy or even the IGF itself are made in other fora such 
as Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), G8 or the UN Committee 
on Science Technology and Development (CSTD). The agenda of the IGF is typically responsive 
to the debates generated and taking place elsewhere.
67 
The three elements that emerged out of the WGIG and WSIS were carried over into the IGF 
through institutional arrangements and practices, mostly because the same actors continued 
steering the debate throughout the WGIG, the WSIS, and the IGF. The broad definition of 
Internet governance, the emphasis on multistakeholderism, and the non-binding character of 
the IGF debates were fundamental to establishing a context for discourse emerging in the 
forum whether through impacting who gets to talk, what gets to be talked about and how, as 
well as the array of opinions expressed in the forum. Moreover, each of these elements 
                                                        
66 Similar sentiments were voiced by other interviewees in this study. The distinction between binding and non-
binding discussions is fundamental in intergovernmental settings; it impacts the array of opinions government 
representatives are willing to voice on the record as well as their openness to accept opposing opinions. 
67 One example to such responsiveness is the “Emerging Issues” session of the plenary (see Table 4). In the early 
days of the IGF, spam, for instance, was one of the main substantive topics on the agenda of the forum. Yet, as 
time has passed and technical and legal solutions rendered spam to be less of an acute issue, this topic gave way to 
other issues such as social networks and cloud computing—all of which were socio-technical phenomena that 
evolved outside of the forum settings. Another example is the recent Working Group on Improvements to the IGF 
established by ECOSOC (see http://www.unctad.info/en/CstdWG/). This decision resulted in a special session at 
the fifth meeting of the IGF in Lithuania and was subject to extensive discussions at the IGF Open Consultations 
and the Multistakeholder Advisory Group meetings in November 2010 and February 2011. 111 
 
embodied a series of political tensions, as each element represented a compromise achieved 
during the WSIS negotiations. In other words, the IGF took on not only the institutional 
innovation in global policymaking, which came out of WGIG, but it also inherited a set of 
political tensions and limitations that were inherent to the broadly and vaguely defined 
compromise that emerged from that working group. 
5.1.2. As non-UN as a UN forum can get 
Yet in other ways the IGF was an organizational and conceptual innovation within the nation-
state oriented environment of the UN. This pioneer status placed the IGF leadership (especially 
the secretariat) in a peculiar situation. On the one hand, the IGF was established by and acted 
based on a UN-sanctioned mandate; it was an outcome of a UN conference and as such, the 
forum was tied to UN bureaucracy and to the practices of UN discourse. The IGF pioneers 
viewed this link as an asset. William Drake, who was and still is very active in the Internet 
Governance Caucus, said: the “Internet Governance Forum ought to be convened under the 
authority of the U.N. secretary general, and I think that we also believe that it should be 
coordinated by the United Nations as the appropriate inclusive forum that brings all 
stakeholders together.”
68 Even the industry, which is typically critical of the UN bureaucracy, 
expressed opinions stressing the importance of IGF remaining under the auspice of the UN.  
The evolving IGF was caught in a tension between competing sources of legitimacy. On the one 
hand, being a non-government-led forum under the UN umbrella gave legitimacy to the IGF as 
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a global venue for public policy debates. Being formally associated with the UN enhanced the 
authority of the IGF, even though the forum had no formal binding power. Moreover, for those 
favoring a more ICANN-based status quo, having a forum that reflected similar values in terms 
of bottom-up governance hosted under the UN umbrella helped to fence off arguments about 
the US hegemony in Internet governance.
69  
On the other hand, the IGF also drew legitimacy from the existing informal Internet governance 
institutions. As such, the IGF community made an effort to distinguish itself from the UN 
bureaucracy. As one U.S. government statement put it: “The United States believes that the 
Internet Governance Forum should be a truly multistakeholder event. Therefore, it is important 
that it not be encumbered by extensive, existing United Nations processes and procedures.”
70  
Similar statements were made by other participants in the early consultations. The main 
attribute of the IGF distinction was placing the notion of multistakeholderism as one of the 
pivotal principles of the forum. In doing so, the IGF was bending, if not breaking, many of the 
acceptable norms of the UN. It was evident, from the very beginning, that the Geneva offices of 
the UN were not well prepared to handle an extra-governmental meeting.
71  
Extra-budgetary funding of the secretariat and its uniquely lean structure have also 
differentiated the IGF from the UN. WSIS outcomes called for the IGF to have a “lightweight and 
decentralized structure” (Tunis agenda for the information society, 2005, para. 73.b) and early 
                                                        
69 The non-binding nature of the IGF is a double edged sword. On the one hand, it gives IGF the flexibility to bring 
institutional innovations into the rigid UN system. On the other hand, within the UN system, where authority is 
derived from decision-making power, the non-binding nature of the IGF places it in a relatively weaker position 
compared to other spaces for policy deliberation. 
70 IGF Open Consultations, February 2006, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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consultations on the IGF institutionalized this notion by declining a full size bureau in favor of a 
secretariat that at the beginning included only three paid officials: the executive coordinator, 
the chair of the forum, and a consultant who managed the program logistics and the IGF 
website. Yet, deriving legitimacy from a UN mandate and being physically housed in the UN 
headquarters in Geneva, some of the UN practices of discourse were also part of the IGF. 
The attempt to dance at two weddings
72, i.e. establishing a non-UN-like forum under the 
auspice of the UN, was partially successful
73. The tensions between the UN legacy on the one 
hand, and the WSIS-inspired institutional innovation on the other, had an impact on the 
settings that shape IGF discourse. During the open consultations, for example, any registered 
participant may speak regardless of his or her institutional affiliation. Moreover, contrary to the 
regular UN protocol, where government representatives are given priority in taking the floor, in 
IGF and IGF consultations the interventions are on the first come, first served basis.  These 
practices are representative of the new structures of legitimation being conceptualized within 
policymaking discourse – no longer are the states, or state-accredited speakers, the only 
legitimate participants; civil society and the technical community members are now expected 
to be considered as allegedly equals. Mathiason (2009) described these practices as being 
                                                        
72 Daniel Stauffacher’s intervention during the first IGF Open Consultations is a good illustration of the tension 
between UN legacy and WSIS-inspired innovation. In the same intervention, Stauffacher said:  
I think [it is] important to underline that we do not embark on an intergovernmental process with 
stakeholder participation, but that we really develop a true multistakeholder process,” and later 
emphasized that “WSIS Tunis has given the secretary general [of the UN] and you [Nitin Desai] the 
mandate to structure and organize this forum. And I think this is important that this forum, then, also 
remains under the auspices of the United Nations. 
73 In her reflections on the first to meetings of the IGF, Anriette Esterhuysen (2008) wrote: “To be successful, the 
IGF needed to draw on two cultures - the formal culture of the UN system and the informal culture of the Internet.  
Only by balancing these two cultures could the IGF attract the support and participation - as importantly, the 
positive participation - of the necessary range of participants” (p.38).   114 
 
shocking to the UN system, particularly in the Geneva offices of the UN, which hosted most of 
the preparatory meetings of the IGF. Indeed, as the transcripts of the first round of 
consultations indicate, the UN was unprepared to host a meeting with non-government 
participants. For example, only government officials had name-plates that help the chair of the 
meeting to call upon speakers; neither the private sector nor the civil society had their name-
plates prepared in advance. There were also complications with security clearance for non-UN 
and non-government participants to enter the Palais des Nations in Geneva, where the 
consultations were held. 
Being physically housed in the UN and operating on the basis of a UN-sanctioned mandate, the 
IGF also adopted some of the organizational and discursive practices of the UN, which 
represent the traditional thought about legitimacy and authority—those focused on the nation 
state. During the consultation processes, for example, Nitin Desai and Markus Kummer, both of 
whom derived their formal authority from the UN (de La Chapelle, 2010), emerged as pivotal 
figures. In quantitative terms, Nitin and Kummer are responsible for almost 30% of the total 
volume of formal discussions during the consultation process.
74 This significant presence is 
reflective of the status of Kummer and especially Desai as presiding officers of the consultative 
process
75. However, qualitative reflections suggest that unlike ‘traditional’ UN conferences, 
                                                        
74 Over the period of five years, between February 2006 and November 2010, a total of over 643K words 
constituted the overall volume of formal and substantive discourse in the IGF Open Consultations (see Footnote 75 
and Chapter 3 for details); out of that volume almost 200K words (29.2%) are attributed to Nitin Disai and Markus 
Kummer (127,666 or almost 19.9% and 59,872 or 9.3% respectively). 
75 I tried to account only for substantive contributions as opposed to purely technical or procedural ones (e.g. 
managing the order of speakers, making sure that microphones work, etc.). A persistent characteristic of a clearly 
technical intervention is its length. Contributions of substance tend to be much longer compared to technical 
comments. That does not mean that there are no longer procedural interventions, but for such a simple procedure 
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where presiding officers have limited power and influence
76, Nitin Desai, as the chairman of the 
IGF seemed to exercise significant framing power over the constitutional preparatory meetings 
of the forum. While many of Kummer’s interventions were primarily procedural, Desai, as the 
chair of the meeting would typically go on with thorough and extensive summaries of the 
debate; he would “pluck consensus from the air,” as Mathiason (2009, p. 128) described it.  
While the most central and formalized, the secretariat was not the only authority in the room. 
Authority in the IGF is marked by the tensions between the traditional ways of thinking about 
legitimacy and authority, as those are represented in the UN practices, and the new to the UN 
system approaches imported from non-governmental institutions of the Internet community. 
The authority figures in the room would be clearly marked both through institutional markers
77 
and through the physical arrangement of space; a typical intervention from the floor would 
usually be conducted as a dialogue between the chair and the speaker, but not as a direct 
exchange between participants as the IGF ethos would suggest.
78 The level of formality in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
as word count, length is the main predictor. Based on analysis of a sample of procedural interventions, the cut off 
line was established at 15 words. 
76 Kaufmann (1988, p. 78) described an ‘ideal chairman’ of a traditional UN conference as an efficient master of the 
ceremony:  
The ideal chairman is able to keep delegates’ statements within reasonable length and limits himself to an 
occasional observation in order to remind delegates of the subject before them. He will summarize (but not too 
frequently) lest he be accused of talking too much. The good chairman will also give rapid and correct rulings on 
procedural questions.  
77 Not only the Chair and the Executive Coordinator derived their formal authority from the UN, members of the 
Multistakeholder Advisory Group, who are nominated by the Secretary General of the UN, also fall under the 
category of participants carrying an institutional mark of importance (see section 5.2.2). 
78 While the dialogue between the Chair or the Executive Coordinator and a participant was the most common 
form of formal working interaction during consultations, other, less hierarchical, forms of interaction were also 
employed. For example, during the open consultations, which I observed in May 2009, in addition to the plenary-
style discussions, the participants also worked in small groups to assess workshop proposals. Yet even in that case, 
the Executive Coordinator, who chaired that particular meeting, did not participate in the small group activities; 
later on, the groups reported back to him about the results of their small group discussions. 116 
 
consultative process, however, has decreased over time. In the early consultations, it was 
common to refer to participants by their institutional affiliation (e.g. France, ISOC, ICC, etc.); in 
the recent consultations, it is more common to see the Chair referring to participants by their 
full names or even their first names only (e.g. Bertrand, Ayesha Hassan, Bill Graham, etc.)
79. The 
participants, however, would still rather consistently remain formal, which can be partially 
explained by habit and partially by the settings of the meeting including it being conducted in 
the UN and awareness of the discussion being recorded.
80 In referring to Nitin Desai and 
Markus Kummer by their official UN titles the participants of the IGF consultations enacted the 
hierarchical and procedure-oriented practices of UN conferences.
81  
The physical space of the European headquarters of the UN, where most of the consultative 
processes have taken place, is designed to reinforce this centrality of the formal authority and 
the protocol (see Picture 1). Even though the consultations are a working meeting, the 
presiding officers are seated on the podium with all the other participants facing them; each 
participant (or delegation) has a name plaque, which would typically have the name of the 
country or an organization, but not the names of the actual participants; in order to speak, each 
participant needs to request the floor and use the built-in microphones at their desks to 
                                                        
79 Depledge (2006) describes the use of first names, together with humor and the use of allegories, as techniques 
of good chairmanship for a working group in the UN setting. Writing about negotiations around the Kyoto Protocol, 
Depledge explained that these practices helped to create a “largely informal, personal and Interactive” 
atmosphere, which in turn assisted in building up “a sense of personal involvement and ownership of the 
negotiation process among parties” (p. 43). 
80 The IGF publishes live transcripts of all the consultative processes online. 
81 Donahue and Prosser (1997), for example, described UN addresses as a distinct genre containing the following 
elements: “(a) congratulations to the current President of the proceedings, or at least addressing the speech 
toward him or her or similar officer, (b) an affirmation of the importance or the necessity of the UN and one’s 
alliance to its aims, (c) the use of highly polite and formal language, (d) observations on regional or world issues” 
(p.65). 117 
 
address the room; there would typically be an earpiece to listen to simultaneous 
interpretation.
82 The UN facilities are designed to observe a particular protocol of interaction in 
an intergovernmental setting (Kaufmann, 1988) and as such they preserve the traditional 
notion of hierarchical, formal, and designated authority. This aspect added to the dissonance 
created by the IGF leadership’s attempt to develop a new format for multistakeholder decision-
making processes (for example see Picture 2).
83  
                                                        
82 Interpretation is an important feature of international meetings as language barrier remains a significant 
obstacle in cross-cultural communication that inevitably happens in those spaces (Kaufmann, 1988). In the early 
days of the IGF consultations the IGF secretariat talked about having interpretation into all six official UN 
languages. However, not being funded through the regular UN budget, interpretation services were offered rather 
sporadically, upon the availability of interpreters. During the annual meeting of the IGF itself, the interpretation is 
available in all the main sessions. 
83 The constraints of physical space used during the consultative process are particularly evident when compared 
to some of alternative space arrangements used in recent annual meetings of the forum. The mains sessions of the 
annual IGF event (Picture 3) as well as many of the workshops (Picture 4) are still organized as classic lecture halls, 
with people on the podium being in the center of the attention and those willing to “speak to the power” need to 
line up by two or three microphones spread around the room. At the same time, there are also attempts to have 
more of roundtable-style discussions where the participants actually face each other, with no hierarchy embedded 
into the spatial arrangements (Picture 5). 118 
 
 
Picture 1: Venue of the first Open Consultations on IGF that took place in February 2006 
(photo by Kieren McCarthy, uploaded to the IGF website). 
   119 
 
 
Picture 2: The venue used for February 2010 Open Consultations was not shaped to have a 
discussion among the participants (photo by Seiiti Arata, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0). 
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Spatial arrangements are one of the elements through which the IGF, as an institution, is trying 
to negotiate its own identity, distinct from the procedure-oriented, bureaucratic discursive 
practices of the UN. Another important element of the UN heritage that the participants of the 
forum need to interact with is the UN nomenclature. The very notion of ‘multistakeholderism,’ 
which has become one of the most prominent markers of the forum, is deeply rooted in the 
traditional intergovernmental view of global policymaking. Mueller (Mueller, 2010, p. 82) 
explains that “the term multi-stakeholder has etymological roots in the United Nations complex 
of organizations, where interested parties are often referred to as ‘stakeholders.’ 
Multistakeholderism means expanding opportunities for participation beyond governments to 
other stakeholders in society” (emphasis in the original). However, operationalization of this 
concept within the UN system reinforces the state-centric view of the world. Although the UN 
distinguishes between three main groups of stakeholders – governments, the private sector, 
and the civil society – and that distinction was institutionalized throughout the WSIS process, 
the public lists of participants in the IGF and IGF consultations include three different 
categories: government delegation, international delegations, and “other entities.”
84 As Josep 
Xercavins from the World Forum of Civil Society Networks noted during early Open 
Consultations
85: 
(…) when I saw the list of participants in this meeting, it is very clearly that there are 
governments, there are international organizations, but then we have the entities list.  
(…) taking into account the whole process, the Geneva process and the Tunis process, as 
a minimum we should have two lists at least.  The business entities, private sector, and 
                                                        
84 For example, see the classification of participants in the 2010 IGF: 
http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/component/content/article/96-vilnius-2010-meeting-events/748-list 
85 IGF Open Consultations, February 2006, Geneva, Switzerland. 121 
 
the civil society lists.  And I am saying this positively, not negatively.  But these are 
interested parties that are different, different lists.  And in many cases, we can have 
synergies or points of agreement, but during Tunis and Geneva, these are listed as 
different lists.  And that would be good for them to be listed as different lists. “  
Classification of participants, spatial arrangements, behavioral protocols, origins of formal 
authority – all these are structural components of the IGF discourse as social practice. To 
participate in the IGF discussion, particularly in its consultative stages, one needs to be familiar 
with the language of the UN and with the protocol of UN meetings. To appreciate the novelty of 
the IGF settings and understand the tensions inherent to its relationship with the UN apparatus, 
one needs to have experience with the business practices of intergovernmental fora. To 
evaluate the political significance of the frames and deliberative practices developed through 
the IGF consultative process one needs to have a grasp of the settings in which this consensus 
emerged. As Fairclough (2003, p. 25) described it:  
The relationship between these different elements of social practices [status, language 
use, and physical settings+ is dialectical (…) this is a way of putting the apparently 
paradoxical fact that although the discourse element of a social practice is not the same 
as for example its social relations, each in a sense contains or internalizes the other — 
social relations are partly discoursal in nature, discourse is partly social relations. 
The tensions between the UN institutional heritage and the Internet community culture shape 
how the discourse is conducted. David Allen’s concluding remarks to his proposal for the 
operational mode of IGF is one way to describe this influence
86: 
(…) shall I call *the needed operational mode for the IGF+ the marriage between the 
working style of the Internet community, where working groups are everything, and 
where participation in those working groups is wide open, that's on the one side. And on 
the other side, the working style of U.N. proceedings and those that governments are 
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particularly familiar with. We need in this brave new world to take the risk of those 
innovations and make some good choices about how that marriage will come together. 
The substance of the IGF discourse is tied to the debates about the practices of deliberation. 
The notion of consensus, for example, has become one of the early points of contestation in the 
IGF debate. On the one hand, there were those who argued that the forum should steer away 
from controversial topics. For example, Heather Dryden, speaking on behalf of Canadian 
government said that “Canada believes it is essential to concentrate on issues where positive 
outcome can be anticipated rather than those issues known to be divisive,” and Raul Echeberra 
of LACNIC emphasized that “it's important that in the forum we seek mechanisms to find 
consensus within the work of the forum.”
87 
On the other hand, there were others who argued that debating controversial topics is what 
the forum should be doing. As Milton Mueller stated during the first open consultation, “*i+n my 
opinion, and in that of most of the civil society people that I talk to, a well-organized forum is a 
way of bridging divisive issues and finding solutions to those issues. If we attempt to prevent 
the forum from discussing those issues, first of all, where will those issues be discussed? 
Secondly, how will they ever be resolved?”
88 The view of consensus as the ideal outcome is an 
inherent feature of UN discourse—some UN officials view their role as making everybody in the 
meeting agree (Epstein, 2010; Kaufmann, 1988). The need for a space for knowledge exchange 
and debate over controversies was promoted by the civil society during the WSIS and the WGIG 
processes (Mathiason, 2009; Mueller, 2010). As the forum progressed, the views of some 
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stakeholders have changed and others, who could not or refused to adjust, have stopped or 
nearly stopped participating. The tension between institutional conservatism and institutional 
innovation, however, continues to contextualize the IGF discourse; it is fueled by competing 
interests bound by structural arrangements; and it shapes the IGF discourse and is re-shaped 
through the discourse at the same time. 
5.2. Structuration of the IGF 
 
 “To be successful, the IGF needed to draw on two cultures - the 
formal culture of the UN system and the informal culture of the 
Internet” 
Anriette Esterhuysen (2008, p. 38) 
 
Formalization of the IGF practices is an ongoing process. Some participants I interviewed 
rejected the very idea of IGF institutionalization; others wanted a more formal framework with 
clearly marked functions and procedures. These two extremes are reflective of the inherent 
tensions of the IGF as a non-UN-like UN forum. Since the first set of open consultations, the IGF 
community has been spending a lot of its time debating the role of the forum compared to 
other Internet governance institutions, the shape of the forum itself, and the internal decision-
making processes within the IGF. Kelty’s (2008) description of a community as a “recursive 
public,” one that is “vitally concerned with the material and practical maintenance and 
modification of the technical, legal, practical, and conceptual means of its own existence as a 
public” (p.3) is particularly relevant in this case. The institutionalization of the IGF is a 124 
 
continuous negotiation of the boundaries of Internet governance and principles upon which it 
should be based. 
Mueller, Mathiason, and Klein (2007) argued that the major flaw in attempts to construct a 
global Internet governance regime lies in the lack of attention and willingness to discuss the 
norms and principles upon which such regime will be based (also see Mueller, 2010). Mueller et 
al. claimed that the debates in the WSIS and WGIG jumped to a discussion of rules and 
procedures, before there was an agreed-upon normative base from which to do that. The IGF 
seems to continue struggling with the same difficulty, whereby the discussions about rules, 
procedures, and spheres of authority refer to norms and principles, but do not address them 
directly.
89 As such, the participants invoke diverse perceptions of the Internet and, with them, 
different structures of signification, as opposed to having a common normative ground or a 
shared structural understanding of how to tackle such a wide and broadly defined policy issue. 
A newcomer to the IGF will quickly recognize a nexus of relatively stable components composed 
of bureaucratic units, procedures, and meetings. These include the IGF secretariat, the 
Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG), Open Consultations, the annual meeting of the IGF, 
and IGF Dynamic Coalitions—the fixtures of the IGF (Figure 4). It may take longer, however, for 
a newcomer to identify the set of practices that have evolved around these institutional 
arrangements. This set of practices, brought to the IGF by its participants from a variety of 
                                                        
89 The IGF Dynamic Coalition on Core Internet Values is one of the attempts to mainstream the discussion about 
values and core principles within the IGF. Established in 2009 the coalition seems to be gaining only limited 
traction with the IGF community. The mailing list of the coalition is mostly inactive and the meeting held in 2010, 
although it hosted a dynamic discussion, was scarcely attended, compared to the meetings of other dynamic 
coalitions such as Dynamic  Coalition on Internet Rights and Principles (see section 5.2.4. for a detailed discussion 
of the dynamic coalitions). 125 
 
spaces where Internet governance happens, is very diverse. They represent an ongoing conflict 
between two cultures of Internet policymaking—that of the Internet community and that of the 
UN-style intergovernmental decision-making.  
The newness of the IGF institutional arrangement and its continuous renegotiation embodies a 
struggle over advancing a set of values and principles of governance each cultural group is 
asking to preserve. In this debate one can most clearly see both the enactment of social 
structures and the exercise of the agency of particular IGF players. By debating the formal and 
the informal practices of the forum, IGF participants engage in discursive reflection not only on 
the technical modus operandi of the forum, but also on the underlying normative framework 
for Internet policy decision-making. When figuring out ways of making decisions about the 
conduct of the forum and its content, the participants bring in often conflicting views on 
authority, legitimacy, and morality. In the process some of these views become IGF norms, 
others are adjusted as they become norms, and yet others are pushed out of the IGF space. 
Unpacking the practices that emerged around the fixtures of the IGF tells a story of the 
structuration of the IGF as a space that reifies a set of hybrid structures drawn from the two 
distinct cultures of Internet policymaking.126 
 
 
Figure 4: Map of the IGF discursive processes 
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5.2.1. IGF Secretariat. 
The secretariat is one of the core elements of any UN conference. It is typically the main driving 
force behind the management of the process and the shaping of the debate. Haas (2002) 
explains that “autonomous secretariats staffed with professionals recruited on merit” and 
“independent and capable executive heads” are among the most influential “institutional 
design features” of any UN meeting (p.76). The secretariat is responsible for the logistics of the 
conference, for the preparatory process, and for publishing the official records and the final 
reports of the meeting. All these activities taken together make typical secretariats ultimate 
gatekeepers in terms of production of discourse
90 and a nexus where ways of thinking about 
authority and legitimacy are reified or challenged (Kaufmann, 1988).  
The IGF secretariat is similar to any other secretariat of a UN meeting in that it coordinates the 
preparatory process for the annual meeting and manages the bureaucracy of the conference. 
The IGF Secretariat facilitates the Open Consultations, which are the primary preparatory 
process for the annual IGF meeting, and works with the Multistakeholder Advisory Group 
(MAG), which acts as a steering committee for the Forum. The Secretariat also works with the 
host country to find a venue and settle various logistics such as transportation and security; in 
addition, the secretariat works with third party vendors and the UN system to ensure services 
such as interpretation and captioning. During the consultations and the annual meeting of the 
                                                        
90 Kaufmann (1988) also explains that the UN practice accepts timely corrections of the language of the record. The 
decision to commit corrections lies within the power of the secretariat, which is typically reluctant to make 
substantive changes. Yet, when the final reports represent consensus language agreed upon the participating 
parties, the language is frequently changed and altered before it is finalized. 128 
 
forum, the secretariat acts as a host and primarily as an administrating unit. In the phase 
following the annual IGF event, the Secretariat coordinates the writing of the Chairman’s 
Summary, which is the main formal output of the IGF. Although seemingly administrative, these 
activities play an important role in shaping elements of social practice that influence IGF 
discourse (Fairclough, 2003, p. 25).  
In IGF, the secretariat needs to balance the constraints of the UN system and the calls for 
organizational innovation coming from stakeholders who are not part of the UN. For example, 
one of the growing concerns is the need to balance the large number of workshop requests and 
institutional constraints such as the length of each session, which is in part a function of the 
availability of interpreters.
91 Moreover, the arrangement of the rooms contributes to the type 
of engagement the participants will feel comfortable with; the space in the UN headquarters in 
Geneva, as well as in many UN conferences, reifies a hierarchical approach to power where 
authority is derived from the formal titles of participants, not necessarily based on merit, and 
that celebrates the centrality of the nation state in international politics. In the recent years, 
however, the IGF is experimenting with round table arrangements (see Picture 5), as opposed 
to the more traditional format where a panel of experts sits on the podium facing the audience 
                                                        
91 During the open consultations in February 2009, Markus Kummer explained:  
The U.N. has fairly fixed rules that are set by the member states and supervised by various committees for 
budget and utilization of resources.  And U.N. slots are two times three hours, and that is mainly because 
the interpreters work in three-hour slots.  And we cannot change that. We cannot have three two-h our 
slots, for instance.  We have to have two three-hour slots.  And we are also required to make maximum 
use of these resources. 129 
 
(see Picture 3 and Picture 4)
92. Such seemingly pragmatic decisions play an important role in 
guiding the discourse in terms of what voices will get heard and in terms of setting the 
discursive environment of the forum; the more leveled settings and round-table arrangements 
seen in some IGF meetings, ones that eliminate the prescribed hierarchy of panel and audience, 
are said to encourage more inclusive interactions and dialogues where everyone is a panelist 
and a member of the audience. 
 
 
Picture 3: IGF 2009 plenary session (photo by Seiiti Arata, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0) 
 
                                                        
92 Notably, the IGF community tried to work in less hierarchical interaction even in environments designed to 
sustain hierarchy. For example, the “Management of Critical Internet Resources” plenary during the 2009 IGF in 
Sharm el Sheikh was conducted in the plenary room (Picture 3), but without a panel. The session only had Nitin 
Desai as the chair, and Chris Disspain of the .au registry and Jeanette Hoffman of the London School of Economics, 
as moderators. 130 
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Picture 4: Typical workshop arrangement during IGF 2009 (photo by Seiiti Arata, CC BY-NC-SA 
2.0) 
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Picture 5: Alternative space arrangement for a workshop during IGF 2009 (photo by Seiiti 
Arata, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0) 
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The IGF secretariat is also unique in a number of ways on the practical level. Unlike a typical UN 
secretariat that needs to deal with a limited range of actors—mostly professional diplomats and 
government delegations—one of the main tasks of the IGF secretariat, from day one, was 
mediating between stakeholders coming from different institutional background and bearing a 
range of, often conflicting, worldviews. The diverse body of participants implied an array of 
perceptions of the “normal” way of conducting the consultative process and making decisions 
in a policy deliberation forum. One of the pivotal tasks for the forum, channeled through the 
secretariat, was to establish a common ground in understanding of authority, legitimacy, and 
ways of decision-making. For many, this process, which involved new actors and deliberate 
creation of new institutional settings, was exploring unchartered waters—it was an experiment 
(Mathiason, 2009). As a result, Mathiason notes, the IGF secretariat was more active compared 
to traditional presiding officers in the UN settings. First, being nominated directly by the 
Secretary General of the UN gave the IGF secretariat more autonomy compared to those of 
other UN fora. Second, extra-budgetary funding reinforced the independence of the secretariat 
vis-à-vis other players within the UN system. Finally, the open-ended mandate of the IGF gave 
its leadership the freedom to create new structures and procedures as the forum evolved from 
the WSIS process. The emergence of dynamic coalitions is frequently cited as one such 
structure. Others procedures involve publishing verbatim transcripts of the meetings on the IGF 
website openly accessible to all. The secretariat, as such, was engaged in the creation of a new 
“normal” within the particular settings of the IGF as a non-UN, yet still UN forum. The particular 
settings of the IGF creation placed a unique challenge on the IGF secretariat to mediate across 
different approaches to policy deliberation and various perceptions of the Internet as 134 
 
economic, cultural, social, and mostly political tool; at the same time, the lack of settled 
structures within the IGF gave the members of the secretariat more space to exercise their 
individual agency. 
5.2.1.1. Secretariat leadership 
The leadership cadre of the IGF founders was recruited directly from the WGIG. The UN 
Secretary General, Kofi Annan, personally appointed his Special Adviser on WSIS, Mr. Nitin 
Desai, who had chaired the WGIG, to lead consultations on the establishment of the IGF; Desai 
has since become the Chairman of the MAG and co-chaired some of the annual meetings of the 
forum together with representatives of the host countries. In fact, the entire Secretariat of 
WGIG was eventually morphed into the IGF Secretariat
93, including, Markus Kummer, who was 
the Executive Coordinator of WGIG and later became the Executive Coordinator of the IGF 
Secretariat. Both Nitin and Kummer emerged as spokespeople for the WGIG during the second 
phase of the WSIS and their transition to leadership positions with the IGF, perceived by some 
as ‘natural’. They also transferred many of the practices established during the WGIG process to 
the IGF. The WGIG was considered a successful experiment in multistakeholderism, and Desai 
and Kummer were credited with this success (Mathiason, 2009), even though neither man had 
a prior track record in Internet-related policymaking
94. As Markus Kummer described in an 
interview:  
At that time [WSIS] I didn’t have any background on Internet policy making or whatever. 
But we managed to conclude the negotiations and the result of these negotiations was 
                                                        
93 To clarify, the WGIG Secretariat was initially lean due to budgetary and time constraints.  One of the notable 
features of both Secretariats was their extra-budgetary funding.  
94 Nitin Desai was involved with environmental issues in the UN and Markus Kummer was a Swiss career diplomat. 135 
 
to create a Working Group on Internet Governance. (…) And I do remember, when I 
chaired that group, I did not think in the slightest or remotest that I might stay involved 
in that issue. But I was then asked if I would take on the Secretary of this Working 
Group.  (…) And I thought, well, after all it might be an interesting challenge because it’s 
combining cutting edge technology with diplomacy in a new way of diplomatic 
interaction between traditional government diplomats, negotiators, and business 
technology, and also civil society, for civil society had emerged as very strong player in 
the WSIS context.  
In the IGF context, Desai and Kummer were not just bureaucrats, they were symbols of the 
WGIG achievements and idea entrepreneurs dedicated to taking the lessons of the working 
group further by establishing a new kind of institutional setting within the UN. They stayed in 
this position, because they demonstrated both the understanding of the UN system as well as 
open mindedness and appreciation of the practices of decision-making of the Internet 
community. They operated within the structural world of the Internet community as well as 
that of the UN system. In fact, they acted as a bridge between the two cultures required to co-
exist in this new space. In the same interview, Kummer explained:  
And out of the Working Group on Internet Governance came the recommendation to 
create this *IGF+… basically what we know to work. There was something missing out 
there… where you could discuss all these issues with no natural home. Yes, we identified 
that there are plenty of organizations dealing with aspects related to policymaking on 
the Internet, but there was no platform where the linkages could be discussed and that 
was the proposal that came out of WGIG, and there was taken away the natural 
continuation that this has to continue and that I be the secretary to this Internet 
Governance Forum. 
The continuity, both conceptual and personified, is important. Both Desai and Kummer are as 
much products of the WGIG process as the WGIG process was the product of their work. In 
Malcolm’s (2008) terms, they embodied values that a number of stakeholder groups wanted to 
bring to the new institution and they proved themselves as having contributed substantively to 136 
 
the work of the community. On the one hand, both came from the background of diplomacy 
and intergovernmental relations, but on the other they were open to ideas of meritocracy and 
bottom up decision-making, as well as the liberal and neo-liberal values advocated by the civil 
society and the private sector. Moving on to the IGF was a continuation of the creative process 
started in WGIG. Having the same leadership was an important signal to the participants
95 in 
terms of what they can expect from the forum and how they could conduct themselves
96. The 
presiding officers set the tone for the meetings and were very active not only in quantitative 
(Desai and Kummer are responsible for almost 30% of the volume of the discussion during the 
consultative process), but also in qualitative terms (for a more detailed account of Desai’s 
contribution to reaching consensus see Mathiason, 2009). 
The pivotal role of the individual leadership of Desai and Kummer became particularly salient in 
the beginning of 2011, after both individuals had left their respective posts
97 just as the IGF 
mandate came under scrutiny from a specially-established working group of the UN 
Commission on Science Technology and Development (CSTD).  In private conversations I held 
with a number of actors since then, some viewed the timing as particularly problematic, 
because the dedication of key players to the IGF is viewed as a vote of confidence for the forum 
itself. Others referred to the leadership vacuum as a danger to the character of the IGF, 
because the forum became associated with Desai and Kummer both as its public faces and as 
                                                        
95 14 out of 40 members of WGIG participated in the first round of Open Consultations on IGF in February 2006 and 
many of them remain active members of the IGF community up to date. 
96 See the congratulatory remarks during the first Open Consultations on IGF (available at 
http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/athensmeeting), which refer to expectation of continuity from WGIG. 
97 Nitin Desai retired and Markus Kummer took a position as the Vice President of Public Policy at the Internet 
Society. 137 
 
guardians of what Mueller (2010) labels as “denationalized liberalism” within the UN 
environment that generally favors more hierarchical and nation-state-oriented value systems. 
This uncertainty regarding the personalities of the future leadership of the IGF is currently one 
of the primary concerns of the IGF community when they discuss the future of the forum.
98 
5.2.1.2. Secretariat funding 
Funding of the IGF secretariat is a particularly important structural attribute, with both 
symbolic and practical repercussions. The IGF secretariat is funded through extra-budgetary 
contributions. In other words, there is a dedicated trust fund administered by the UN 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), where interested parties can contribute 
at will (“Input to the Secretary-General’s report on the system-wide follow-up to WSIS,” 2007). 
In their June 2007 concept paper, the Internet Governance Project (IGP) explained that, “*i+n 
the United Nations, programs are funded from the regular (assessed) budget when the issues 
being addressed are of an interest to all members of the United Nations and there is a need to 
provide core financing to ensure that they are addressed properly” (p.3). At the same time, 
“*v+oluntary funding is indicated when the issues are of a particular interest to some states and 
usually these funds supplement regular budget funding” (Money and advice for the Internet 
Governance Forum: The structure of the MAG and financing the IGF secretariat, 2007, p. 3). This 
arrangement supports the notion of the IGF as both unique and an isolated space within the UN 
system. It represents a set of norms that not all members states consider valid, important or 
worthy of their support. On the flip side, in the extremely politicized environment of the UN, 
                                                        
98 See transcripts of Open Consultations held in February 2011 in Geneva, Switzerland.  138 
 
those who choose to support the forum are making a statement that they subscribe to the 
values enacted through the IGF process. 
Formally, reliance on voluntary contributions to support the IGF aimed to signify its 
independence from intergovernmental influence; were the IGF funded through the regular UN 
budget, it would be considered a formal UN program, subject to intergovernmental decision-
making processes
99. For example, in recent response to the CSTD questionnaire about potential 
improvements to the IGF, the Canadian Internet Registration Authority (CIRA) stated: 
“Financing the IGF through the UN budget could be detrimental to its current multi-stakeholder 
format and could lead to enabling more control by the UN of not only the IGF but perhaps other 
Internet governance functions.”
100 Similarly, the US government wrote: “(… ) we do not support 
the IGF being solely financed by the general UN budget, which would alter the multi-
stakeholder nature of IGF support. (…) *We+ believe that the UN’s role should be light-handed 
and that IGF funding should be based on the voluntary contributions of stakeholders.”
101 
Yet, the model of voluntary contributions raises two important structural questions: the 
question of sustainability and the question of influence over the IGF, i.e. “who pays the piper, 
calls the tune;” both questions are interrelated and have implications for the structural settings 
                                                        
99 This is a complex claim and it refers primarily to the symbolism of regular UN funding. Despite claims for 
apparent independence from the UN system, the IGF came out of a UN process and its mandate was ratified by an 
inherently intergovernmental General Assembly of the UN. Moreover, as suggested by one of my interviewees, the 
ITU sometimes frames the IGF being a result of their work (by the way of WSIS), which again places the IGF under 
the intergovernmental umbrella.  
100 See CIRA response to the questionnaire of the CSTD working group on improvements to the IGF (available at 
http://www.unctad.info/en/CstdWG/WGIGF_Contributions/). 
101 See US Government response to the questionnaire of the CSTD working group on improvements to the IGF 
(available at http://www.unctad.info/en/CstdWG/WGIGF_Contributions/). 139 
 
of IGF discourse. Does the funding make the IGF a mouthpiece of one or more of the interested 
parties? Will the support stop if IGF participants start voicing criticism of some of the donors?  
The budget of the IGF secretariat is not publically available, but the total number of donors to 
the trust fund has been consistently growing since the establishment of the IGF.  Starting in 
2006 with only 12 donors, 27 entities contributed to the trust fund in 2010. 11 out of the 12 
original donors have consistently supported the Forum all these years, and in fact three of them 
had started their support already at the WGIG stage.   
The full list of contributors to the trust fund across the years can be found in  
Table 2. Among them are governments of developed countries, such as Finland, Norway, and 
Japan; large international NGOs, such as ICANN, ISOC, and Number Resource Organization 
(NRO), which were created explicitly as Internet-governance focused institutions; as well as 
major Internet industry players, including large telcos and registries. As of 2010 the ITU is listed 
as one of the contributors to the trust fund, but majority of the recently added donors belong 
to the private sector.
102 
Table 2: Donors to the IGF secretariat
103 
  WGIG  IGF 
2006 
IGF 
2007 
IGF 
2008 
IGF 
2009 
IGF 2010 
HOST GOVERNMENTS  Switzerland  Greece  Brazil  India  Egypt  Lithuania 
             
TRUST FUND             
Afilias Global Registry Services             
                                                        
102 The ITU holds its own WSIS follow up event—WSIS Forum—with an aim to have another phase of the summit in 
2015. Some IGF activists view ITU funding for the IGF as a strategic move towards moving the IGF entirely under 
the ITU umbrella by the next phase of the WSIS. 
103 Shaded cells mark years when the entity contributed to the IGF 140 
 
  WGIG  IGF 
2006 
IGF 
2007 
IGF 
2008 
IGF 
2009 
IGF 2010 
AT&T             
auDA Australia's Domain Name 
Administrator 
           
CISCO             
CommunityDNS             
Coordination Center for TLD RU 
[In Russian] 
           
Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform (UK) 
           
Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (BIS) 
           
European Union (EU)             
Foundation for MultiMedia 
Communications (FMMC) 
           
French Government, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
           
Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN) 
           
ITU             
MCADE, LLC.             
Ministry of Economic Affairs of 
The Netherlands 
           
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Norway 
           
Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communication of the 
Government of Japan 
           
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of 
Finland 
           
Nic.at The Austrian Registry             
NIKKEI DigitalCORE             
Nominet UK             
Number Resource Organization 
(NRO) 
           
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft - 
Communications 
           
Summit Strategies International             
Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation (SDC) 
           141 
 
  WGIG  IGF 
2006 
IGF 
2007 
IGF 
2008 
IGF 
2009 
IGF 2010 
The Internet Society (ISOC)             
The Swiss Education & Research 
Network (SWITCH) 
           
UNINETT Norid             
Verisign             
Verizon Foundation             
             
IN KIND             
The United Nations Office in 
Geneva (UNOG) 
           
Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN) 
           
Agence Intergouvernementale 
de la Francophonie- Institut 
Francophone des Nouvelles 
Technologies de l'Information 
et de la Formation (INTIF)  
           
nic.br The Brazilian Network 
Information Center  
           
Centre for Distance-Spanning 
Technology at the Luleå 
University of Technology 
           
The UNDP Asia-Pacific 
Development Information 
Programme (APDIP)  
           
The donors constitute a rather homogenous group. With the exception of the IGF host 
countries and Brazilian Network Information Center, all the donors are coming from western, 
liberal societies. Even though among the donors there are representatives of the three 
stakeholder groups (government, private sector, and the civil society), many of them, such as 
ICANN, Cisco, Verisign, Nominet, etc., can be viewed as affiliated with the existing status quo in 
Internet governance. ICANN, for example, is the symbol of the status quo, which is frequently 
referred to as the ICANN regime (e.g. Mathiason, 2009; Mueller, 2010); it is that system that 142 
 
according to many “ain’t broken” (or ain’t broken enough) and thus does not need a fix through 
an intergovernmental intervention. Organizations such as Nominet, auDA, Nic.at, NRO, etc. are 
all part of the ICANN ecosystem of private-sector-led organizations managing Internet names 
and numbers with close working ties to ICANN (see Mueller, 2002 for the early history of this 
ecosystem). The corporate players contributing towards the IGF, such as Verizon, AT&T, 
Siemens, Cisco, Verisign, and Affilias, are currently enjoying dominant positions in their 
respective segments of the Internet market, being it providing Internet connectivity, 
manufacturing network equipment or managing network infrastructure. Governments 
supporting the IGF financially are overwhelmingly West-European, liberal, developed 
economies such as Finland, Switzerland, UK, and the Netherlands.
104 What unites these donors 
is being ideologically, financially or politically invested in the current system of Internet 
governance, even when they express criticism of certain aspects of it (i.e. the European 
criticism of the dominant role of the US in the oversight of ICANN and IANA). Moreover, this 
group is conceptually closer to the private-sector-driven and bottom-up oriented Internet 
community, which makes it more likely to support the multistakeholder approach, as a function 
of understanding this approach as well as realizing its strategic value in limiting government 
intervention in the regulation of the Internet. 
Typically, most donors have a representative participating in the open consultations. At no 
point, however, did I observe the donors to be given formal special treatment, other than 
occasional thanks, which are usually reserved for governments hosting the IGF-related events; 
                                                        
104 Japan is also a donor country to the IGF. Although not European, it is a developed economy invested in the 
sustainability of the current Internet governance regime. 143 
 
the dominance of a particular participant throughout consultative process does not appear to 
be a function of that actor belonging to a donor organization. This perceived neutrality is 
important, because it strengthens the legitimacy of both the IGF and the multistakeholder 
model. Representatives of the donors, as individuals, do establish relative dominance through 
persistent participation and involvement in the preparatory processes and in the annual IGF 
event, but that practice is not unique to the donors. On the other hand, donor influence may 
run on a more fundamental level. For example, location of the IGF secretariat in Geneva, where 
it also holds most of the consultative meetings, has been under continuous criticism from day 
one. Participants from developing countries and from the civil society have warned that the 
high costs of participation in consultations in Geneva may mute voices of the traditionally 
underrepresented stakeholders, who do not have funds to travel. At the same time the 
secretariat is bound by practical considerations such as in-kind donation from the United 
Nations Office in Geneva (UNOG), which includes space and, when available, translation and 
interpretation services. The Swiss government has also conditioned its support to the 
secretariat being set in Geneva.
105,106 Mueller (2010) implied that donations might have also 
influenced decisions about membership in the MAG. He alluded to the ICANN $200,000 pledge 
                                                        
105 IGF Open Consultations, February 2006, Geneva, Switzerland. 
106 Another foundational decision that may have been influenced by donors is establishment of the secretariat and 
the MAG, as opposed to a more formal bureau, typical to UN settings. In his response to Brazilian intervention, 
during February 2007 open consultations, Nitin Desai mentioned that the decision-making process included 
consulting the donors. He said: 
(…) when you have a multistakeholder forum with everybody on an equal basis, the very process of 
constituting a bureau itself is problematic, but even more so when there's no membership. It's an open 
door. So then we clarified. We asked this question to the people that sponsored. And they said, "This is 
what we had in mind." Because I said, "How do I constitute a bureau in an open forum?" And then they 
explained that this is how it was supposed [to be resolved]. 144 
 
to support the IGF during its early stages, and the co-occurring nomination of 11 MAG members 
affiliated or associated with the organization.  
During the annual IGF meetings, host countries have an exceptionally visible position, which is 
typical to UN meetings. The hosts bear most of the costs of organizing the physical event and it 
is customary that government officials from the hosting country would have more “air time” 
during the event, particularly during the opening and closing sessions. Ministers and other high-
level government officials would have opportunities to make speeches, as well as the local chair 
of the annual meeting of the IGF; local actors are involved in the plenary sessions as speakers. 
In fact involvement of the host government starts at the preparatory meeting. While most of 
this involvement is dedicated to logistical issues, it also provides an opportunity for the host 
government to advance its agenda for Internet governance. Thus, for example, during the 
preparatory process for the 2007 IGF in Rio De Janeiro, the Brazilian government helped to 
amplify calls for the inclusion of discussion about critical Internet resources in the main session 
of the forum. This topic touches on one of the main controversies that led to the establishment 
of the IGF, i.e. US oversight over ICANN, and as such many participants in the open 
consultations were opposed to the idea of making it part of the IGF agenda. It was to a great 
degree the Brazilian position as host that allowed supporters of inclusion of a debate about 
management of critical resources, to make it part of the agenda. Such practices reify the 
structures of traditional governance institutions such as the UN, which are built around the 
notion of nation state and celebrate sovereignty as a primary source of authority. 145 
 
Relative financial independence of the secretariat comes at a cost of uncertainty and reflects on 
the sustainability of the IGF as an institution. Financing the secretariat has been an issue for 
each of the open consultations since the inception of the forum. For example, in February 2007 
consultations Markus Kummer explained the financial and logistical constraints of following 
some of the UN practices, such as publishing documents only when they are translated into all 
six UN languages. The IGF eventually deviated from that practice and started publishing the 
English version of the documents as soon as possible, with other languages added when 
available. At the same time, the secretariat was not able to respond to a request for all the 
documents to be translated into the six UN languages, because it was relying on extra-
budgetary funds. Kummer explained it as having “also a time constraint and a capacity 
constraint. “We cannot,” he said, “just have U.N. translator like that. We can only use them if 
they don't have anything to do, and then, in addition, we have to pay for them.”
107 Being 
primarily a discursive space, language barriers remain one of the obstacles to participation in 
the IGF, and occasionally appear on the agenda of the preparatory process.
108 
Lack of predictable funding also impacts the ability of the secretariat to promote diversity of 
speakers at the IGF, which is one of the principles the forum has committed itself to. 
Participation in the preparatory processes as well as in the annual IGF meeting is costly, so the 
question of participation funding is one of the more persistent items on the internal IGF 
agenda. Within the current IGF settings, the solutions have been unsystematic. For example, in 
2008 the government of Canada contributed funds to the IGF secretariat with an explicit intent 
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to support the participation of actors from developing countries in the MAG and in the main 
IGF meetings; this support was distributed, at least partially, through the Diplo Foundation
109, 
which is one of the main players working in the field of capacity building in Internet 
governance, specifically in developing countries. In 2009, ISOC launched its “IGF 
Ambassadorship” program, which supports participation of ISOC members in the IGF and 
includes a mentoring component with an ISOC veteran.  
From a discursive point of view, limited funds result in the recycling of speakers. Diversity of 
participants and inclusion of new voices are repeatedly mentioned as a desirable achievement. 
In search of tangible outcomes for the IGF, Nominet, for example, has proposed including “to 
what extent have new voices been included in the policy dialogue” as one of the measures for 
the IGF impact.
110 Yet, over the years, the proportion of returning speakers in the IGF plenary 
has been constantly growing. Holding 2007 as the base year, the proportion of returning 
speakers grew from 18% in 2008, to 28% in 2009, to 33% in 2010 (also see Table 3). In their 
response to the questionnaire of the CSTD Working Group on improvements to the IGF, the 
Association for Progressive Communication suggested that: “A budget for inviting speakers for 
main sessions” is needed “so that their selection is based on expertise rather than on 'they are 
attending already',”
111 which is currently one of the main elements that influence who gets to 
speak at the IGF in both the main sessions and workshops. 
   
                                                        
109 IGF Open Consultations, September 2008, Geneva Switzerland. 
110 IGF Open Consultations, September 2009, Geneva, Switzerland. 
111 See APC response to the questionnaire of the CSTD working group on improvements to the IGF (available at 
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Table 3: Most persistent speakers 2007-2010 
Name  Plenary Speaker 
(count) 
MAG  
(years) 
Affiliation 
Anriette 
Esterhuysen 
4  0  Executive  Director,  Association  for 
Progressive Communications (APC) 
Chris Disspain  4  5  Chair, Country Code Names Supporting 
Organization  (ccNSO)  Council;  Chief 
Executive Officer, .au Registry 
Nitin Desai  4  5  Special Adviser to the Secretary-General 
on Internet Governance  and Chairman 
of the Multistakeholder Advisory Group 
Raúl Echeberría  4  5  Executive  Director/Chief  Executive 
Officer,  Latin  America  and  Caribbean 
Internet Addresses Registry (LACNIC) 
Alice Munyua  3  0  Director,  Communications  Commission 
of Kenya (CCK) 
David Gross  3  0  Coordinator  for  International 
Communications Policy, Department of 
State, Washington D.C. 
Hamadoun Touré  3  0  Secretary-General,  International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
Jeanette Hofmann  3  5  Researcher,  Social  Science  Research 
Center 
Jonathan Charles  3  0  Jonathan  Charles,  Foriegn 
Correspondent, BBC 
Katitza  Rodriguez 
Pereda 
3  2  International Rights Director, Electronic 
Frontier Foundation 
Lynn St. Amour  3  0  President and CEO, Internet Society 
Markus Kummer  3  0  Markus  Kummer,  Executive 
Coordinator, IGF Secretariat 
N. Ravi Shanker  3  3  Joint  Secretary,  Government  of  India, 
Ministry  of  Communications  and 
Information Technology, Department of 
Information Technology 
Nii Quaynor  3  4  Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of 
Network Computer Systems; President, 
Internet Society of Ghana 
Patrik Fältström  3  5  Consulting  Engineer,  Cisco  Systems; 
Member,  Internet  Engineering  Task 
Force  (IETF);  Member,  Swedish 
Government  Information  Technology 
Policy and Strategy Group 
Robert Pepper  3  0  Government Affairs, Cisco, Washington 
D.C. 
 
5.2.2. Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) 
An important aspect of creating the IGF ‘from scratch’ was agreeing on decision-making 
mechanisms. Mathiason (2009) explains that during the first open consultations “*t+he 148 
 
discussions focused on three basic questions: what issues would be discussed at Athens, how 
would they be discussed and who would decide this” (p.128). In other words, the debate 
centered on mechanisms of formal agenda setting for the IGF. In traditional UN settings, the 
decision-making power clearly lies with the representatives of nation-states, but who holds the 
authority to decide in a space where governments and non-governmental entities are expected 
to interact on an equal footing?  
Early in the IGF process, the participants aired proposals for the organization of decision-
making in the IGF. These proposals ranged from a system of traditional UN bureaus, in a fashion 
similar to the WSIS
112 and supported by the G-77 and China, to self-organizing mechanisms 
modeled after the Internet Engineering Task Force, as suggested by Vittorio Bertola and echoed 
by a number of other participants.
113 The compromise solution came in a form that many 
perceived as similar to the WGIG model
114—a lean secretariat working alongside a group that 
represents different stakeholders—the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG); both functions 
are appointed by the Secretary General of the UN.  
The MAG was charged to act as a program committee for the IGF, but it was not given a clear 
authority to decide, only to advise the Secretary General on the agenda of the forum. In 
                                                        
112 During the WSIS there were three bureaus dedicated to coordination of each stakeholder group. According to 
Mathiason (2009), the government bureau clearly dominated the scene during the WSIS, which in turn made 
representatives of the civil society and the private sector wary, when this model was proposed during the IGF 
consultations. 
113 IGF Open Consultations, February 2006, Geneva, Switzerland. 
114 Speaking during September 2007 Open Consultations, Nitin Desai explained: 
Let me say that in many ways, the origins of this Advisory Group lie in the experience of the Working 
Group on Internet Governance, which was a multistakeholder group which met and produced surprisingly 
a report which was unanimous, and which played a certain role in Tunis. And therefore, when the follow-
up came in the form of IGF, there was a tendency to look toward that model. 149 
 
practical terms, however, MAG recommendations regarding the program are rather influential, 
because, as Izumi Aizu from the Internet Caucus put it during November 2010 Open 
Consultations, “there is no other clear body or structure in and of the IGF.”
115 In other words, 
the beauty of the MAG solution was that it offered an ever evolving decision-making body for 
the IGF, whose decision making authority was not prescribed, but enacted through its 
consultative capacity. Malcolm (2008) wrote: 
What is known is that the Advisory Group possessed little formal authority; for the most 
part operating as a forum for discussion akin to open consultations, at which those in 
attendance expressed and debated their views, but without the object of taking formal 
decisions. (…) What few decisions the Advisory Group did make on its own behalf on 
matters such as the selection of panelists for the plenary sessions were made by rough 
consensus as declared by the Chair (p.320-321). 
The MAG is the most formalized agenda setting function of the IGF. Members of the MAG 
impact the agenda directly by actively participating in the open consultations and then working 
as a group, through meetings and a mailing list, to agree on the overall theme for the annual 
IGF meeting and finalize the selection of workshops. The MAG is the main space where “the 
politics of agenda setting” (Mueller, 2010, pp. 117–120) play out as this is where the formal 
agenda is drafted. Debates over the content, however, is one way the politics of agenda setting 
can play out; another way agenda is impacted is through formalizing the structure of the annual 
event. Using the words of Bertrand de La Chapelle, over the course of five years the MAG “has 
shaped the format and the structure of the meeting” so that today there is “a format for those 
four days that is relatively stable in terms of the balance between the main sessions and the 
workshops, the fact that we adopt now open discussions for the main sessions instead of 
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panels.”
116 Thus, for example, workshop proposals need to explain how they fit in one of the 
main sessions of the annual IGF event (see Table 4) and unorthodox formats for workshops and 
the plenary are encouraged.  
Table 4: Main themes of the Internet Governance Forum, 2006-2010 
Issue area  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Openness  Openness  Openness  Promoting 
cyber-
security  and 
trust 
Openness, 
privacy  and 
security 
Openness, 
privacy  and 
security 
Privacy  -   - 
Security  Security  Security 
Access  Access  Access  Reaching  the 
next billion 
Access  and 
diversity 
Access  and 
diversity  Diversity  Diversity  Diversity 
Critical 
Internet 
resources 
-  Critical 
Internet 
resources 
Managing 
critical 
Internet 
resources 
Managing 
critical 
Internet 
resources 
Managing 
critical  Internet 
resources 
Emerging 
issues 
Emerging 
issues 
Emerging 
issues 
The  Internet 
of tomorrow 
Impact  of 
social 
networks 
Cloud 
computing 
Internet 
governance 
-  -  -  Internet 
governance in 
light  of  WSIS 
principles 
IG4D 
Taking 
stock
117 
The  way 
forward 
Taking  stock 
and  the  way 
forward 
Taking  stock 
and  the  way 
forward 
Taking  stock 
and  the  way 
forward 
Taking  stock  of 
Internet 
governance  and 
the way forward 
(“Continuation of the Internet Governance Forum: Note by Secretary General (A/65/78–
E/2010/68),” 2007) 
The primary tension surrounding MAG is focused, however, on the politics of participation  
(Mueller, 2010, pp. 114–117). The MAG was off to a rocky start. Candidates to the MAG were 
nominated by various stakeholder groups, but the selection process of MAG members was 
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117 Under the title “taking stock” the IGF hosts a discussion about the future agenda of the forum and its 
governance practices. This is one of the sessions where the agenda for the following Open Consultations is set and 
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criticized, especially by the civil society actors, as opaque. Malcolm (2008) and Mueller (2006b, 
2010) notice that originally about half of the seats in the group were reserved for government 
representatives and another 25% for actors associated with ICANN. The representation factor, 
while potentially influential in terms of agenda setting, was also symbolic. Although concerned 
about extensive ICANN representation, Muller (2006b) notes that as individuals, participants 
represented a wide range of opinions.
118 Yet, being the most formalized organ of the IGF as a 
multistakeholder environment, perception of representativeness of the stakeholder groups 
mattered.
119 In addition, MAG started off with closed internal communications and closed 
meetings, attracting further criticism from those outside of the group. The group was diligent, 
however, with publishing its reports after each meeting.  From these reports we know, for 
example, that observers from intergovernmental organizations, in fact participated as full 
members in the closed discussions (Malcolm, 2008). In 2008, following vocal criticism, the MAG 
made anonymized excerpts from its mailing list publically available; full transcripts of MAG 
meetings became public in 2010.  
                                                        
118 Mueller (2006b) provides a detailed account of the ICANN related appointees, thus highlighting the blurring 
borders between individual and institutional identities in Internet governance: 
Two (Alejandro Pisanty and Veni Markovski) are sitting ICANN Board members; one (Theresa Swineheart) 
is an ICANN staff member; two more (Nii Quaynor and Masanobu Katoh) are former ICANN Board 
members; two (Chris Disspain and Emily Taylor) represent ccTLD operators; two (Raul Echeberria and 
Adiel Akplogan) represent Regional Internet Address Registries (RIRs). Even the public interest or "civil 
society" representatives are long time players in the ICANN sandbox: Adam Peake of Glocom, Robin Gross 
of IP Justice, Jeanette Hofmann of WZ Berlin, and Erick Iriarte of Alfa-Redi are all associated with either 
ICANN's At Large Advisory Committee or its Noncommercial Users Constituency (or both). To that one can 
add an IETF representative, Patrik Faltstrom, often utilized by ICANN as a consultant, and the Internet 
Society's public policy advocate. 
119 During February 2008 Open Consultations, Parminder Singh, speaking on behalf of the Internet Governance 
Caucus (a civil society group), noted: “At the outset, I would like to appeal to all stakeholders that we should use 
the full term ‘Multistakeholder Advisory Group’ or a very convenient acronym ‘MAG’, as for purposes, as Chairman 
Desai just described, multistakeholderism as the most important feature of the IGF.” 152 
 
Serving on the MAG gives its members not only more direct influence on the agenda of the IGF, 
but also a more authoritative status within the IGF community. MAG members are frequently 
referred to as a group in the consultative processes, they introduce themselves as such when 
they make interventions during the IGF, and in a way they are lobbied by actors submitting 
workshop proposals. In other words, while the debate in the IGF is supposed to be on equal 
footing, having a group such as MAG recreates an institutional hierarchy. MAG members are in 
the heart of the IGF community—they are on the MAG because they are active and recognized 
individuals in their respective stakeholder groups
120, but being on the MAG further reinforces 
their central positions. For example, among the most persistent speakers at the IGF plenary, 
half are members of the MAG. Three out of four speakers, who spoke in the main sessions of 
each IGF between 2007 and 2010
121, have been on the MAG since its inception (see Table 3). In 
recent consultations, participants aired ideas for the MAG members to serve as evaluators of 
                                                        
120 As mentioned elsewhere (Malcolm, 2008; Mueller, 2010), the selection of MAG members is not systematic and 
opaque, but so is most of the nomination processes. The civil society is the most transparent of the stakeholder 
groups in terms of selection of the nominees, which offers a glimpse at the tensions involved in the politics of 
representation. Mueller, for example, describes the debates that took place across the civil society networks about 
whether the “technical community” belongs to the civil society in light of its political association with ICANN. There 
is no similarly transparent record of the nomination process within the government or the private sector 
stakeholder groups. Observing the MAG, however, suggests that active members of the group are people, who 
have been substantively involved in the IGF process, many of whom emerged as leaders in their respective 
communities during the WSIS. At the same time, as Jeanette Hofmann noted in November 2010 open 
consultations, “there are lots of people on the MAG who have been sent there.  They are there because it's their 
job to be there.  And not all of them participate in an active manner so that they will take space away from other 
people who would like to talk.” One explanation for this is political. For example, the government of Iran, one of 
the more vocal critics of the IGF, has a sit in the MAG, but according to my interviewees, does not participate. 
121 At the moment data about plenary speakers is accessible only for the years 2007-2010. The only people who 
spoke in each of the IGFs are Chris Disspain (Chair, Country Code Names Supporting Organization [ccNSO] Council; 
Chief Executive Officer, .au Registry), Raúl Echeberría (E xecutive Director/Chief Executive Officer, Latin America 
and Caribbean Internet Addresses Registry [LACNIC]), Anriette Esterhuysen (Executive Director, Association for 
Progressive Communications [APC]), and Nitin Desai, who is the chair of the MAG. 153 
 
workshop quality during the IGF itself as a means to weed out lower quality workshops.
122 Also, 
in an attempt to formalize the selection process of MAG members, it was suggested that a 
“trusted” group of former MAG members serves as a selection committee.
123 The emerging 
dynamics is similar to the “Matthew effect” (Merton, 1968) whereby people already in position 
of power continue accumulating advantage, compared to those less powerful or new to the 
institutional settings. From a structuration point of view, the MAG symbolizes the dialectic 
relationship between the agency and the structure and demonstrates the evolution of 
structures of domination over time. 
Today, the concept and the practice of the MAG are undergoing scrutiny in light of the work 
conducted by the CSTD Working Group on Improvements to IGF. The open consultations 
transcripts suggest that IGF participants seek further institutionalization of the MAG. Among 
the suggestions that were voiced during the open consultations
124 are: more clearly defined 
decision-making authority for the group, so that it could participate in procedural decisions, 
such as recommendations for the Chair of the MAG; clearer procedures for the conduct of the 
group itself, particularly the rotation of MAG members; and enhanced transparency, especially 
when it comes to the process of selection of MAG members. For the IGF-loyalists, the MAG 
became one of the main markers of the internally grown institutional solution to 
multistakeholder involvement in Internet governance—it embodies a set of continuously 
evolving values of Internet governance that are enacted and challenged through discursive 
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reflection on the conduct of the group as the decision-making body of the forum. Among those 
values one may recognize a set of values traditionally associated with the Internet community, 
such as collaboration, meritocracy, and transparency. Through redefining and further 
institutionalizing MAG practices, the IGF participants are asking to define themselves as a 
community. 
5.2.3. Meetings 
Meetings are the primary mode of organization of the IGF process. Haas (2002) lists “iterated 
interactions” (p.76) among the most influential “institutional design features” that can shape a 
UN conference (in addition to “autonomous secretariats staffed with professionals recruited on 
merit” and “independent and capable executive heads”). Wodak (2000) describes meetings as 
“sites where decisions are taken and where conflicts evolve and are resolved through decisions 
in a more or less democratic ways” (p. 76). Death (2011) refers to large UN conferences as 
“forms of theatrical and exemplary government,” which “work as transitional mechanisms (…) 
within broader regimes of (…) governmentality” (p.2). The IGF has a little bit of each of these. 
When the IGF started, there was initial tension, between those who envisioned it as a single 
annual event and those who viewed the forum as an ongoing process with the annual gathering 
as a seminal checkpoint (Mueller, 2010). Soon after the first round of consultation, there was a 
strong sentiment to view the IGF conceptually as a process. Yet, the practices and the language 
adapted to describe that process placed the annual event at the center of the IGF existence. 
Most of the activities of the IGF throughout the year are focused on the “preparatory process” 155 
 
and the annual event is referred to as “the IGF.”
125 The model that has evolved over the past six 
years includes a series of three planning meetings—open consultations—per year and one 
annual event. The preparatory meetings take place in the Palais des Nations in Geneva and are 
typically adjacent to the meetings of the MAG (MAG members tend to participate in the open 
consultations). This is the IGF’s “backstage,” in Goffman’s (1959) terms, where participants 
allow themselves a more informal interaction and exhibit a great degree of collegiality. This is 
also a space for discursive reflection on the emerging ways of thinking about Internet 
governance, and even more so about the IGF itself, as well as emerging practices of conducting 
policy deliberation. The annual event is held in a different place in the world each time in order 
to maximize exposure. This is the front stage of the IGF, where exemplary multistakeholderism 
as a mode of governance is performed. So far IGF meetings have taken place in Greece, Brazil, 
India, Egypt, and Lithuania; the next IGF will take place in Kenya.  
5.2.3.1. Open Consultations 
The open consultations are indeed open. Technically, all one needs to do in order to participate 
is register to gain access to the UN compound. Once in the room, anyone can take the floor on 
a first-come-first-served basis. At least theoretically, from that point on, one’s input is valued 
on its merit and its contribution to the community. Practically, however, effective participation 
in open consultations is resource-intensive both financially and in terms of time. First, attending 
meetings in Geneva is costly and in order to be a part of a meritocratic community, one needs 
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to establish sustainable presence; time spent ‘in the field,’ either creating technology or 
regulating it, is also an important source of authority in the IGF.  
Second, participating in the open consultations is an opportunity to influence the agenda of the 
annual IGF meeting, but it is also learning and socializing experience. It takes time to get 
familiar with the acronym-rich language used in the meetings, to develop an understanding of 
the interrelated topics, and to learn the social dynamics of the relatively small group that 
regularly meets to participate in the consultative process.  Location of the secretariat in 
Geneva, thus, poses a significant barrier to participation, primarily due to the financial cost. 
Starting from the first open consultations, participants from developing countries lamented 
that this situation would lead to lack of voices from the Global South. One member of the civil 
society explained: “I would like to express my thanks for the facilities of being here.  Although I 
must also say that these facilities, this setup, are only usable if one has the economic means to 
be able to travel to Geneva.”
126 In other words, the location of the secretariat poses a systemic 
barrier, which was not planned for its negative consequences, but emerged as an 
institutionalized constraint. 
Thematically, the open consultations are dedicated to reflecting on the last annual event and 
planning for the next one. In the process, the institutional features of the IGF are both 
discussed and enacted. Early open consultations focused a lot on creating the format of the IGF 
annual meetings and practices for the preparatory process. Today, a significant portion of the 
open consultation is still dedicated to questions of self organization of the IGF, particularly the 
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status and the authority of the MAG. As the forum matured, as its practices settled, and as the 
IGF started to engage with other policy fora through its numerous activists, the preparatory 
process also became an important gathering for exchange of information and strategy 
coordination.
 127 Taken together, these processes also contribute to community building, and, 
as I will demonstrate later, constitute a recursive public (Kelty, 2008). In a very atypical for the 
UN fashion, during open consultations, it is common to refer to others by their first name and 
to utilize the “us” (as in IGF community) vs. “them” (as in competing fora, including those of the 
UN) rhetoric, thus contributing towards delineating an institutional boundary of the IGF. 
The primary formal task of the open consultations is assisting the secretariat and the MAG with 
determining the agenda for the annual event, including decisions about plenary speakers and 
debates about the merits of submitted workshop proposals. Over the five years of its existence, 
the IGF community has settled on a core format for the annual event. The IGF model is built 
around a number of broad themes discussed in the plenary and numerous workshops that are 
expected to feed into the main sessions.
 128 The process of agreeing on an agenda for the 
plenary is political and it highlights conflicts of both values and resources (Wodak, 2000). For 
example, the topic of “critical Internet resources” was added in 2007 as a result of pressure 
from G77 countries. Although Iran and Pakistan led the motion, Brazil, as the host of the annual 
meeting, played a pivotal role in adopting it. The argument was a continuation of discussions 
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found in transcripts of November 2010 and February 2011 Open Consultations. The group was (and still is) 
perceived as a threat to the IGF, because it is a governments-led initiative and was initially envisioned as an 
intergovernmental group only. 
128 Table 4 offers and overview of the IGF plenary themes 2006-2010 and demonstrates how these themes can be 
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started during the WSIS about the US oversight over ICANN. As such, this debate (discussed in 
detail in Malcolm, 2008; Mueller, 2010) was, on the face of it, an enactment of a conflict about 
names and numbers, which are resources in the context of Internet governance. Yet it 
ultimately represented a clash of different value systems. Defining a framework that would 
allow both sides to reach a compromise was an important step for the IGF because, 
paraphrasing the statement of Willie Currie of APC during May 2007 open consultations, “it was 
clear that some stakeholders wanted to discuss ICANN and the management of critical Internet 
resources; others did not and urged caution in adding the issue to the themes.”
129 Inserting 
itself into the heart of the controversy and offering a space for an open debate, the IGF, as an 
institution, was forming its own identity and establishing a sphere of influence. 
Managing workshops offers a different kind of conflict. The ethos of openness and inclusivity of 
the multistakeholder model created a burdensome situation for the secretariat. Nitin Desai’s 
stated philosophy was not to reject a workshop unless absolutely necessary. As a result, the 
number of workshops at the IGF has been continuously growing. Starting from 36 workshops 
during the 2006 IGF in Athens their number climbed to 113 workshops scheduled in parallel to 
the main sessions during the 2010 IGF in Vilnius. In addition to that, a series of requirements 
attached to each workshop proposal, such as gender, geographical, and stakeholder group 
diversity, causes the panels in the workshops to be too crowded. However, as Markus Kummer 
explained: 
[The number of workshops] is also related to the number of participants.  I was told as a 
rule of thumb, you can count that if you have three times as many participants as you 
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have speakers.  We had roughly 100-plus workshops.  That means 600 speakers in these 
workshops, and that corresponds fairly accurately to the number of participants.  We 
had 1800 participants. So by steering through the workshops, by limiting the number, 
you can also automatically limit the overall number of participants.
130   
The IGFers participating in open consultations and the MAG find themselves in a conflict, torn 
between the desire to be inclusive and the aspiration to maintain a certain quality for the IGF 
experience. People proposing workshops, on the other hand, find themselves manufacturing 
the appearance of multistakeholderism in places where they do not necessarily believe it 
belongs. In the process, both are contributing to establishing patterns of behaviors and thinking 
about principles of Internet governance and the “normal” way of conducting the IGF business; 
in other words, both are participating in the process of structuration. 
5.2.3.2. Annual IGF event 
Contrary to the semi-informal character of the consultative process, the annual IGF event is a 
form of dramaturgical performance of seriousness and symbolic politics; it is a form of 
“theatrical and exemplary government” (Death, 2011, p. 2); a showcase for 
multistakeholderism. The efforts of the MAG and the active participants in the Open 
Consultations, as a team, culminate at the annual event as a choreographed performance of 
idealized version of multistakeholderism, which maintains the legitimacy of the forum itself. 
This is the “frontstage” performance in Goffman’s (1959) terms. The event is typically spread 
over a course of four days with a generous number of red tape events, receptions, and at times 
meticulous protocol. In addition to workshops and plenary discussions, the IGF also hosts side 
events, such as an annual symposium of the Global Network of Internet Governance 
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Researchers (GigaNet). Starting in 2009, two more standard sessions were added to the IGF. 
First, an orientation session was added to brief the participants about the work done at the IGF 
between the previous annual event and the current one. Together with the “Taking Stock” 
session, these components simulate a more formalized version of the open consultations held 
in Geneva. Second, with the growing number of regional and national Internet governance 
events, it was decided to add a regional perspective session at the beginning of the forum in 
order to maintain a link between the local and the global fora.  
In absence of predefined “tangible” outcomes, the success of the IGF is a fluid concept.
131 In 
search of tangibility, the reports of the chairman, the formal document summarizing each 
annual event, emphasize the volume and the diversity of participation. Each report starts with 
the number of participants and their breakdown according to the stakeholder groups, followed 
by mentioning the number of workshops held in parallel with the main session (also see 
Internet Governance Forum: Identifying impact, 2009). The search for tangible outcomes is part 
of the structural heritage of the traditional policymaking, where the output of the work can 
take a finite number of shapes such as treaties or resolutions; process as an outcome is not one 
of the more common products of traditional policy deliberation. 
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One major occasion where lack of metrics for success became an important issue, was continuation of the IGF 
mandate beyond its original five years. The Chinese delegation, for example, with a hint towards a completely 
intergovernmental model for the IGF, openly stated that it won't support continuation of the forum without having 
clearly defined outcomes. Most recently, during the CSTD working group consultations the question of results, 
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Implicitly, the annual events are also assessed by their smoothness or the “perfection” of the 
performed governance. As a front stage performance (Goffman, 1959) aimed at an idealized 
presentation of multistakeholder policy dialogue, explicit conflicts among the stakeholders are 
viewed as very problematic. Thus, for example, when in 2009 a poster mentioning the “Great 
Firewall of China” was removed by the UN security during the launch of OpenNet Initiative’s 
book launch for Access Controlled, upon “objections of a member state,” it overshadowed most 
of the other qualitative developments during the meeting in Sharm el Sheikh.
132 At different 
points in time, other developments at the IGF were framed as tangible outcomes of the forum. 
Thus for example, dynamic coalitions, which started to form during the first IGF in Athens in 
2006, were referred to by some as an IGF outcome.
133 More recently, the growing number of 
regional and national IGF events, which are autonomously organized by the local communities, 
is viewed as an important outcome of the forum (see Mueller, 2010). 
The IGF meetings are a vehicle through which Internet governance as a multistakeholder 
endeavor is both performed and enacted. There is a clear distinction between the back and the 
front stages of this act (Goffman, 1959). The front stage in this case aims to demonstrate an 
idealized version of multistakeholder policy dialogue, under the constraints of the UN discursive 
practices. There is no debate about the meaning of the practice at front stage. The back stage is 
where conscious debates about the practices and their formalization take place. It is in the back 
                                                        
132 For additional details about the incident see the report on the OpenNet Initiative’s blog 
(http://opennet.net/blog/2009/11/un-security-forces-removal-oni-poster) and on the Internet Governance Project 
blog (http://blog.Internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2009/11/15/4380817.html). For the formal reaction of 
the IGF secretariat see IGF Open Consultations, February 2010. 
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stage, where the core of the IGF community is being formed, and it is in the shaping of that 
core and the performance rituals, that structures of domination and legitimation are enacted. It 
is in the back stage of the IGF processes where the normative framework of the IGF is 
systematized as a mediating mechanism that allows values of the Internet community work in 
the UN settings. The two stages can be viewed as collections of processes of structuration, 
whereby different actors reify structures imported through the practices of the Internet 
community and the UN; when these processes collide, or the practices are forced to co-exist in 
a single space, new forms of thinking about and enacting of Internet governance are formed 
through reflection and deliberation. 
5.2.4. Dynamic coalitions 
One of the challenges of institutionalizing the IGF is defining its relationship with the public it 
serves. During the WSIS, the civil society self-organized thematic caucuses and working groups, 
contributed to the summit through a set of ad hoc fixtures such as “content and theme drafting 
group” and the “civil society plenary” (see Mueller, 2010 for a more detailed account). Seeking 
to replicate that model, civil society organizations at the first IGF meeting in Athens started 
organize dynamic coalitions—groups of IGF stakeholders “organized around specific policy 
positions or perspectives” (p.121), so called “thematic ‘homes’ of some of the specific issues 
that compose IG as a policy field” (Padovani & Pavan, 2007, p. 104). 
Since the IGF has no formal deliverables, other than holding the annual meeting and preparing 
the report of the chairman, there is a continuous quest to identify the IGF impact (e.g. Internet 
Governance Forum: Identifying impact, 2009). When the dynamic coalitions started to form, 163 
 
some suggested that they should be viewed as one of the tangible outcomes of the IGF. For 
example, during February 2007 Open Consultations, the Swiss delegation commented: 
(…) some people feel that the IGF should have an impact that goes beyond just 
discussing issues.  They feel that the IGF should facilitate discussions, but also concrete 
solutions to challenges connected to the Internet and Internet governance. Now the 
question is: how should this be achieved? At the first session of the IGF in Athens, a 
series of dynamic coalitions has been formed.  These coalitions formed themselves in 
order to work between meetings to promote action that should emerge from the 
discussions at the IGF. This is a good idea, and I think -- we think we have to support 
those dynamic coalitions, because if they do good work, they can help the IGF to have 
an impact outside the meeting rooms.
134 
While some perceived the dynamic coalitions as an outcome of the IGF, others asked to make 
them a formal part of the IGF structure. The civil society was particularly vocal with calls to 
formalize the relationship between the secretariat and the coalitions, thus giving the coalition 
members a greater say in the agenda setting mechanism of the IGF. Yet, formalizing 
relationships with the community ran into questions similar to those faced by the formalization 
of MAG, namely questions of representativeness, legitimacy, and authority. During September 
2008 open consultations, Markus Kummer, explained: 
You will recall, we had a discussion last year (…) we had requests to be posted as a 
dynamic coalition, and we asked for guidance. What are the criteria? (…) Does it need to 
include representatives of all stakeholder groups or is it enough if it's just maybe one or 
two? And to sum up the discussion we had then, the general feeling was that the 
dynamic coalitions were an experiment, and we should give them a little bit more time 
to develop, and it was generally acknowledged that it should be revisited and their 
relationship with the IGF ought to be more clearly defined. The only clear guidance I got 
from that meeting was a dynamic coalition should be at least more than one person. 
Because there was I think at the time one person with several hats who said, "I am a 
dynamic coalition." So there we said, "No, you are not."  
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Now we have 14, and there are more in the pipeline. We've been approached by people 
who said, "We are in the process of setting up a coalition." And we say, "Okay, the 
more, the merrier." But, nevertheless, I think the more we have, the more urgent it is, 
actually, to look at these questions. What are the criteria? what is the relationship with 
the IGF at large?  
We also asked for reports, if they had a meeting in Rio, please send us a report on the 
meeting and also please send us a report on the activities since. We certainly do not 
want to burden dynamic coalitions with additional bureaucracy. But I think it's good to 
know whether a coalition is alive and well and actually is dynamic or whether it's just a 
sleeping coalition on paper and doesn't really do anything. But of these 14 dynamic 
coalitions, I think only five submitted a report. Now, does that mean we are going to 
delete them from our Web site or should we push them a little bit more to deliver a 
report? We did receive a few reports in the last few days. As deadlines approach, people 
do remember maybe they ought to do something. But on all these questions, I look 
forward to guidance so that we know how to react when confronted with these 
questions. 
The formalization of relationships between the dynamic coalitions and the secretariat has never 
materialized. The secretariat continues to publish information about dynamic coalitions on the 
IGF website and to provide them with space to meet during the annual IGF meeting, but there 
is no other formal relationship between the coalitions and the secretariat or the MAG. As of 
today, the IGF website lists 13 active and 6 inactive dynamic coalitions.
135 Some of the 
coalitions, such as the “Stop Spam Alliance” halted their activity because the policy issue lost its 
public relevance. Others, such as “Online Collaboration” or “A2K@IGF” dynamic coalition, did 
not get enough traction or were not capable of sustaining it over time. Yet other coalitions, 
merged to form a larger and more active body, such as the “Internet Bill of Rights” and 
“Framework of Principles for the Internet” dynamic coalitions, which joined forces to form the 
“Internet Rights and Principles” dynamic coalition. 
                                                        
135 Available at: http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/dynamiccoalitions.  165 
 
Although there is no formal relationship between the IGF secretariat and the dynamic 
coalitions, in terms of practice, the coalitions play a role in shaping the discourse of the forum. 
As discursive devices, the coalitions are utilized as authority amplifiers within the IGF setting. 
Talking on behalf of a coalition, which is a common practice, gives the speaker the aura of 
representativeness in the eyes of the other participants. Although speaking on behalf of a group 
is not a unique to the IGF structure of legitimation, the special status of informal dynamic 
coalitions that developed in the forum gives this particular form of perceived legitimation a 
unique IGF flavor; compared to other, non-IGF formed groups, this form of performance is 
viewed as more authentic to the IGF, thus carrying more weigh. The coalitions add another 
layer to the in-group/out-group dynamics of the IGF —a person typically belongs to a 
stakeholder group, which is an important marker of organizational identity within the IGF, but 
he or she can also belong to one or more dynamic coalitions, which makes them a member of 
another group within the IGF, thus adding another layer to their IGF identity. During the 
preparatory process an intervention on behalf of a coalition supposedly carries greater weight, 
compared to opinions expressed in personal capacity, because it represents a consensus of a 
group invested in the IGF process. Typically, the participants are careful to distinguish between 
the different capacities they are speaking in. During the annual event, it is a common sight in 
the workshops for people to introduce themselves as belonging to a dynamic coalition; some of 
the workshops are formally organized by the coalitions as well. Moreover, messages delivered 
on behalf of the coalitions in the plenary add a sense of authority not only to the speakers, but 
to the IGF itself; it allows performing a structured process of not only multistakeholder, but also 
multi-interest representation.  166 
 
Also, from the point of view of practice, the coalitions are used for coordination of workshop 
proposal submissions and drafting statements for the “Taking Stock” session of the IGF. In 
between the annual meetings, the level of activity in coalitions varies. As part of my field work, 
I’ve joined the mailing lists of three coalitions, which provided me with wide range of examples 
of how this construct is being utilized. The Dynamic Coalition on Internet Rights and Principles 
(IRP), for example, maintains an active mailing list, where participants share relevant materials 
from other fora and coordinate activities not limited to the IGF settings. The Youth Coalition on 
Internet Governance (YCIG) also maintains a mailing list, but it gets utilized almost solely in 
relation to workshop submissions to the annual IGF event and then for coordination of 
activities at the event itself. Finally, the communication channels of Dynamic Coalition on 
Internet Values are mute. As loosely formalized entities, the level of communication between 
the annual IGF meetings depends solely on the initiative of the members of the coalition; I 
observed that individual leadership and existence of formal structures in the group play an 
important role in sustaining coalition activity via email—while the IRP has a well developed 
structure and a formalized steering committee
136, the other two coalitions I observed lack those 
elements (also see Cogburn, Johnsen, & Bhattacharyya, 2008 for discussion of factors 
influencing remote engagement in similar settings). However, the intensity of online activity 
between IGF meetings seems to be directly proportional to the reach and the amount of work a 
coalition manages to accomplish during the face to face meeting at the yearly IGF event. For 
example, while YCIG is still trying to figure out its own governance mechanisms (the coalition 
                                                        
136 See IRP website for further details about its history and structure: 
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was established in 2009, but still does not have formal leadership), IRP is using the face to face 
time to coordinate interventions at the IGF and beyond. The more established and formalized, 
in the most traditional sense, a group is, the more active and effective it seems to be within the 
IGF space. 
While coalitions vary in their level of activity and impact, they offer a form of belonging to the 
IGF in a more systematized fashion; they offer another identity marker to the IGF participants. 
It is my impression from participating in two annual meetings of the IGF, that most participants 
do not make use of the coalition mechanisms. Belonging to a coalition, and even more so, 
maintaining an active status within one and utilizing the membership status as an identity 
marker within the IGF community, are signs of a commitment to the IGF model; borrowing from 
engineering terminology, the coalitions amplify the authority of individual players. 
The fixtures of the IGF—the secretariat, the MAG, its meetings, and solution such as the 
dynamic coalitions—are a set of evolving practices that enact a web of social structures. The 
emerging construct draws from the normative worlds of the bottom-up, meritocratic, and 
liberal ethos of the Internet community and the top-bottom, hierarchical, and nation-state-
centric umbrella of the UN. Each culture strives to reify itself within the IGF; in doing so, it not 
only it affects the structures of the other culture, but also its own. For example, a government 
official representing a country following a formal diplomatic protocol enacts the hierarchical 
and nation-state centric way of thinking about policy deliberation; but by sitting at the same 
table with an Internet entrepreneur, who has an equal say in the debate, the government 
official alters the traditional thought, even if only nominally. Similarly, simply by participating in 168 
 
a UN sponsored forum, the same entrepreneur enacts structures of legitimation and 
domination that are embodied in the nation-state-centric nature of the Union. 
At the core of the IGF formalization is the notion of multistakeholderism, which in the IGF 
interpretation not only tackles the question of sovereignty in Internet governance, but also 
serves as a vessel for values such as openness, inclusivity, and individual freedoms. Mueller 
(2010) warned that as an ideology multistakeholderism is flawed and incomplete, as it 
“addresses issues of representation and process,” but “does not provide any guidance on the 
substantive policy issues of Internet governance” (p. 264). Yet, analyzed through the lens of 
structuration, multistakeholderism can be seen instead as a practice that enacts ideological 
elements. It is not necessarily the “marriage” between the culture and the normative basis of 
the Internet community and that of the UN, as some of the IGFers have envisioned; it is more of 
an “adoption” of a version of liberal principles of Internet community by the intergovernmental 
system, and an adoption of the formal and somewhat hierarchical principles of the UN as a 
solution for representativeness and legitimacy. The ultimate power to choose the form, and 
frequently the substance, of engagement remains with the governments, and these structures 
of domination are deeply rooted into the UN practice. The practices of the IGF, although 
somewhat constrained by the institutional settings of the UN, enact alternative power 
structures and structures of legitimation. 
5.3. People of IGF 
“It's my pleasure to meet many old friends all over again”  
Nitin Desai, IGF Open Consultations, February 16, 2006 
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Previous sections focused primarily on the structures and practices of the IGF. This section will 
focus explicitly on the actors in order to complete the puzzle of agency and structure as they 
are expressed through the practice of the forum. Mueller (2010; see also Malcolm, 2008) 
classified IGF participants into the IGF “hawks and doves” (p.110). He explained that the 
“hawks”—developing, mostly BRICS, countries and civil society organizations—wanted to see a 
more formalized IGF that produces tangible results (e.g. intergovernmental framework 
convention, policy recommendations, etc.); on the other hand, the “doves”—mostly Western 
development government, the private sector, and the technical community—sought to 
maintain existing status quo and focused on the informational and educational aspects of the 
IGF. While this is a useful classification for understanding the perspectives and the motives of 
various players, it provides little insight into the potential influence of individual actors on the 
structuration processes and the discourse of the IGF.  
In my observations, I identified two broadly defined groups that exert qualitatively different 
influence on the discourse of the IGF. The first group is a loosely connected collective of 
Internet pioneers and government officials, who participate, primarily in the annual meeting of 
the IGF. Members of this collective draw their authority on external to the forum sources, such 
as a position in the host government or legacy of a pivotal role in the Internet community. Their 
impact on the discourse of the forum is temporal and typically reifies structures of the 
communities from which they draw their authority. I label this group the “IGF celebrities.” The 
second group is much more cohesive and consists of the persistent participants, who have 
mostly self-selected to take greater stock in the IGF. Members of this group draw their 
authority not only from external sources, but also, and perhaps mostly, from their long-term 170 
 
engagement in the IGF process. These are the people who participate actively in the 
consultation process, serve on MAG, and take active roles in various dynamic coalitions. Their 
impact on the IGF is longitudinal and as such they have more opportunities to challenge the 
structural assumptions of each other and those getting formalized through the IGF practice. I 
identify this group as the “IGF nucleus.” The interaction between the nucleus and the cell is at 
the heart of the structuration process of the forum. In both cases, the actors draw on the 
structural resources of the IGF, which enable both groups to exercise their agency in particular 
ways, while also reifying the structural heritage they bring from their home institutions. In this 
context, the celebrities, both political and technical, have more prescribed roles that reify the 
structures typical to their communities; the participants in the nucleus, however, spend more 
time resolving intra-IGF discrepancies that stem from the collision of different ways of thinking 
about the appropriate conduct of Internet policy deliberations. 
5.3.1. IGF celebrities 
One group that frequently exhibits celebrity behavior across various IGFs is the high-level 
officials of the host country. As mentioned above, the host country, which picks up most of the 
bill for the annual gathering of the IGF, receives more “air-time” during the event. It is 
customary to invite local politicians and industry leaders to participate in the opening and 
closing ceremonies, plenary sessions and social events during the meeting. In many cases, these 
interventions are staged with great fanfare and rigid protocol. It is a demonstration of state 
political power and affirmation of its central role in the context of the meeting. As a ritual 
emphasizing importance, main actors, such as prime ministers or ministers, would leave the 171 
 
venue right after their speech. Their “tangible” impact on the IGF discourse, however, is 
typically limited in both scope and span; from a structural perspective they are beholden to and 
reify hierarchical structures of authority, where the nation state holds a central position.  
The most illustrative example of such participation I observed in 2009 during the IGF in Sharm 
el-Sheikh, Egypt, when then-the-first-lady of Egypt, Susan Mubarak, was one of the speakers. To 
accommodate her schedule and her security needs, the speech was rescheduled a number of 
times at a very short notice until it was finalized to take place on the last day of the forum. The 
speech, scheduled at the last moment, interfered with the regular schedule of the IGF; 
workshops had to be shortened and rescheduled, while at the same time many people were 
rushing to their flights. Accommodating the security needs of the first lady also required 
additional screening at the entrance to the venue, which caused another delay and being 
arranged at the last minute, did not allow for adequate planning on behalf of the IGF organizers 
and participants. As a result, while the content of Ms. Mubarak’s speech
137 may have had little 
substantive impact on the IGF, the way it was conducted had influence in both the short and 
the long terms. In the immediate term, the need to adjust other workshops to accommodate 
Ms. Mubarak’s schedule impacted the discussions in all these workshops by altering their 
settings. In the long term, the impact could be twofold. First, making Ms. Mubarak’s speech a 
central piece of the forum’s program was celebrating the authority of the nation-state. By 
demonstrating acknowledgment through participation of a high-level government official, the 
                                                        
137 The speech and the panel discussion that followed are available at: 
http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/2009/sharm_el_Sheikh/Transcripts/Sharm%20El%20Sheikh%2018%20Novembe
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IGF reified its own legitimacy both towards its participants and towards other, competing fora 
where the legitimacy of the IGF is questioned. Second, by accommodating Ms. Mubarak and 
observing the protocol, the IGF enacted a clear power structure between the political elite of 
the host country and other attendees of the forum. 
A very different class of celebrities in the IGF is the techno-political elites of the Internet 
community. “Fathers of the Internet,” the engineers behind various aspects of the modern 
Internet, TCP/IP or Web, have a celebrity status within the IGF community. Most notable tech-
celebrities I observed in the IGF meetings I attended were Vint Cerf, Bob Kahn, and Tim 
Berners-Lee.
138 When Vint Cerf participated in the Vilnius IGF in 2010, the most common sight 
was seeing him taking pictures with the forum attendees. Tech-celebrities attract more 
participation, when they are part of a workshop, not just in the plenary. As one of the 
participants in the February 2011 Open Consultation noticed, “when you have a workshop 
being attended by Vint Cerf. You would have people even standing outside the room and 
blocking the entrances to the other workshops.”
139 When Cerf, Kahn, or Berners-Lee participate 
in a workshop or in a plenary, the content of their speeches would resonate throughout the 
conference—in their presentations and interventions from the floor other attendees would 
refer back to the content of celebrity speeches or conversations they had with them.
140   
                                                        
138 Vint Cerf and Bob Kahn were among those who co-created the fundamental communication protocols of the 
Internet (the Transmission Control Protocol and the Internet Protocol) and were pivotal in the establishment of 
Internet institutions such as ICANN and ISOC. Tim Berners-Lee is credited with the invention of the Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol and the World Wide Web. 
139 IGF Open Consultations, February 2011, Geneva, Switzerland. 
140 For example see Jonathan Charles’s comment as he chaired the “Taking Stock” plenary session during Vilnius, 
2010 IGF:  
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Having tech-celebrities participating in the IGF and at the same time repeatedly celebrating 
their foundational roles in creating the Internet provides the IGF with another structure of 
legitimation. Similar to the political celebrities who reify nation-state-centric way thinking 
through their symbolic behavior, the tech celebrities do the same with regards to the Internet 
community. The iconic figures of the Internet are symbolic in that they are associated with the 
ethos of the Internet as “a unique electronic frontier, one that steadfastly resists all attempts at 
governmental control or state-imposed regulation” (Drissel, 2006, p. 105; also see Uimonen, 
2003). Some of the “Internet pioneers” have also aligned themselves clearly with the private-
sector-led Internet governance arrangement. Vint Cerf, for example has actively contributed to 
the formation of ICANN and served on its board between 1999 and 2007. In other words, while 
government-celebrities offer the IGF legitimacy rooted in the centrality of the nation-state as 
the ultimate source of power, tech-celebrities offer the IGF the legitimacy of the Internet 
community and its meritocratic approach to authority. The formal interaction between the two 
types of celebrities within the IGF context therefore is an exemplary performance of 
multistakholderism, which over time both normalizes the idea as a form of information policy 
deliberation and sets the terms for what multistakholderism can look like in practice. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
There is this question we're discussing this afternoon as to whether or not Internet Governance is keeping up with 
the pace of change in the Internet.  And Bob Kahn said something at lunchtime which I hope you won't mind me 
repeating, a very interesting thought.  That was that we should perhaps devote some of our speaking time at 
future IGFs to the idea of looking further ahead because we spend a lot of time looking at the current issues, when 
actually, the Internet is moving faster than we are sometimes.  And maybe there is a case for sometimes throwing 
our perspective 10 or 15 years ahead and have some very specific broader blue skies thinking on that.  That may be 
something you want to reflect on as you frame your discussion this afternoon. 174 
 
5.3.2. IGF nucleus 
The core group of the IGF, or its nucleus, is rather small. It includes those, who are actively 
involved in shaping the IGF as an institution and its discourse on an ongoing basis. These are the 
people who attend most of the preparatory meetings, the annual IGF events, and participate 
actively in online discussions in between the meetings. They are also more likely to be members 
of the MAG or serve as its consultants, to be a speaker in the IGF plenary or appear in a number 
of workshops or even to intervene from the floor. Many of the members of the nucleus have 
continued their involvement in IGF since the days of WSIS and WGIG. People like Avri Doria, 
Ayesha Hassan, Marilyn Cade, Raúl Echeberría, William Drake, Wolfgang Kleinwächter, and 
others, who participated in drafting the WGIG report, are still active members of the IGF 
community; most have made Internet-governance-related activities part of their day jobs. 
These people were engaged in the early consultations on IGF: they interpreted its mandate in a 
broad fashion, argued for various institutional arrangements for the MAG, and actively 
participated in design of agendas of the annual IGF events. They are occasionally hired by the 
secretariat as consultants to work on the summary report or to edit the proceedings of the 
annual events. These are the people who are invested in the IGF and who appear to be 
genuinely concerned with making it a meaningful space for Internet policy discussion. These are 
also the people who have the most persistent and conscious impact on the structures of the 
IGF, preserving the forum being the most consistent goal across the board. 
As I mentioned above, participation in the IGF process is costly. Having the secretariat housed 
in the Geneva headquarters of the UN favors those based on the European continent and those 175 
 
for whom attending IGF and other Internet-policy-related meetings is part of their job. Looking 
at the most persistent participants in the IGF open consultations (Table 5), we will see, for 
example, the governments of Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, Japan, France, India, Russia, and the 
United States, all of which have Geneva missions, as well as the European Union and the 
Council of Europe. Among the NGOs for example, are APC, which established itself as a pivotal 
civil society player during the WSIS (see Mueller, 2010); the Diplo Foundation, led by Jovan 
Kurbalija; and the Conference of NGOs (CONGO), led by Qusai Al-Shatti. All have European 
offices and have demonstrated the strongest stamina in terms of persistent participation. In the 
business community, Marilyn Cade (who at different points has represented different entities), 
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), specifically Ayesha Hassan, and then the 
European Telecommunications Network Operators (ETNO) have been the most persistent 
participants in the IGF process. Finally, a group of European academics, including Wolfgang 
Kleinwächter, William Drake, and Francis Muguet are also among the more persistent IGFers. 
Being the most persistent participants, the members of the nucleus are the main carriers of the 
IGF structures, as those are expressed in continuous debates about the internal organization of 
the forum and both formal and informal understandings achieved during the consultative 
process. To a degree, their way of thinking about the IGF and Internet governance is what 
defines the IGF as an emerging institution.  
Members of the nucleus are not only more persistent in their participation, but they are also 
more likely to engage in the discussions during the preparatory process. For example, members 
of the persistent group made 2.5 interventions per meeting on average, while the other 
participants made only 1.9 interventions (Table 5). Similarly, members of the persistent group 176 
 
were more voluminous in their interventions. On average, a member of the nucleus would use 
814 words per meeting, compared to 530 for everybody else.
141 Taken together, these 
quantitative markers add to the overall impression that there is a core group driving the debate 
that shapes the IGF. While there are a variety of opinions expressed by the members of this 
group, they appear united in their explicit appreciation of the IGF process with an emphasis on 
its desirability.  
 
[continues after tables]   
                                                        
141 Reversing the lens and looking at the top 20 most active (Table 6) or top 20 most voluminous (Table 7) 
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Table 5: Actors who participated in 5 or more open consultations, 2006-2010 
  Total 
#interventions 
Total 
#words 
Persistence  Interventions  per 
meeting 
Words  per 
meeting 
MARILYN CADE  56  12256  10  5.6  1225.6 
BERTRAND DE LA CHAPELLE  71  23489  9  7.9  2609.9 
WILLIAM DRAKE  22  10887  9  2.4  1209.7 
AYESHA HASSAN  38  9715  9  4.2  1079.4 
FRANCIS MUGUET  24  7752  9  2.7  861.3 
WOLFGANG KLEINWAECHTER  21  5316  9  2.3  590.7 
CHINA  16  4798  9  1.8  533.1 
BILL GRAHAM  16  4539  9  1.8  504.3 
ADAM PEAKE  13  3872  9  1.4  430.2 
EGYPT  18  7086  8  2.3  885.8 
EMILY TAYLOR  13  4000  8  1.6  500.0 
UNESCO  11  3515  8  1.4  439.4 
UNITED STATES  10  2429  8  1.3  303.6 
BRAZIL  26  12036  7  3.7  1719.4 
ETNO  14  8591  7  2.0  1227.3 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE  8  4623  7  1.1  660.4 
JOVAN KURBALIJA  9  4237  7  1.3  605.3 
QUSAI AL-SHATTI  10  3444  7  1.4  492.0 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  9  3078  7  1.3  439.7 
ICC  18  9213  6  3.0  1535.5 
GEORGE PAPADATOS  35  6933  6  5.8  1155.5 
MARTIN BOYLE  17  6367  6  2.8  1061.2 
RAUL ECHEBERRIA  16  6195  6  2.7  1032.5 
APC  11  4616  6  1.8  769.3 
INDIA  9  4031  6  1.5  671.8 
KAREN BANKS  7  3499  6  1.2  583.2 
EUROPEAN UNION  6  3032  6  1.0  505.3 
GINGER PAQUE  34  6962  5  6.8  1392.4 
SWITZERLAND  9  5090  5  1.8  1018.0 
LEE HIBBARD  21  4888  5  4.2  977.6 
FOUAD BAJWA  28  3941  5  5.6  788.2 
PARMINDER SINGH  10  3836  5  2.0  767.2 
EL SALVADOR  6  3207  5  1.2  641.4 
KATITZA RODRIGUEZ  17  2759  5  3.4  551.8 
JEFF BRUEGGEMAN  10  2607  5  2.0  521.4 
CANADA  6  2222  5  1.2  444.4 
JEANETTE HOFMANN  8  1894  5  1.6  378.8 
EUROLINC  6  1884  5  1.2  376.8 
JAPAN  5  1400  5  1.0  280.0 
Notes: 
1.  The calculations are based on automated analysis of Open Consultation meeting transcripts 2006-2010. 
2.  5 meetings constitute over 1/3 of the total number of Open Consultations 2006-2010 
3.  The calculations exclude Nitin Desai and Markus Kummer, who clearly were the most persistent, the most 
active, and the most voluminous participants 
4.  Not all participants could be identified as individual due to the practice of UN meetings to call upon 
speakers using their institutional affiliation. Thus, for example, it is quite possible that when APC is listed 
as an intervener, it is possible that Karen Banks was speaking on behalf of the organization. Similarly, 
Ayesha Hassan commonly speaks on behalf of ICC. 
5.  I counted any intervention longer than 20 words as substantive. The purpose of this practice was to 
eliminate noise stemming from technical interactions (e.g. a microphone that does not work). 
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Table 6: The 20 most active participants (number of interventions per meeting, 2006-2010) 
Name  Affiliation  Total 
#interventions 
Total 
#words 
Persistence  Interventions 
per meeting 
Words  per 
meeting 
HADIL DA ROCHA VIANNA  Government of Brazil  58  5993  2  29.0  2996.5 
LIESYL FRANZ  TechAmerica  46  3941  2  23.0  1970.5 
RAQUEL GATTO  NIC.br  10  865  1  10.0  865.0 
EDMON CHUNG  DotAsia  9  441  1  9.0  441.0 
LUCINDA FELL  Childnet International  8  625  1  8.0  625.0 
BERTRAND DE LA CHAPELLE  Government of Frence  71  23489  9  7.9  2609.9 
ANDREA SAKS  Personal Capacity  29  3793  4  7.3  948.3 
PATRIK FALSTROM  Cisco  21  2091  3  7.0  697.0 
ANDREY SHCHERBOVICH  Moscow State University  7  1174  1  7.0  1174.0 
CHRISTINE ARIDA  Government of Egypt  7  640  1  7.0  640.0 
GINGER PAQUE  Diplo Foundation  34  6962  5  6.8  1392.4 
GEORGE PAPADATOS  Government of Greece  35  6933  6  5.8  1155.5 
OLGA CAVALLI  Government of Argentina  23  3058  4  5.8  764.5 
MARILYN CADE  mCADE LLC  56  12256  10  5.6  1225.6 
FOUAD BAJWA  Independent consultant  33  4932  8  5.5  822.0 
CHRIS DISSPAIN  .au Domain Administration Ltd.  20  2089  4  5.0  522.3 
ALEJANDRO PISANTY  ISOC Mexico  5  2832  1  5.0  2832.0 
SYRIA  Government of Syria  5  1481  1  5.0  1481.0 
YASSER HASSAN IBRAHIM  Government of Egypt  5  1308  1  5.0  1308.0 
STEPHEN LAU  HP  14  2857  3  4.7  952.3 
Notes: 
1.  See notes to Table 5. 
2.  Affiliations of some participants change over time. The table includes the most dominant affiliation in the course of the 
five years between 2006 and 2010. 
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Table 7: Top 20 most voluminous participants (number of words per meeting, 2006-2010) 
Name  Affiliation  Total 
#interventions 
Total 
#words 
Persistence  Interventions 
per meeting 
Words  per 
meeting 
HADIL DA ROCHA VIANNA  Government of Brazil  58  5993  2  29.0  2996.5 
ALEJANDRO PISANTY  ISOC Mexico  5  2832  1  5.0  2832.0 
BERTRAND DE LA CHAPELLE  Government of France  71  23489  9  7.9  2609.9 
WOLFGANG KLEINWACHTER  University of Aarhus  5  4710  2  2.5  2355.0 
LIESYL FRANZ  TechAmerica  46  3941  2  23.0  1970.5 
CCBI  International  Chamber  of 
Commerce 
3  1886  1  3.0  1886.0 
KONSTANTIN KLADOURAS  European  Telecom  Network 
Operators (ETNO) 
11  5213  3  3.7  1737.7 
BRAZIL  Government of Brazil  26  12036  7  3.7  1719.4 
ICC  International  Chamber  of 
Commerce 
18  9213  6  3.0  1535.5 
NERMINE EL SAADANY  Government of Egypt  9  4464  3  3.0  1488.0 
SYRIA  Government of Syria  5  1481  1  5.0  1481.0 
FRANCE  Government of France  10  5754  4  2.5  1438.5 
GINGER PAQUE  Diplo Foundation  34  6962  5  6.8  1392.4 
IAN PETER  Ian Peter and Associates Pty Ltd  3  1388  1  3.0  1388.0 
YASSER HASSAN IBRAHIM  Government of Egypt  5  1308  1  5.0  1308.0 
ETNO  European  Telecom  Network 
Operators (ETNO) 
14  8591  7  2.0  1227.3 
MARILYN CADE  mCADE LLC  56  12256  10  5.6  1225.6 
VITTORIO BERTOLA  ISOC-ECC  3  2421  2  1.5  1210.5 
WILLIAM DRAKE  Centre  for  International 
Governance 
22  10887  9  2.4  1209.7 
MILTON MUELLER  Syracuse University  11  4827  4  2.8  1206.8 
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The nucleus of the IGF is characterized by two primary factors. First, it is socially close. While 
those, who sporadically attend the annual IGF events or occasionally partake in the preparatory 
process, exhibit loose associations
142 based primarily on their professional interest, people at 
the nucleus exhibit attributes of task or even intimacy groups
143 (Lickel et al., 2001). This 
cohesion of the nucleus has a self reinforcing tendency in terms of strengthening the views of 
the nucleus about the IGF and Internet governance, and at the same time protecting those 
views from outside influences. In other words, in a classical Giddens-ean fashion, the existence 
of the nucleus is reifying the structural trajectory started during WSIS.  
To be a member of the nucleus it is not enough to attend the preparatory process, it is also 
required to share a set of common goals and priorities. Members of the nucleus seem to share 
a belief in the uniqueness of the IGF as a multistakeholder forum and they strive to maintain its 
relevance among other fora where Internet governance is discussed. In other words, while the 
members of the nucleus represent different cultures and institutional settings, there is an 
established meta-structure at the basis of the IGF as it is represented through the practices of 
the nucleus. This unanimous support of the IGF as a concept is particularly evident when there 
is an external threat to the IGF. For example, when the question of renewal of the IGF mandate 
was discussed, there was unanimous support among the members of the nucleus about 
continuing the IGF. They might have disagreed about the direction of the forum, but there was 
                                                        
142 Lickel et al. (2001) describe loose associations as marked by “very high permeability; fairly short duration; and 
low levels of interaction, common goals, common outcomes, importance, and similarity” (p.131). 
143 Lickel et al. (2001) describe task groups as “small in size; moderate in duration and permeability; and 
moderately high in interaction, common goals, common outcomes, importance, and similarity;” using the same 
criteria, intimacy groups are perceived as “having a long duration; as being small and impermeable; and as having 
high levels of interaction, common goals, common outcomes, importance, and group member similarity” (p.131).  181 
 
no questions raised about the principle desirability and the multistakeholder character of the 
IGF. China was the only persistent delegation which stated during the Open Consultations that 
they do not intend to vote for the extenuation of the IGF mandate.
144 
The use of first names is one of the prominent practices that delineate the nucleus group. It 
was common during the preparatory process that Desai or Kummer, as chairs of the meeting, 
called on the members of the nucleus, those they personally knew, by their first names; they 
would call on those outside of the nucleus using generic names or names of the entities those 
people were represented. For example, the Chinese delegation, the only one that openly 
questioned the necessity of continuation of the IGF, was always referred to as an entity, while 
members of other government delegations, such as that of Brazil, Greece or the Council of 
Europe, are frequently called on using their first names. Distancing those confronting the 
internal basic consensus of the IGF nucleus through a particular form of signification is again 
part of reifying the emerging structures of legitimation and domination. 
There were other indicators of this social intimacy. I also observed cases of loss in one’s family 
and the support that the community provided; I learned that romance is not foreign to the halls 
of Palais des Nations and there are couples that grew out of IGF; I heard stories of vacations 
people spent together with each other’s families. But, I also witnessed cases of personal 
animosity, mistrust, and professional betrayal. One of my informants used the analogy of a 
family to describe this community. “There are always disagreements within the family,” she 
explained, “And people argue with each other. But when something happens to you or if there 
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is an outside threat, the family will always be there for you to support.” In other words, the 
nucleus group is by no means homogenous and it enacts political tensions surrounding long-
standing Internet governance issues such as management of names and numbers and the role 
of the nation-states in Internet-related policy-making. At the same time, there is a sense of 
solidarity and a joint mission among the members of the nucleus; or in other words, a shared 
structural basis. As another one of my interviewees, a member of the nucleus, put it, “I also 
think we value the relationships that get built. It’s not just what happens in the room. ” The 
notion of family makes the interactions among the members of the nucleus more personal and 
it also makes the group less permeable to those outside of the nucleus.   
The second characteristic of the nucleus is that its members are very mobile and focused at the 
same time. Over the relatively short span of IGF history, a number of individuals, who can be 
associated with the nucleus, have changed their professional affiliations and even the 
stakeholder groups to which they belong, but remained active within the IGF in their new 
capacities. For example, when the IGF started, William Drake was the president of Computer 
Professionals for Social Responsibility, an international NGO that developed professional ethics 
among a new class of experts, but soon after that he shifted back to an academic career with 
the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. Bertrand de La 
Chapelle shifted stakeholder groups at the end of 2010, when he left his position as a Special 
Envoy for the Information Society with the French Foreign Ministry to become a Program 
Director at the International Diplomatic Academy and to join the board of directors of ICANN. 
Bill Graham made a similar move in 2007 when he left a position with Canadian Government to 
work on strategic global engagement at ISOC. Most recently, Markus Kummer, has left his 183 
 
position as an Executive Coordinator of the IGF to become a Vice President of Public Policy at 
ISOC. While changing their institutional affiliations these individuals remain actively involved in 
and committed to the IGF processes; for them doing this under a different institutional label is 
to approach Internet governance from a different angle.
145 This shift draws a picture of IGF as 
not only professional, but a personal quest for those in the nucleus.  
While many IGF participants are there because it is their job, the members of the nucleus seem 
to adjust their jobs so that they can participate. They seem to seek positions that allow them a 
way of participation that better suits their personal aspirations with regards to the forum. They 
are on a mission to make the Internet ethos compatible with the intergovernmental system of 
decision-making. This focused mobility is an important attribute from the point of view of 
structuration, because it suggests that members of the nucleus are not only the most influential 
group that maintains the conceptual infrastructure of the forum, but also acts as ambassadors 
to other institutional settings by leveraging their experience with IGF. Furthermore, focused 
mobility enhances the persistence factor of the members of the nucleus. 
Over the years, the IGF developed a series of practices that embody a value system that sees 
merit in non-binding discussion, inclusion of non-state stakeholders in policy debate, organic 
institutional evolution, and a belief in the ultimately positive impact of the Internet. As 
Esterhuysen (2008, p. 38) explained: 
                                                        
145 In response to a question about separating the different institutional “hats,” one of the interviewees explained: 
“You don’t really need to distinguish them you just need to wear a really good, broad, rimmed hat and keep 
embellishing it with different bells and whistles, because the fundamental principle of Internet and user voice and 
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To be successful, the IGF needed to draw on two cultures - the formal culture of the UN 
system and the informal culture of the Internet.  Only by balancing these two cultures 
could the IGF attract the support and participation - as importantly, the positive 
participation - of the necessary range of participants. In practice, the IGF adopted more 
of the Internet community's informality than of the UN system's formalism. The 
relatively informal and egalitarian character of the IGF felt appropriate and should be 
maintained in the future.”   
Yet, I would argue that it is those individuals that constitute the IGF community, and especially 
the nucleus, who carry on this value system: not necessarily IGF as a well defined institution 
(because it is not), but a collective of individuals, who care deeply about the subject matter and 
share some basic agreement about the way solution might be reached. Paraphrasing Kelty 
(2008), the nucleus represents a community that exists insofar as it comes together in new 
forms of Internet-related policy discourse of its own creation. While their affinity is very clearly 
constituted through the IGF, the forum is not the only reason for that affinity. It is this collective 
affinity that Kelty refers to as a recursive public. “Because it is impossible to understand this 
affinity by trying to identify particular types of people, it is necessary to turn to historically 
specific sets of practices that form the substance of their affinity” (p.92). The analysis of the IGF 
presented in this and previous chapters, offers this perspective.  
While the IGF community remains true to its multistakeholder ethos and, at least nominally, is 
open to a plurality of opinions, one needs to subscribe to this value system to develop that 
affinity, in order to participate in the forum effectively and sustainably. Those who steered 
away from the IGF, despite their initial interest for the forum, are an interesting illustration of 
this point. Iran and Pakistan, two vocal speakers on behalf of “G-77 and China” in the early 
stages of IGF, are no longer participating in the IGF meetings. The Iranian representative was an 185 
 
important factor in making Internet critical resources part of the IGF agenda. Yet, despite that 
success, the Iranian delegation is no longer taking part in open consultations.   
An episode I witnessed during one of my research trips suggests that while Iran may have 
practical reasons for withdrawing its mission from the IGF processes
146, there also remain deep 
conceptual divides. I witnessed an argument between that representative and a member of the 
IGF nucleus. The argument took place in the spring 2009, at the beginning of debates about the 
extension of the IGF mandate. The Iranian diplomat was arguing that the IGF has failed its 
mandate, because it did not address the question of US control over ICANN thoroughly enough. 
In return, the member of the IGF nucleus called upon the Iranian delegation to raise this issue 
within the forum, stating that IGF exists exactly for the purpose of hosting this kind of 
discussion. The argument quickly deteriorated into a (diplomatic) shouting match regarding the 
merits of non-government-centric public policy fora. In other words, although it started as a 
disagreement about a specific issue, the argument was essentially about the value system 
enacted through the practices of the IGF. 
The argument presented above illustrates the main catalyst of the structural processes of the 
IGF—cognizant and knowledgeable participants as agents who enact a variety of often 
conflicting social structures. The IGF draws its legitimacy on participation. Celebrity participants, 
                                                        
146 During open consultations in 2006 and 2007, Iran called upon the IGF to address the issue of enhanced 
cooperation, which, together with the establishment of the forum, was one of the action items on Tunis Agenda 
for Information Society document. The concept of enhanced cooperation implied intergovernmental, as opposed 
to multistakeholder, control over Internet-related international public policy, and the calls of the Iranian 
delegation were systematically dissolved in the IGF (see Malcolm, 2008; Mueller, 2010). As time passed, other 
organizations, such as the ITU, added enhanced cooperation to their agenda, which could explain the shift in 
resource allocation by the Iranian delegation (in Epstein, 2010 I discuss the active role of the Iranian delegation in 
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acting in their respective roles during the annual IGF event, offer the IGF the legitimacy of their 
respective communities and ideological bases. The government-celebrities reify the centrality 
of the state in Internet policy debate and amplify the state-centric environment of the UN 
where the IGF is hosted. The tech-celebrities, however, symbolize a set of private-sector 
focused and individual liberties oriented culture of the Internet community. Having both 
participating in the IGF creates a new, hybrid source of legitimacy for the IGF and also shifts the 
perceptions of power among the IGF participants; by acknowledging the concept of 
multistakeholderism through their participation, the nation-sate actors concede some of their 
symbolic power otherwise contained within the UN system (same holds true for the other side 
of the argument, i.e. actors representing the Internet community).  
The IGF nucleus has undergone a process of self-selection, so that the people who remain 
active do share a common appreciation of the process and the values it represents. The 
tightness of the core group and its high profile in shaping the practices of the IGF make it a 
major ideological force. The nucleus solidified multistakeholderism as vessel for values such as 
openness, inclusivity, and individual freedoms, and made it a major organizing principle both 
for the forum and for their vision of the Internet governance regime. Although there are 
debates within the nucleus itself about the role of nation-states vis-à-vis individual liberties in 
the ultimate Internet regime, this vision is constructed primarily using the vocabulary of 
individual freedoms. These ideological elements enacted through practice of the nucleus are 
both reified and challenge by the rest of the IGF community. On the one hand, as a rather tight 
task group, the nucleus is not particularly welcoming to ideas that deviate from its status quo 
(e.g. the Chinese and the Iranian cases). On the other hand, members of the nucleus are in a 187 
 
continuous interaction with the broader community IGF participants, where they enact and 
reflect on the structures emerging from the group. In other words, although a significant driving 
factor in the IGF, the nucleus is both shaping and is being shaped by the universe of Internet 
governance debates. 
5.4. Governing through discourse 
The story of the IGF is a story of a contest for power. Yet, it is not a typical one. The forum was 
created as a venue for the unresolved tensions of the WSIS, but without any authority for 
policymaking in the traditional sense. On the face of it, this is an impossible arrangement – a 
policy forum without the formal legitimacy to make and without the material resources to 
assert any decision. This apparent lack of traditional authority and lack of material leverage 
within the forum make it difficult to explain the IGF in terms of theories of international 
relations, which rely heavily on existence of material resources at the basis of power. The 
analysis above suggests that power within and of the IGF may not be material but conceptual, 
and the outcome of the forum may better be viewed not as tangible, but ideological. 
In Giddens’s (1984a) terms, the debate in the IGF is about producing and reproducing 
structures of domination by enacting structures of signification and reifying structures of 
legitimation derived from a variety of contexts. This phenomenon, however, is difficult to 
explain in terms of traditional theories of international relations, precisely because of the lack 
of tangible resources as the basis of power. The theory of structuration shifts attention from 
power defined exclusively in terms of allocative resources, which is at the basis of evolutionary 188 
 
theories such as realism and rational choice institutionalism, to power understood in terms of 
authoritative resources.
147 As Giddens wrote:  
The augmenting of material resources is fundamental to the expansion of power, but 
allocative resources cannot be developed without the transmutation of authoritative 
resources, and the latter are undoubtedly at least as important in providing ‘levers’ of 
social change as the former (p. 260). 
While the IGF process, and the IGF debate, is to some degree concerned with and driven by 
allocative resources, the main focus is indeed on the authoritative resources. Bringing the two 
worlds—that of the UN and that of the “Internet community” (Esterhuysen, 2008)—into a 
single discursive space produced an arsenal of practices that enact the dialectic relationships 
between structures and discourses originating in the different conceptual “homes” of the IGF 
participants.  
 For a participant in the debate, who is focused on carrying his or her point across, the 
structures and discourses are inseparable as these are the conceptual tools they are used to 
operating with (Yanow, 1999). Yet, from an analytical perspective, unpacking discursive 
practices may shed light on the state of the IGF structures as a way of thinking about the 
Internet and its governance, because it is in the discursive interaction that the original ways of 
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resources, such as material features of the environment, the means of material production and reproduction, and 
produced goods; the latter are described as conceptual infrastructure and include organization of social time-
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perceiving the world are expressed by the actors. What ideological elements are enacted in IGF 
discourse? How do those change over time or in different contexts?  
Structuration theory places the analytical focus on the discourse of the IGF as a social practice.  
It is through observing the dynamics of discourse one can observe the constitution of structures 
of dominance based on authoritative resources. The unique contribution of the theory of 
structuration in this case is that it offers a holistic framework where structure and agency are 
inherently intertwined, not treated separately as in approaches such as realism, rational choice 
or constructivism. Building off Sikkink’s (2001, p. 393) critique of the theories of international 
relations, structuration offers “a more specific understanding of who the relevant actors are, 
what they want, and what the content of social structures might be.” This framework allows us 
to treat policy discourse as a power manufacturing process that happens through the actions of 
individual actors involved in the act of policy deliberation; it can be unpacked through analysis 
of their perceptions of the world and their understanding of what is normal, normative, or 
desired; and it is more clearly observable when the discourse centers on conscious construction 
of institutions for policy deliberation, which is the case of the IGF. 
The structural tensions between the UN heritage of the IGF and the Internet-community-
inspired innovations are reflected in the way discourse is conducted at the IGF. Structurational 
tensions in this context are more than formal rules of engagement in each one of these spaces. 
They are the ways in which participants, particularly veteran participants, in these spaces think, 
what they hold as normal and obvious elements of the information policymaking world. On the 
one hand, the UN discourse is built around the centrality of the nation-state as the primary 190 
 
decision making entity and a hierarchical approach to decision making. Donahue and Prosser 
(1997) described UN addresses as a distinct genre containing the following elements: “(a) 
congratulations to the current President of the proceedings, or at least addressing the speech 
toward him or her or similar officer, (b) an affirmation of the importance or the necessity of the 
UN and one’s alliance to its aims, (c) the use of highly polite and formal language, (d) 
observations on regional or world issues” (p.65). Scott (2001) alludes to the use of ambiguity as 
another pivotal element of the UN genre, especially in the area of conference diplomacy.  
Observing the genre is one of the defining factors of the community of practice that is UN 
diplomats. The actors need to operate within the boundaries of the genre to maintain their 
legitimacy and authority; for a career diplomat in the UN system, these are the obvious 
elements of how one conducts him or herself if they want to be a legitimate part of this 
community and a voice that will be listened to. To derive power from this system they need to 
manipulate the elements of the genre in order to achieve their goals and dominate. Yet, by 
working within the elements of genre, either using of abusing them, the participants in the UN 
setting legitimize the authority of the UN as an intergovernmental institution
 148. Like in a game 
of chess, an experienced player may come up with creative solution to a complex situation; 
while the number of such solutions is practically infinite, all these solutions have to play out 
                                                        
148 Donahue and Prosser’s (1997) book analyzes UN discourse surrounding conflicts, which makes articulation of 
the elements of the genre more prominent. During my field work at the ITU, I could observe similar elements of 
the genre within the specific context of the Union. Both presidium speakers and interveners from the floor would 
congratulate the presiding officers and address their intervention to him or her. They would use polite and formal 
language, and affirm the importance of the ITU and never pose direct critique of the Union. Finally, speeches 
would build off observations about the state of the world telecom or the state of the meeting, depending on the 
particular context. Another element of the ITU genre is continuous reference to the issues of development as part 
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only according to the rules of the game. The difference from a game of chess, however, is that 
in the case of UN deliberations these rules are not set in stone. Instead they are reified through 
repeated behavior and argumentation tactics, no matter the final outcome of a particular 
debate. 
On the other hand, the Internet community is drawn from a plurality of fields, each with a set of 
distinctive discursive genres. There is no single genre that unites the various discourses of all 
the organizations that constitute the Internet community. Yet, there are strong links to the 
early ethos of the Internet as a free and open network, and the Internet governance process as 
based on principles of meritocracy and bottom-up problem solving. For example, Braman 
(2010), when analyzing the discourse of the IETF, noticed that the formal ground rules were as 
follows: “anyone was welcome to speak, there were no genre restrictions, minimum required 
length was one sentence, and any thoughts, however tentative, were welcome” (p.310). Similar 
to the factors that constitute the UN as a community of practice, here a different set of 
behaviors and perceptions of the normal and the normative constitute a community of practice 
that is Internet technologists.  
While on the face of it, these genres are different, the fundamental mechanism behind both is 
similar from the perspective of the theory of structuration; as genres represent an assembly of 
structural properties and practices. Just like the UN diplomats practice certain elements of 
genre that celebrate the nation state as a pivotal organizing principle, the Internet community 
enacts a different set of practices, which reifies their view of meritocratic and distributed 
authority in Internet matters. The two discursive genres delineate the range of the discursive 192 
 
arsenal deployed in the IGF. Between the two extremes lies a variety of combination of 
discursive elements, which are deployed strategically by the IGF participants.  
In the IGF, the two genres were forced to co-exist, which from the structuration point of view is 
bound to produce new structures, new ways of thinking. Each genre brings with it distinct 
structures of domination “whereby power that ‘flows smoothly’ in processes of social 
reproduction (and is, at it were, ‘unseen’) operates” (Giddens, 1984a, p. 257) in ways that are 
unique to that genre. Yet, as the analysis above demonstrates, when elements of one genre are 
placed in the context of another, they are reinterpreted; structures of domination in one 
context can be adopted with a different meaning in another and new structures of domination 
(and legitimation) emerge.  
The procedural change that allowed participation of non-government stakeholders, in formerly 
state-dominated domain of public policymaking, was a significant strategic achievement for the 
multistakeholderism movement. Yet on the tactical level, in order to participate, the non-state 
actors must conform to the UN discursive practices, or, in other words, rely on the structures of 
domination, legitimation, and signification. This meant using the UN classification system of 
stakeholder groups, being conscious about how many times one took the floor, observing the 
rituals of congratulating the presiding officers, and conducting the verbal exchange through 
them. These procedural norms are observed more strictly during the plenary sessions of the 
annual IGF even; less so during the consultative processes, which is hosted in the UN 
headquarters; and in the workshops of the annual event, one can observe the most casual and 
interactive atmosphere, which is closer to the practices of discourse in communities such as the 193 
 
IETF. The degree of (in)formality of a workshop is typically a function of institutional identity of 
the organizers; workshops organized by corporate players and government representatives 
tend to be more formal, while workshops organized by the members of the civil society tend to 
be more casual.
149  
The need to conform to the UN genre put the newcomers to the UN system (mostly non-state 
actors) at a relative disadvantage, compared to the veterans (nation-states).  Many of the state-
centric UN practices, such as identifying participants by the country they represent or the 
enhanced sense of authority associated with speaking on behalf of a country, are still followed 
in the IGF. Adopting attributes of traditional UN discourse meant also enacting the underlying 
structures of legitimation, which originally evolved around nation-states as primary actors. 
When affirming the importance and necessity of the multistakeholder approach, for example, it 
is more common for the non-state actors to acknowledge the importance of the participation of 
the governments, but the reverse is not always true. Similarly, the need for consensus, although 
formally dismissed by the IGF leadership (because the IGF is a non-binding forum), is widely 
practiced and also deployed as a rhetorical device. Another UN-specific attribute is the power 
of “development” as a universal motivating principle in argumentation. Most centrally, 
however, adopting the UN genre meant conceptually accepting the authority of the UN itself in 
the IG debate as an intergovernmental body. Put together with contextual factors such as the 
                                                        
149 An extreme example in the context of the IGF is a workshop held during the 2010 annual meeting. Titled 
“Innovative Internet Governance Ideas and Approaches - An Open Discussion Space,” the workshop had no formal 
speakers, but a free flow discussion among the participants. As the title suggests, the aim of the workshop was 
generating ideas. The transcript of the workshop is available at: 
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UN mandate of the IGF, this practice creates dissonance with the multistakeholder rhetoric of 
the forum, because it reifies a system where the ultimate political authority lies solely in the 
hands of the nation-states.  
Despite the need to conform to the UN discursive practices and despite the institutional home 
of the forum within the UN system, the multistakeholderism movement brought with it new 
genre elements.   First, some of the features of the UN genre got re-appropriated. For example, 
the practice of affirmation of the importance or the necessity of the current forum and one’s 
alliance to its aims remained, but instead of the UN, it is turned to the IGF and its 
multistakeholder approach. The practice of providing general observations of the state of 
affairs as a basis for one’s intervention is also present, but deployed strategically to either 
survey the state of affairs in a particular domain of Internet governance, or, when the 
discussion is focused on institutional arrangements of the forum itself, the state of affairs of the 
IGF. The participants also tend to make broad comments and avoid specificity (specificity many 
times signals confrontation); they maintain the same ‘creative ambiguity’ that characterized the 
definition of the IG itself.
150  
Second, “injection” of the “Internet community” culture also resulted in distinctive new 
elements of discourse, new structures of domination, legitimation, and signification, in the IGF. 
For example, unlike in other UN meetings, the use of first names, as opposed to formal titles, is 
very prevalent in the IGF, particularly in the secretariat references to the participants and in 
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participants’ references to each other. This practice highlights the informal character of the 
meeting and the centrality of individuals, not formal institutions or governments; referring to 
somebody by his or her first name became a badge of seniority and a status marker for the IGF 
participants; consistently referring to someone by their institutional identity marks them as not 
belonging to the IGF nucleus. At the same time, newcomers into the multistakeholder setting 
are expected to clarify their institutional identities, as well as the capacity in which they are 
speaking; the more regularly a person attends the IGF meetings, the less significant, at least on 
the face of it, their formal affiliation becomes; the reference by the first name vs. institutional 
affiliation, serves as an in-group/out-group marker. In the IGF, it is also common for the 
participants to express their personal opinions, as opposed to the opinions of an entity they 
represent—an atypical element for the UN genre. Finally, critical comments during the IGF, 
especially during the consultative process, are made with an explicit or implicit demonstration 
of care for the well-being of the forum. Taken together, these discursive elements acknowledge 
the plurality of stakeholders in Internet governance and the informal exchange as a means of 
resolving public policy issues; they replace the centrality of the nation state as an ultimate 
source of authority in the debate, with a more individual-focused and meritocratic view of 
authority.  
When combined, the UN-centric and the Internet-community-centric elements create a 
discursive domain that is both shaped by and is shaping the IGF process. In the processes, 
actors bring into the debate different ways of thinking about the Internet and perceiving 
authority and legitimacy in the information policymaking processes. The discursive attributes 
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Internet governance. To participate effectively in the IGF, one needs to internalize attributes of 
both, to accept a model of coexistence of the different perspectives, and to know how to 
navigate the elements of discursive practices of both the UN and the Internet community. 
Actors, who unequivocally reject the structures enacted through the UN-centric attributes or 
actors who unequivocally reject the structures enacted through the Internet-community-centric 
discourses are likely to be marginalized in the IGF
151; those, who embrace and balance the two, 
move to the power center of the forum.  Driven primarily by authoritative resources, this 
dynamic cannot be adequately explained through realism or rational choice, as it deals with the 
change of categories that structure the power hierarchy of the IG debate. 
For example, among those who have rejected the Internet-community-centered practices, the 
government of Iran participated actively in the early stages of the debate, but quit soon after 
the second annual meeting of the IGF. Observing the commentary of the Iranian delegation in 
the IGF and in other settings
152, I could see how the fundamental disagreement about the role 
of the governments in Internet-related policy-making processes was a significant obstacle for 
effective Iranian participation in the IGF
153. Pakistani involvement in the IGF followed a similar 
trajectory. 
                                                        
151 Hintz and Milan (2009) demonstrate an extreme case. They interviewed grassroots media activists, radical tech 
collectives, and alternative Internet Service Providers in Europe, who actively chose not to participate in the IGF, 
because of fundamental disagreement with the notion of institutionalized policy-related decision-making and 
skepticism regarding their ability to influence the forum. 
152 I observed formal interventions of the Iranian delegation in the WSIS Forum as well as informal exchanges 
between them and other participants in OGF open consultations and the WSIS forum.  
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The Chinese delegation, on the other hand, is among the most persistent participants in the 
open consultations. Yet, it fails to penetrate the nucleus because of its open rejection of the 
merits of the IGF; it was the only delegation taking part in the preparatory process that loudly 
opposed the continuation of the IGF mandate beyond the initial five years. When the Chinese 
delegation participates during the open consultations, its substantive contributions are treated 
on par with everybody else, as long they remain on the technical level or are reserved to 
congratulatory remarks. One can observe, even, how the Chinese delegation is marginalized 
through subtle practices such as the official way other participants and the secretariat refer to 
it (as opposed to the more informal reference to other participants). When the Chinese 
delegation has questioned the merit of having a non-binding policy deliberation forum, it has 
usually faced an open confrontation from a number of members of the nucleus at a time. In 
other words, even though the Chinese delegation is generally a productive member of the IGF 
community, because of the normative gap between its position and the status quo of the 
nucleus, it is marginalized. 
Unlike the Iranian and the Chinese examples, ISOC is an example of an organization that has 
adapted to this emerging discursive space. ISOC acts as a protector of existing IG organizations, 
which emerged out of the technical community. During the WSIS process, it had rejected the 
nation-state-centric structures prevailing in the UN community and dismissed the very need for 
the IGF as a UN forum. Over time, however, the ISOC adapted to the new conceptual 
framework and embraced some of the UN practices, while remaining a carrier of the Internet 
community perceptions of authority and legitimacy in Internet-related policymaking. Eventually 
ISOC became a pivotal actor in the IGF community and one of its important financial backers.  198 
 
Viewing the IGF participants, particularly at the  IGF nucleus, as a community that exists insofar 
as it comes together in new forms of Internet-related policy discourse of its own creation, the 
discourse becomes a vehicle through which affinity among the IGF stakeholders is built (in 
Kelty, 2008 terms). Since the discourse of the IGF, as a structure of signification, captures ways 
of thinking about the Internet and its governance, adopting the discursive practices of the 
forum reifies other social structures it is shaped by and is shaping at the same time. For 
example, for the critique of the forum to appear constructive to its participants, it has to be 
done using the discursive mechanisms of the forum and while making a gesture that the 
critique is contributing to the overall sustainability of the IGF. In other words, the IGF discourse 
produces authoritative resources that insure the existence of the forum as a space that 
generates authoritative resources for the broader debate about Internet governance. 
The IGF discursive space is used to co-create the IGF as an institution; and one of the tacit, yet 
important, factors of institutionalizing the IGF is its discourse. Without speaking the language of 
the forum it is difficult to participate in it effectively. Without subscribing to the hybrid genre of 
the IGF discourse, a participant runs the danger of being marginalized as an extremist, newbie, 
or simply weird. Adopting the new structures of IGF thinking allows the actors to maintain 
positions that may appear counterproductive to maintaining the formal authority of the IGF or 
transforming it into a decision-making body in the more traditional sense. Discursive practices 
become the definitive factors of the in-group/out-group dynamics. Through repetitive 
participation in the IGF consultations and the annual events, the participants reify the structural 
basis of the compromise between the UN-heritage and the WSIS-inspired innovation. Yet, the 
structural basis and its discursive representation are a moving target. Through adjusting their 199 
 
discursive behavior within the parameters of the genre, the participants are able to alter the 
discursive space and re-define the boundaries of the IGF as an institutional arrangement. The 
strong and active nucleus of forum participants acts as both the carrier and the guardian of that 
structural basis.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
What can we learn from unpacking the practices of the IGF? I started this research curious 
about the dynamics of the IGF as a non-binding multistakeholder debate about information 
policymaking. My intention was to look “under the hood” of the IGF; to explore how the nation-
state-centric and the Internet-community-centric perceptions of authority and approaches to 
decision-making manifest themselves in the forum; to understand what political and cultural 
norms they reify. I aspired to gain insight into why people engage in the politics of agenda 
setting and participation in the IGF, provided that the forum does not have “tangible 
outcomes;” and I wanted to reveal how they do it.  
My analysis draws a complex picture of the inner workings of the IGF as a space where the 
historical tensions between the traditional methods of global policymaking and the unorthodox 
approach to governance developed by the Internet community are played out. The IGF is a UN 
forum that aspires to bring collaborative, meritocratic, and bottom-up decision-making 
practices into the nation-state-focused, hierarchical environment of the UN system. My analysis 
demonstrates how the two worldviews on Internet policymaking are enacted through the 
institutionalized fixtures of the IGF and the practices that evolved around them.  
This study highlights the importance and the complexity of studying and theorizing the dynamic 
construction of governance institutions, as opposed to the analysis of the steady states. The IGF 
fixtures are in fact not fixtures at all, they are in constant flux; they are another face of the 
institutions of the Internet in the making. The secretariat, funded through extra-budgetary 201 
 
contributions and reliant on in-kind contributions from the UN headquarters in Geneva for its 
logistics, acts as a mediator among the variety of stakeholders participating in the IGF and 
between the IGF community and the UN system. The Multistakeholder Advisory Group, 
nominated by the Secretary General of the UN in a rather vague selection process, is an ever 
evolving internal decision-making body that sets the agenda for the annual meeting of the 
forum, decides on the speakers for the plenary, and enacts the unofficial hierarchy of the IGF 
community; with that, in an ideal state this internally grown solution to multistakeholder 
participation is perceived by the IGF loyalists as embodying a set of values traditionally 
associated with the Internet community, such as collaboration, meritocracy, and transparency.  
My analysis also highlights the role of idea entrepreneurs in shaping the practices of the IGF 
and their formalization. It identifies a nucleus of committed and active IGF participants who 
consciously engage in the negotiation of IGF structures and their systematization. Not only are 
these people engaged in setting the agenda of the forum and reflecting on its practices, they 
also enact a relatively unified culture of multistakeholderism. Paradoxically, although inherently 
open, this culture is hostile to strong criticism of the IGF or of collaborative policymaking; the 
critics conform, find themselves at the margins of the IGF discourse, or choose to turn to the 
traditional intergovernmental frameworks instead of participating in the IGF deliberations. The 
resulting discourse, while reifying the basic structural properties of the UN-style decisions 
making, such as the centrality of the nation-states, relies heavily on the Internet community’s 
discursive genre insofar as plurality of voices, bottom-up initiative, and technical or policy 
expertise are valued as power resources within the IGF. What do these observations about IGF 202 
 
practices contribute to our understanding of the Forum, and to Internet governance more 
broadly?  
6.1. Mainstreaming Internet community values 
While the non-binding nature of the IGF is frequently mentioned as one of the main strengths 
of the forum, it has been also criticized for rendering the IGF toothless and thus of questionable 
significance in the Internet governance debates. Those invested in the continuation of the 
forum repeatedly rehearse this concern in their search for “tangible” outcomes of the IGF to 
respond to it; some view attendance as a metric of success and importance, others point to the 
variety of stakeholder groups and voices represented, still others suggest that the dynamic 
coalitions that have spun off of IGF are its primary accomplishment.  
Viewing the practices of the IGF through the lens of structuration theory suggests that the long-
lasting impact of the IGF may not necessarily be tangible, but structural—a harder deliverable 
to “sell” in a traditional policymaking environment, admittedly, but nevertheless an important 
one for the constitution of Internet governance. 
 From the rationalist perspective, deliberately arguing for a lack of decision-making power 
appears counterproductive (or irrational) to establishing of the IGF as a space with any impact 
on Internet-related policy. Decision-making power is the surest form of tangible control over 
authoritative resources (Giddens, 1984a), yet it is based on the allocation of tangible resources 
and the centrality of the nation state as an ultimate decision-making power. Making a formal 
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grounded in the material authority of the nation state. The theory of structuration, however, 
offers an alternative, albeit somewhat tautological view. From that perspective, the 
competition is indeed over resources, but these resources are less tangible and rooted in 
building off and altering the thought process of decision-makers.  
The non-binding nature of the IGF is an important part of the ethos of the forum that gives it 
legitimacy across the board, at least on the nominal level. This ethos also creates a structural 
path dependency – the IGF as an institution has evolved with the lack of binding decisions (and 
all the formal politics attached to it) as one of its cornerstones and advertised strengths; it was 
the enabling factor that gave the IGF its unique flavor as a space where governmental and non-
governmental actors could talk on an equal footing; it was also the characteristics that set the 
IGF apart from other Internet governance bodies. Over time, buying into the IGF ethos and way 
of thinking meant also buying into the value of non-binding discussions.  
Taking away this non-bindingness would mean undermining one of the pivots of legitimacy of 
the IGF. Changing the non-binding status of the IGF would alter the very fabric of the forum and 
its open character. As such, the very idea of the IGF as inherently non-binding becomes a point 
of commonality for the insiders, and a point of contestation of the authority and legitimacy of 
the forum for its outside critics.
154 In exclusively allocative terms (Giddens, 1984a), the IGF 
might be viewed as a decoy, that draws human and attention resources away from other fora 
with traditional decision-making power; yet in terms of authoritative resources, the 
                                                        
154 The IGF nucleus offers a tangible outcome of the use of authoritative resources embodied in the culture of 
consensus driven non-bindingness. Supporting the view that the IGF should remain a non-binding forum also 
became one of the markers of in-group-out-group dynamics; to be in the nucleus, one has to accept at least the 
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atmosphere of openness and dialogue made possible by the lack of formally binding outcomes 
creates a space that, for many involved, reflects the culture of the Internet itself and the culture 
they would like to preserve in its governance institutions. By doing so, the advocates of the 
non-binding doctrine may be undermining the status of the forum in the otherwise allocative 
environment of information policymaking. But in the view of structuration of Internet 
governance, there is an internal logic that offers an explanation to this otherwise irrational 
behavior. 
The values of the Internet community are largely foreign to traditional policymaking settings. 
While the Internet community leans on a meritocratic, globally-oriented, bottom-up, and 
consensual decision-making, the traditional policy-making environment is based on a formal 
hierarchy, bureaucracy, and, in the international settings, an emphasis on competing nationalist 
interests. In the ITU, for example, the authority of the speaker stems first of all from their 
position within a government delegation and then from their professional contribution to the 
debate. In a non-hierarchical environment such as the Internet Governance Caucus this order is 
reversed—authority is first derived from one’s contribution and dedication to the policy 
deliberation process, and only then from one’s organizational affiliation. Thus, the IGF, as a 
forum hosted within the UN-system, but fueled by the Internet community values, is indeed a 
peculiar case. In the IGF, some of the practices enact structures typical of the 
intergovernmental policy settings, while others enact structures typical of the Internet 
community.  205 
 
In the IGF, the two genres of discourse and decision-making are forced to co-exist. Yet they are 
not on equal footing. By the very virtue of being based within the UN system and acting 
through a UN-sanctioned mandate, the IGF is first and foremost a UN forum; members of the 
Internet community, who arrived into the WSIS and later the IGF settings from outside of the 
UN system, had to conform to some degree to UN discursive practices and their structural 
properties. Yet, the IGF is not a typical UN forum; these newcomers, who followed from the 
WSIS process into the IGF, also infused the UN environment with the Internet community’s 
values. When combined, the UN-centric and the Internet-community-centric elements create a 
hybrid policy discourse that is both shaped by and is shaping the IGF process. 
But with what outcome? The main contribution of the IGF process, as I see it, is the 
mainstreaming of the Internet community values within the intergovernmental UN system. The 
practices that have evolved in the IGF bring meritocratic and open structures to the formal 
intergovernmental policy-discourse settings. By creating mechanisms for participation for non-
state actors, formalizing consultative and decision-making processes that are agreed upon by 
actors coming from different policymaking backgrounds, and developing a language to describe 
those systems, the IGF normalized concepts such as openness, inclusivity, meritocracy, 
individualism, and bottom-up decision-making within the UN system. Multistakeholderism, for 
example, which some of the IGF participants indeed treat as an ideology (see discussion in 
Mueller, 2010), is significant insofar as it marks a set of diverse practices that embody some of 
the values of the Internet community. In this sense multistakeholderism is not an ideology, but 
a set of practices that help enact structures of legitimation and domination brought to the UN 
system from the Internet community way of setting rules and procedures. The IGF participants, 206 
 
especially the nucleus of the forum, argue about systems of decision-making but also argue 
with and through them, by formalizing, modifying, and maintaining the very practices of 
participation in the IGF by which they associate with one another.  
Going back to Braman’s (2009) distinction between government, governance, and 
governmentality
155, the IGF does not produce government in the “tangible” sense, as it is not a 
formal institution of law-making, or even a formal standard-setting body. Yet to the degree that 
the IGF produces systems of consultative and decision-making processes that have constitutive 
effects for Internet policymaking elsewhere, as nominal as it may be at this point in time, it 
does engage in governance. Moreover, to the degree that the IGF helps mainstream the values 
of the Internet community within traditional policymaking environments and spreading them 
beyond the boundaries of the tight IGF process, it also may impact governmentality. For 
example, the ITU has begun to open up some of its meetings to non-government participation, 
albeit in a limited fashion. They have also formalized the practice of providing publically 
accessible transcripts and captioning to the open meetings of the union.  
These are signs that the hybrid structures of the IGF are being taken up by other UN fora that 
deal with Internet policy. Also recently the CSTD was pressured not to limit participation in the 
Working Group on Improvements to the IGF to governments only. The chair of the commission 
was persuaded to reserve seats also for the civil society, business sector, academic and 
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making with constitutive [structural] effect whether it takes place within the public or private sectors, and formally 
or informally); and governmentality (cultural predispositions and practices that produce and reproduce the 
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technical communities, and intergovernmental organizations. This shift was possible largely 
because the practices of participation in the IGF are now viewed as acceptable or even the 
“right” form of participation in Internet policy debates within the UN system. The emergence of 
local and regional IGF-like events in different parts of the world is another example of how 
practices of the global forum get re-appropriated in local settings. Taken together, this 
anecdotal evidence suggests a change in the way a desired Internet-related policymaking 
process is perceived.  
It is important to emphasize that structuration is not the same as values transfer; structuration 
highlights the mutual co-construction of social structures through the interactions between 
actors and already existing structural elements. When I describe the mainstreaming of Internet 
community values within the UN system, it is important to read it not as a claim that UN 
bureaucrats are adopting an idealized set of principles. This is an iterative process, where value-
laden practices shape and are shaped by their encounter with institutionalized systems. 
Through this process of structuration, a forum such as the IGF can in fact have a long-lasting 
impact that involves not necessarily allocative, but authoritative resources represented through 
discourse. Multistakeholderism, for example, is subject to a range of normative and practical 
interpretations. Taking up multistakeholderism could be a deep adoption of the values it 
represents, or a nominal gesture, which does not mean its deep embrace. Still, taking it up 
opens a door to a more Internet-centric policy approach regardless of the specific interpretive 
lens. Formalizing a particular form of multistakeholder participation as a set of practices that 
reflect a particular ideology can be an important, long-lasting outcome of the IGF as a practice 
“negotiating” space. 208 
 
6.2. Multistakeholderisms 
Analysis of the IGF process through the lens of structuration theory and critical discourse 
analysis raise further questions about what is in fact meant by multistakeholderism, or about 
how multistakeholderism plays out in practice. Multistakeholderism is accepted as one of the 
main contributions of the WSIS process to the practice of Internet governance, but the rhetoric 
of multistakeholderism often focuses on an idealized notion of equal participation of non-
governmental actors as the goal of Internet governance. Mueller (2010) criticized 
multistakeholderism as an ideology. “At best,” he wrote, “it tells us to open up existing 
intergovernmental institutions to participants other than states. (…) At worst, it offers a simple-
minded communitarianism that implies that all political, economic, and social conflicts can be 
resolved if everyone involved just sits down and talks about them together” (pp. 264-265). 
While agreeing with Mueller’s critique of multistakeholderism as an ideology, in my analysis, I 
find merit in viewing it as a set of practices that enact ideological elements.  
Analysis of the IGF meetings and IGF celebrities suggests that multistakeholderism can often be 
an empty shell. It assembles actors, who carry the labels of the various stakeholder groups. Yet, 
those actors do not necessarily engage in a meaningful exchange in the search for deeper 
knowledge or consensual solutions that one might hope for, given the idealized rhetoric of 
multistakeholderism. Instead, the participants often resort to re-stating well-worn positions of 
their stakeholder groups without any exchange. In other words, the participants enact social 
structures, thus reifying them, but often do not discursively reflect on them, which is the source 209 
 
of structural change. Opening and closing ceremonies of the IGF annual event in particular are 
scripted moments that enact only the nominal performance of multistakeholderism. 
In the IGF nucleus, however, one can observe a different kind of multistakeholderism at work. 
The nucleus includes actors from a variety of stakeholder groups, but all the participants share 
a common appreciation of the IGF process and are invested in it professionally. It is a close 
collective where people move between stakeholder groups while maintaining loyalty to the 
ideal of open participation and dialogue as a way to solve policy problems. In the nucleus there 
is often meaningful exchange, which sometimes highlights tensions between the interests of 
the stakeholder group one represents and the interests of the forum as a compromise space. 
Moreover, in the nucleus, the practice of multistakeholderism depends on individuals, whose 
personal merit has already made them prominent in the IGF preparatory meetings, and enables 
the particular type of interaction that can be observed in that space. This is the kind of 
paradoxical multistakeholderism that emphasizes the individual freedoms of the members of 
the group, by already excluding those who do not subscribe to the communal culture of the 
nucleus. Paraphrasing Galloway’s (2006) observations about the IETF, in the nucleus there is a 
communitarianism based in openness, inclusion, universalism, and flexibility; it is a 
communitarianism born of a process of self-selection and preemptive exclusion from high 
degrees of personal freedom and individualism. 
Finally, in the workshops of the annual IGF events, and even in the open plenary sessions that 
garner a high level of audience participation, one can observe yet another version of 
multistakeholderism. The depth of multistakeholder participation in the workshops ranges in 210 
 
terms of meaningfulness, typically as a function of themes, speakers, and organizers. The 
distinctive feature of the workshops, however, is the unpredictable audience. During the formal 
parts of the forum, among the celebrities, or even within the nucleus, the discourse of each 
actor is moving in a predictable trajectory; the unpredictable nature of participation in the 
workshops can yield unexpected surprises. People who are not regularly involved in the IGF 
process, many times local participants from the host country, who bring different normative 
frameworks and attitudes to Internet policymaking, can end up making points deemed radical 
within the systems of the IGF. To mediate this, interest groups strategize their participation in 
various workshops to control the agenda, yet this practice of unpredictable participation enacts 
the sort of disruptive innovation that is, ironically, valued by the Internet pioneers. 
Treating the IGF as a laboratory for the multistakeholder experience, the future of the Internet 
governance debate will depend, to a degree, on which multistakeholderism will be formalized. 
For future research, and policy debates, however, it is important to recognize that there is a 
multiplicity of practices of multistakeholderism, each enacting different structures with 
different potential long-term results.  
6.3. Internet governance as a system 
My research supports recent claims that the study of Internet governance by focusing on single 
institutions is limited (Mueller & van Eeten, 2011). IGF is an example of a discursive nexus, 
where structures of the Internet governance community are enacted through the collision of 
various ways of organizing and carrying out the debate. Yet, understanding the practices that 
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trajectory of this debate and the context in which it has evolved. The path set by the WSIS 
process is an important factor in shaping the IGF and defining its core elements. The broad 
definition of Internet governance, the emphasis on multistakeholderism, and the non-binding 
character of the IGF debates were fundamental to establishing the context from which 
discourse emerges in the forum, impacting who gets to talk, what gets to be talked about, and 
how the array of opinions is expressed in the forum.  
At the same time, events external to the forum, such as the CSTD Working Group on 
Improvements to IGF, or the G8 meeting in May 2011, have a more immediate impact. Such 
events, as well as socio-technological developments (e.g. the rise of social networks or cloud 
computing) play an important role in setting the agenda of the IGF as well as defining the range 
of acceptable opinions. In addition, the fundamental notion of multistakeholderism implies that 
participants in the IGF arrive from a diversity of institutional backgrounds, thus not only infusing 
the debate with the interests of their home institutions, but also importing structures of 
legitimation and domination that typically do not co-exist in a single discursive space (e.g. the 
UN and the Internet community organizations).  
A structuration approach to the analysis of the Internet governance space, thus, calls for a more 
nuanced understanding of the practices and structures of the spaces that impact it. Some of 
these spaces have a systematic influence that is altering the institutional context in which IGF 
acts (e.g. recommendations of the CSTD working group); the outcomes of others impact the 
substantive agenda of the forum (e.g. the new generic Top Level Domains policy by ICANN); the 
influence of others is felt through vocal participants, who represent that space in the IGF (e.g. 212 
 
strong advocates of specific interests in the nucleus). Similarly, at this point in the evolution of 
the field of Internet governance, understanding each of these other spaces would still be 
incomplete, without a deeper understanding and account for the structuration processes taking 
place within and around the IGF.  
In a systemic view of Internet governance, the institutions and the decision-makers in the 
Internet policy field are linked through structures of signification, legitimation, and domination 
that change and evolve over time, as the key players interact and debate not just the role of 
information technologies as social, political, and cultural forces, but the proper means by which 
these forces should be governed. The IGF has a potential structural impact on other institutions 
of information policy, not limited to Internet governance, and including those with more formal 
decision-making authority, by influencing the ways in which people think about both the 
Internet and its governance.  
6.4. Contribution and emerging research agenda 
This study is the first step towards a broader program of research in Internet governance. Not 
only does it open up additional questions about the IGF, it also offers a trajectory for asking 
more nuanced questions about other aspects of the field of Internet governance. This project 
focused primarily on the practices of IGF as mechanisms that enact competing normative 
frameworks of its participants. Future research can continue this trajectory, to deepen our 
understanding of the elements of structuration within the forum itself, or it could pursue a 
comparative approach to further investigate the potential repercussions (or lack of thereof) of 213 
 
the IGF on the Internet governance. The systematic view of Internet governance would suggest 
that the two trajectories are related. 
Structuration theory offers a prism to examine aspects of the Internet governance process that 
were assumed as given or not treated with adequate sophistication by the theories of 
international relations. Whereas the realist and the rational choice institutionalism approaches 
focus on steady states of policymaking and assume as given contextual factors such as material 
resources or the fixed preferences of the actors, structuration shifts the focus to the dynamics 
of the political process. In the particular case of the IGF it helped explain how resources (albeit 
not material, but authoritative) are shaped and how preferences of the actors shift in the 
process of institutionalization of the forum and structuration of thought about Internet-related 
policymaking. Moreover, structuration brings the focus back to the individuals, whose behavior 
is shaped by, but is also shaping the emerging institutional settings. Unlike in structuralism, 
where individuals interact with and within predetermined structures, here the actors are a 
pivotal factor in structuring the social context in which they act. 
To deepen our understanding of the processes of structuration within the IGF, additional 
studies of the norms and values held by the individual participants, particularly those active in 
the nucleus, would be beneficial. As a product of human activity, IGF is, to a great degree, a 
reflection of the individual beliefs, perceptions, and ambitions of the people in its nucleus. 
When the participants argue for a particular policy position, whether about the adoption of 
IPv6 or freedom of expression, they do not argue for a mere technical solution, but for an 
arrangement that reifies their view of the desired social, political, economic, or cultural state. 214 
 
When the participants insist on a particular way of conducting the business of IGF, they seek to 
reify their perceptions of how technology should be governed. 
The study of information policy needs to more carefully examine policymaking elites, as a way 
to make sense of the emerging structures and institutions. In this study I examined 
policymaking interactions on the micro level, to see how the policy language is constructed in 
order to understand the political meaning of that language. Policy is written by individuals in 
groups that come to have they own unique practices of deliberating and making decisions. 
Some of these practices are “imported” from the stakeholder groups the policymakers 
represent; but some are inherent to the group, shaped by the group members, and at the same 
time influencing the behavior of the members of the group. A structuration analysis suggests 
that policy and policymaking processes should be viewed as a whole. The mundane and the 
obvious of the policymaking space is integral to how policy is produced by the small group of 
decision-makers. This observation is particularly important for thinking about an emerging 
medium such as the Internet, which is being constructed partially through debates about policy 
regulating its use, whether in binding or non-binding settings.  
Some of the perceptions and attitudes of the key players in the Internet governance debate can 
be explained as factors of their institutional and national affiliations. But not all of them. The 
institutions of Internet governance are still evolving, and in a rather unique, mostly bottom-up 
fashion. As such, the emphasis should be on the dynamic constitution of these institutions, on 
accounting for the actions of individuals, and on revealing the link between their agency and 
the structures they craft. The individuals who drove the Internet governance debate in the early 215 
 
days left a permanent mark on the institutions of Internet governance, arguably more than in 
other spheres of policymaking, because this field and its institutions evolved in a bottom-up 
fashion under the leadership of these individuals. Studying policymaking processes related to 
the Internet can teach us about the way we, as a society, think about information policy. One of 
the trends the findings of this study support is the move away from the purely technical focus 
to the more content-conscious view of the Internet, also by the policymakers.  
The interviews conducted for this research can shed preliminary light on the normative basis of 
individual members of the nucleus. Future research can have both a broader and a deeper look 
at the norms and values of individuals participating in and shaping the agenda of the IGF. 
Mapping out the individual perceptions and visions of the Internet of the IGF participants, 
combined with the understanding of their practices offered by this study, can provide a detailed 
map of the structures guiding the IGF discourse. Such a map can shed further light on the 
processes of agenda setting and norm producing that happen during the IGF preparatory 
process and the annual events. Comparing the values, norms, perceptions, and visions of 
technology of the first-time participants in the forum before and after the IGF could shed 
additional light on the impact of the forum on its participants. Such analysis can offer lessons to 
the broader study of information policymaking process; as convergence blurs the boundaries 
between distinct information and communication technologies, decisions made in one 
particular technical arena have the potential of affecting the entire filed. 
At the same time, insights about the practices of discourse production, as well as better 
understanding of the normative frameworks enacted through them, can shed additional light 216 
 
on the substantive discourse of the IGF. The framing of policy issues, as well as the ways of 
arguing for or against a policy view, is another form of enacting social structures. Particularly 
interesting in this regard are the visions of technology coming out of the IGF. My observations 
suggest that one of the discursive “artifacts” created in the IGF are socio-technical visions of the 
Internet. These visions of technology are inherently normative and fueled by the individual 
perceptions of technology as well as the cultural, national, and institutional identities of the 
participants. While some attribute high value to personal freedom, openness, and 
individualism, others attribute high value to economic stability, nationalism, and cultural 
conformity. Evaluating the same policy positions against such different ideals will most likely 
yield very different assessment results. Yet, these ideals are the building blocks of the broader 
notion of the information society. 
It is possible, however, that in the process of IGF deliberations, some visions of the Internet 
have become more acceptable than others. In IGF-USA, for example, the use of future scenarios 
as a way to reflect on Internet policy issues has become a common practice in the past two 
years; the premise of such exercises is, how do we avoid the social consequences described in 
scenarios through governing the Internet’s role in them? Analyzing such visions can shed light 
on potentially competing version of information-based society being constructed through 
information technology regulation in other fora, whose representatives participate in the IGF. 
Structuration theory is frequently perceived as all-encompassing and explaining everything to a 
degree that it is not falsifiable. Yet, when applied, structuration is actually very much confined 
to particular settings (for example, see the conceptual adaptation in Orlikowski, 1992). To 217 
 
consider the complexity of information policy broadly defined one needs an expansive notion of 
governance, one that spans beyond the law and regulatory discussions to include development 
and adoption of technology (very much in Lessig's (2006) notion of code as governance). Yet, 
when applied, structuration requires a well confined space, a commitment to looking at the 
phenomenon from within an institution as a structural vessel or a system. In other words, to 
ask macro questions, structuration calls for a nuanced micro-level investigation. The level of 
nuance in fact grows with the breadth and scope of the research question, as it includes an ever 
greater number of structures, systems, and participants. 
Following the systematic view of Internet governance, in order to broaden the scope of the 
questions asked, future research on the structuration of Internet governance should move well 
beyond the boundaries of the IGF, while keeping in mind the limitations noted above. This 
study can serve as launching pad, from which to track the practices of the IGF to other domains 
of Internet governance. To better assess the impact of the IGF and to understand the structures 
of the emerging Internet governance regime, it will be useful to study how the people, 
practices, and ideas, “travel” between the spaces where regulation of the Internet is being 
discussed. This study supports a common observation that the same individuals participate in a 
number of fora that debate Internet governance on national, regional, and international levels. 
But do these people carry practices and ideas from one such forum to another? Can we identify 
a meta-structure of Internet governance by observing common practices and ideas across 
spaces that address Internet policy? Social network analysis offers useful tools for mapping out 
such cross-fora processes. In addition, such inquiry will require an in-depth analysis of the 
practices in these other fora as well as their outcomes. While conducting this kind of inquiry is 218 
 
expansive, it can prove to be invaluable for understanding the macro picture of the de facto 
emerging Internet governance regime. 
The study of the IGF points also to questions of the public understanding of Internet 
governance. The forum appears to be uniquely positioned to make Internet governance, as 
policy sphere, more accessible to the general public. If the IGF produces ideas, one of the ways 
to assess its impact would be to evaluate the reach and the accessibility of these ideas for the 
general public. Public opinion has an important role to play in steering resource allocation and 
influencing the policy positions of government officials. To that end, it will be important to 
understand how the ideas of the IGF disseminate through mass media and how the mass media 
interpretation of substantive issues of Internet governance is understood by the public. 
Even more broadly, this study lays a foundation from which to ask questions about the 
construction of our understanding of the information-based society. Questions of privacy, 
anonymity, security, inclusivity, etc. are not unique to the Internet. The boundaries between 
particular information and communication technologies are disappearing and the concepts we 
use to make sense of this ever changing information environment are also becoming 
ubiquitous. For example, the constitution of the notion of privacy in the IGF is not, and cannot 
be, separated from the discussions of privacy as they happen in other information technology 
related contexts, on local, national, and international levels. The IGF is just one part of a larger 
mechanism through which we as a global society are making sense of the dynamic information 
environment that is challenging earlier established norms and institutions, and at the same 
time we are co-creating this environment in the process.  As such, this research calls attention 219 
 
to the study of information policy and policymaking as a way to critically assess the making of 
information and communication technologies as social, cultural, and political constructs.220 
 
APPENDIX A 
Interview outline (as submitted to IRB) 
 
I am conducting semi-structured interviews, which are by a great degree driven by the 
interviewees themselves.  Having said that, there are some fundamental points that each 
interview covers.  These points refer to the capacity in which an interviewee is participating in 
the Internet Governance debate, their views of information and communication technology, 
and their views of the international telecom policymaking process, particularly the Internet 
Governance related issues (as those viewed by the interviewee). 
To illustrate, a general flow of a typical interview is presented below.  It includes “starter 
questions” or prompts that I use to initiate a conversation about a particular point.  Not in 
every interview all the questions are getting asked.  At the same time, additional questions may 
be asked to unpack the interviewee’s response to a particular prompt. 
 
Context 
  What is your background in the field? 
  How did you get involved in Internet Governance / telecom policy? 
  What does your involvement include today? 
o  What does your organization do? 
o  What do you personally do? 
Internet Governance 
  What is this process about? 
o  What are the core issues? 
o  Why are they important? 
  Where is the discussion on these issues are heading? 
o  Who are the players arguing for a particular stand on an issue? 
o  Why would they support this position? 
o  Is there enough attention paid to these issues? 
o  How did this particular issue became pivotal to the debate? 
  How do you envision the future of the Internet? 
o  Why is this the way you think the Internet should evolve? 
o  What kind of Internet / information society is emerging in the current 
discussion? 
Internet Governance Debate/Process 
  Does the current meeting matter for shaping the Internet policy? 
o  Why yes/no? 221 
 
o  Where (else) are these issues will be decided? 
o  Why in these fora? 
  Since most Internet governance debate are not binding, why are they important (or 
not)? 
o  Why the stakeholders invest time and money in this process? 
o  Does this debate have impact on actual Internet-related policies? 
o  Why yes/no? 
o  If yes, what is this impact? 
  What does it mean that this is multi-stakeholder process? 
o  Do all the stakeholders have an equal say? 
o  Who have a stronger voice? 
o  What does it mean for the discussion? 
Use of technology 
  How do you use the Internet in your daily routine? 
o  How do you use it as part of your work? 
o  How do you use it outside of your work? 222 
 
APPENDIX B 
The duality of telecom policymaking 
Study consent form 
You are invited to take part in a research study of international telecom policy debates, particularly 
those focusing on Internet Governance.  I am asking you to take part because you hold a decision 
making position related to information and communication technology (ICT) policy and are an active 
member of the internal telecom policymaking community.  Please read this form carefully and ask any 
questions you may have before agreeing to take part in the study. 
What the study is about: The purpose of this study is to learn how the agenda for global telecom 
policymaking is set and how the various views and constraints that policymakers are bringing into these 
debates shape the discourse. 
What I will ask you to do: If you agree to be in this study, I will ask you to participate in an interview, 
envisioned to last between 30 minutes to one hour. The interview will include questions about the 
organization  you  represent,  the  nature  of  your  involvement  in  the  telecom  policy  and  Internet 
Governance debates, your views of information and communication technology, and your views of the 
international telecom policymaking process.  With your permission, I would also like to digitally record 
the interview. 
Risks, benefits, and compensation:  I do not anticipate any risks for you participating in this study, other 
than those encountered in day-to-day life.  The study will not have any direct benefits for you and will 
include no financial or other compensation.  If we correspond via email, there is a chance that a third-
party could read our correspondence.  Indirect benefits of participation include a greater understanding 
of the processes of international telecom policymaking. 
Taking part is voluntary: Taking part in this study is completely voluntary. You may skip any questions 
that you do not want to answer. If you decide not to take part or to skip some of the questions, it will 
not affect your current or future relationship with Cornell University. If you decide to take part, you are 
free to withdraw at any time.  
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Confidentiality: The records of this study will be kept private.  In light of your potentially publicly or 
professionally visible position, you may choose your comments to be attributed explicitly to you or to 
remain confidential.  If you decide to remain confidential, in any sort of report I might publish, I will 
make an effort to obscure any information that will make it possible to identify you.  If you choose not 
to be confidential, articles for publishing may include your comments in a way that may make it possible 
to identify you.   
I choose to be confidential in this study (circle one):       Yes       /       No 
All data will be securely stored in my office on my computer, and on several hard disks. Hard copies of 
data will remain in my office. All data will be destroyed (i.e., shredded or erased) when their use is no 
longer needed but not before a minimum of five years after data collection. 
If you have questions: The researcher conducting this study is Dmitry Epstein. Please ask any questions 
you have now. If you have questions later, you may contact Dmitry Epstein at de56@cornell.edu. If you 
have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a subject in this study, you may contact the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at 607-255-5138 or access their website at http://www.irb.cornell.edu. 
You may also report your concerns or complaints anonymously through Ethicspoint by calling toll free at 
1-866-293-3077.  Ethicspoint  is  an  independent  organization  that  serves  as  a  liaison  between  the 
University and the person bringing the complaint so that anonymity can be ensured.  
You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records. 
Statement of Consent: I have read the above information, and have received answers to any questions I 
asked. I consent to take part in the study.  
Your Signature _______________________________________________ Date ______________ 
Your Name (printed) _____________________________________________________________ 
 
In addition to agreeing to participate, I also consent to having the interview recorded.  
Your Signature _______________________________________________ Date ______________ 
 
Signature of person obtaining consent ____________________________ Date ______________ 
Printed name of person obtaining consent _________________________ Date ______________ 
This consent form will be kept by the researcher for at least three years beyond the end of the study and 
was approved by the IRB on April 18, 2011. 224 
 
REFERENCES 
Abell, J., & Myers, G. (2008). Analyzing research interviews. In R. Wodak & M. Krzyzanowski 
(Eds.), Qualitative discourse analysis in the social sciences (First Edition., pp. 143-161). 
New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001). The colonial origins of comparative 
development: An empirical investigation. The American Economic Review, 91(5), 1369-
1401. 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2005). Economic history and political science: 
Clarifying the questions, methods and answers. The Political Economist, 12(3), 4-13. 
Adorno, T. W. (1991). The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture (1st ed.). New York, 
NY: Routledge. 
Al-Darrab, A. A. (2005). The need for international internet governance oversight. In W. J. Drake 
(Ed.), Reforming internet governance: perspectives from the working group on internet 
governance (pp. 177-183). New York, NY: United Nations Information and 
Communication Technologies Task Force. 
Apthorpe, R., Gasper, D., & Gasper, D. (1996). Arguing developmental policy: Frames and 
discourses. Portland, OR: Frank Cass. 
Avgerou, C. (2010). Discourses on ICT and development. Information Technologies and 
International Development, 6(3), 1-18. 225 
 
Bacchi, C. (2000). Policy as Discourse: What does it mean? Where does it get us? Discourse: 
Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 21(1), 45-57. 
doi:10.1080/01596300050005493 
Banks, S. P., & Riley, P. (1993). Strucuration theory as an ontology for communication research. 
Communication Yearbook, 16, 167-196. 
Bell, D. (1999). The coming of post-industrial society: A venture in social forecasting (3rd ed.). 
New York, NY: Basic Books. 
Beniger, J. R. (1986). The control revolution: Technological and economic origins of the 
information society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Retrieved from 
http://catalog.library.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?BBID=4834454&DB=local 
Berleur, J. (2008). 15 years of ways of Internet governance: Towards a new agenda for action. In 
C. Avgerou, M. L. Smith, & P. Besselaar (Eds.), Social Dimensions Of Information And 
Communication Technology Policy (Vol. 282, pp. 255-274). Boston, MA: Springer US. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.springerlink.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/content/3n855w257018m328/ 
Boczkowski, P. J., & Lievrouw, L. A. (2007). Bridging STS and Communication Studies: 
Scholarship on Media and Information Technologies. The handbook of science and 
technology studies. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Borg, K. (1999). The “chauffeur problem” in the early auto era: Structuration theory and the 
users of technology. Technology and Culture, 40(4), 797. 226 
 
Bosso, C. J. (1994). The contextual bases of problem definition. In D. A. Rochefort & R. W. Cobb 
(Eds.), The politics of problem definition: Shaping the policy agenda (pp. 182-203). 
Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. 
Bourdieu, P. (1991). Language and symbolic power. (G. Reymond & M. Adamson, Trans.). 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Braman, S. (2009). Change of state: Information, policy, and power. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Braman, S. (2010). The interpenetration of technical and legal decision-making for the Internet. 
Information, Communication & Society, 13(3), 309–324. 
Brinberg, D., & McGrath, J. E. (1982). A network of validity concepts within the research 
process. New Directions for Methodology of Social and Behavioral Science, 12, 5-21. 
Brinberg, D., & McGrath, J. E. (1985). Validity and the research process. Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications. 
Bryant, C. G. A., & Jary, D. (1991). Giddens’ Theory of Structuration: A critical appreciation. 
Routledge. 
Bryant, C. G. A., & Jary, D. (Eds.). (2001). The contemporary Giddens: Social theory in a 
globalizing age. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bygrave, L. A., & Bing, J. (Eds.). (2009). Internet governance: Infrastructure and institutions. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Castells, M. (2004). Informationalism, networks, and the network society: A theoretical 
blueprint. In M. Castells (Ed.), The network society: A cross-cultural perspective (pp. 3-
45). Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Pub. 227 
 
Castells, M. (2007). Communication, power and counter-power in the network society. 
International Journal of Communication, 1(1), 238–266. 
Castells, M. (2010). The rise of the network society. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
Chair’s “food for thought.” (2005, September 30). Retrieved from 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/pc3/working/dt15.pdf 
Checkel, J. T. (1998). The constructivist turn in international relations theory. World Politics, 
324-348. 
Chouliaraki, L., & Fairclough, N. (2010). Critical discourse analysis in organizational studies: 
Towards an integrationist methodology. Journal of Management Studies, 47(6), 1213-
1218. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2009.00883.x 
Codding, G. A. (1983). The changing nature of the ITU Plenipotentiary. Telecommunications 
Policy, 7(4), 317-325. doi:10.1016/0308-5961(83)90086-1 
Codding, G. A. (1991a). Evolution of the ITU. Telecommunications Policy, 15(4), 271-285. 
doi:10.1016/0308-5961(91)90050-L 
Codding, G. A. (1991b). Introduction : Reorganizing the ITU. Telecommunications Policy, 15(4), 
267-270. doi:10.1016/0308-5961(91)90049-H 
Codding, G. A. (1995). The International Telecommunications Union: 130 years of 
telecommunications regulation. Denver Journal of International Law & Polity, 23, 501. 
Codding, G. A., & Gallegos, D. (1991). The ITU’s “federal” structure. Telecommunications Policy, 
15(4), 351-363. doi:10.1016/0308-5961(91)90056-H 
Codding, G. A., & Rutkowski, A. M. (1982). The International Telecommunication Union in a 
changing world. Dedham  MA: Artech House. 228 
 
Cogburn, D. L., Johnsen, J. F., & Bhattacharyya, S. (2008). Distributed deliberative citizens: 
Exploring the impact of cyberinfrastructure on transnational civil society participation in 
global ICT policy processes. International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics, 4(1), 27-
49. doi:10.1386/macp.4.1.27_1 
Cohen, I. J. (1989). Structuration theory: Anthony Giddens and the constitution of social life. 
New York, NY: St. Martin’s. 
Continuation of the Internet Governance Forum: Note by Secretary General (A/65/78–
E/2010/68). (2007, May 7). Genral Assembly and Economic and Social Council. 
Cordesman, A. H., & Cordesman, J. G. (Eds.). (2002). Cyber-threats, information warfare, and 
critical infrastructure protection: Defending the US homeland. Santa Barbara, CA: 
Greenwood Publishing Group. 
Craib, I. (1992). Anthony Giddens. New York, NY: Routledge. 
de La Chapelle, B. (2010). Towards an internet governance network: Why the format of the IGF 
is one of its major outcomes. In W. J. Drake (Ed.), Internet governance: Creating 
opportunities for all (pp. 92-106). New York, NY: United Nations. 
Dean, M. (2009). Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society (1st ed.). Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications. 
Death, C. (2011). Summit theatre: exemplary governmentalityand environmental diplomacy in 
Johannesburg and Copenhagen. Environmental Politics, 20(1), 1-19. 
DeNardis, L. (2009). Protocol politics: The globalization of internet governance. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 229 
 
DeNardis, L. (2010a). The privatization of internet governance. Presented at the Fifth Annual 
GigaNet Symposium, Vilnius, Lithuania. 
DeNardis, L. (2010b, September 17). The emerging field of internet governance. Yale 
Information Society Project. Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1678343 
Depledge, J. (2006). The organization of global negotiations: Constructing the climate change 
regime. Sterling, VA: Earthscan. 
Desai, N. (2005). Preface. In W. J. Drake (Ed.), Reforming internet governance: Perspectives from 
the working group on internet governance (WGIG) (p. vii-x). Geneva, Switzerland: United 
Nations. 
di Gregorio, S., & Davidson, J. (2008). Qualitative research design for software users (1st ed.). 
London, UK: Open University Press. 
Diplo Foundation. (2009). Internet Governance Forum: Identifying impact. Msida, Malta. 
Retrieved from http://www.diplomacy.edu/ig/impact/ 
Donahue, R. T., & Prosser, M. T. (1997). Diplomatic disocurse: International conflict at the 
United Nations - adresses and analysis. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Publishing 
Group. 
Doria, A., & Kleinwächter, W. (Eds.). (2008). Internet Governance Forum: The first two years. 
Geneva, Switzerland: UNESCO. 
Drake, W. J. (2004). Reframing Internet governance discourse: Fifteen baseline propositions (pp. 
122–161). Geneva, Switzerland: International Center for Trade and Sustainable 
Development. 230 
 
Drake, W. J. (Ed.). (2005). Reforming internet governance: Perspectives from the working group 
on internet governance (WGIG). Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations. 
Drake, W. J. (Ed.). (2010). Internet governance: Creating opportunities for all. New York, NY: 
United Nations. 
Drezner, D. W. (2004). The global governance of the internet: Bringing the state back in. 
Political Science Quarterly, 119(3), 477-498. 
Drissel, D. (2006). Internet governance in a multipolar world: Challenging American hegemony. 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 19(1), 105-120. 
doi:10.1080/09557570500501812 
Dunn, M., Krishna-Hensel, S. F., & Mauer, M. (Eds.). (2007). The resurgence of the state: Trend 
and processes in cyberspace governance. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 
Durkheim, E. (2003a). From “Suicide.” In M. Emirbayer (Ed.), Emile Durkheim: Sociologist of 
Modernity, Modernity and Society (pp. 32-49). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 
Limited. 
Durkheim, E. (2003b). From “The division of labor in society.” In M. Emirbayer (Ed.), Emile 
Durkheim: Sociologist of Modernity, Modernity and Society (pp. 58-77). Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing Limited. 
Dutton, W. H., & Peltu, M. (2007). The emerging Internet governance mosaic: connecting the 
pieces. Information Polity: The International Journal of Government & Democracy in the 
Information Age, 12(1/2), 63-81. doi:Article 231 
 
Dutton, W. H., & Peltu, M. (2009). The new politics of the internet: Multi-stakeholder policy-
making and the internet democracy. In A. Chadwick & P. N. Howard (Eds.), Handbook of 
internet politics (pp. 384-400). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Dutton, W. H., Palfrey, J., & Peltu, M. (2007). Deciphering the codes of Internet governance: 
Understanding the hard issues at stake (Discussion Paper No. 8). Oxford, UK: Oxford 
Internet Institute. Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1325234 
Emirbayer, M. (2003). Emile Durkheim: Sociologist of Modernity. Blackwell Publishing Limited. 
Epstein, D. (2010). Constructing the Information Society: The binding nature of non-binding 
debates about Internet Governance. Presented at the Telecommunication Policy 
Research Conference, Arlington, VA. Retrieved from 
http://www.tprcweb.com/images/stories/2010%20papers/epstein_tprc2010.pdf 
Esterhuysen, A. (2008). Reflections on the Internet Governance Forum from 2006-8. In A. Doria 
& W. Kleinwächter (Eds.), Internet Governance Forum: The first two years (pp. 37-41). 
Geneva, Switzerland: UNESCO. 
Fairclough, N. (1995). Critical discourse analysis: the critical study of language. New York, NY: 
London. 
Fairclough, N. (2003). Analysing discourse: Textual analysis for social research (1st ed.). 
Routledge. 
Fairclough, N., & Wodak, R. (1997). Critical discourse analysis. In T. A. van Dijk (Ed.), Discourse 
as social interaction (pp. 258-284). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc. 232 
 
Farquharson, K. (2005). A different kind of snowball: Identifying key policymakers. International 
Journal of Social Research Methodology, 8(4), 345-353. 
doi:10.1080/1364557042000203116 
Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (2001). Taking Stock: The constructivist research program in 
international relations and comparative politics. Annual Review of Political Science, 4(1), 
391. doi:Article 
Fischer, F. (2003). Reframing public policy: Discursive politics and deliberative practices. Oxford 
University Press, USA. 
Fischer, F., & Forester, J. (Eds.). (1993). The argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning. 
Duke University Press. 
Foucault, M. (1970, December 2). The order of discourse. Speech presented at the Inaugural 
Lecture, College de France. 
Foucault, M. (1989). Archaeology of knowledge. Brunswick, NJ: Routledge. 
Galloway, A. R. (2006). Protocols vs. Institutionalization. In W. H. K. Chun & T. W. Keenan (Eds.), 
New media, old media: a history and theory reader (pp. 187-198). New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
Gasper, D., & Apthorpe, R. (1996). Introduction: Discourse analysis and policy discourse. 
Arguing developmental policy: Frames and discourses (pp. 1-15). Portland, OR: Frank 
Cass. 
Genieys, W., & Smyrl, M. (2008). Elites, ideas, and the evolution of public policy. New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 233 
 
Giddens, A. (1979). Central problems in social theory: Action, structure, and contradiction in 
social analysis. Berkley, CA: University of California Press. 
Giddens, A. (1984a). The constitution of society. Berkley, CA: University of California Press. 
Giddens, A. (1984b). Elements of the theory of structuration. The constitution of society: Outline 
of the theory of structuration (pp. 1-40). Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Giddens, A. (1985). The nation-state and violence: Volume 2 of a contemporary critique of 
historical materialism. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press. 
Giddens, A. (1993). New rules of sociological method: A positive critique of interpretative 
sociologies (2nd ed.). Stanford University Press. 
Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
Anchor Books. 
Goffman, E. (1963). Behavior in public places: Notes on the social organization of gatherings. 
New York, NY: Free Press. 
Goldsmith, J. L., & Wu, T. (2006). Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World. 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Haas, P. M. (2002). UN conferences and constructivist governance of the environment. Global 
Governance, 8, 73-91. 
Hall, P. A., & Taylor, R. C. R. (1998). Political science and the three new institutionalisms. In K. E. 
Soltan, E. M. Uslaner, & V. Haufler (Eds.), Institutions and Social Order (pp. 15–43). Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Hart, J. A. (2008). Global internet governance. Presented at the Faculty/Student Conference of 
the International Public  Affairs Association at Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. 234 
 
Hart, J. A. (2011). Information and communications technologies and power. In S. Costigan 
(Ed.), Technology and international affairs. Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 
Hilgartner, S. (2000). Science on stage: Expert advice as public drama. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press. 
Hintz, A., & Milan, S. (2009). At the margins of internet governance: grassroots tech groups and 
communication policy. International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics, 5(1&2), 23–
38. doi:10.1386/macp.5.1&2.23/ 
Hu, Q. (2005). Internationalized oversight of internet resource management. In W. J. Drake 
(Ed.), Reforming internet governance: perspectives from the working group on internet 
governance (pp. 185-192). New York, NY: United Nations Information and 
Communication Technologies Task Force. 
Huberman, A. M., & Miles, M. B. (Eds.). (2002). The qualitative researcher’s companion. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc. 
Huston, G. (2002). Telecommunications policy and the internet. On the Internet, 
(January/February). Retrieved from http://www.isoc.org/oti/articles/1201/huston.html 
Input to the Secretary-General’s report on the system-wide follow-up to WSIS. (2007, May). The 
Internet Governance Forum. 
Internet Governance Project. (2007). Money and advice for the Internet Governance Forum: The 
structure of the MAG and financing the IGF secretariat (Concept paper). Syracuse, NY. 
Retrieved from 
http://blog.internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2007/7/10/3083236.html 
Kaspersen, L. B. (2000). Anthony Giddens: An introduction to a social theorist. Wiley. 235 
 
Katzenstein, P. J., Keohane, R. O., & Krasner, S. D. (1998). International organization and the 
study of world politics. International Organization, 52(4), 645-685. doi:10.2307/2601354 
Kaufmann, J. (1988). Conference diplomacy: An introductory analysis (2nd ed.). Norwell, MA: 
United Nations Institute for Training and Research. 
Kelty, C. M. (2008). Two bits: The cultural significance of free software. Durham, NC: Duke Univ 
Press. Retrieved from http://twobits.net/discuss/ 
Keohane, R. O. (1984). After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. 
Princeton, NJ: Pinceton University Press. 
Keohane, R. O. (2002). Governance in a partially globalized world. American Political Science 
Review, 95(01), 1-13. 
Kleinwächter, W. (2005). De-mystification of internet root: Do we need governmental 
oversight? In W. J. Drake (Ed.), Reforming internet governance: perspectives from the 
working group on internet governance (pp. 209-225). New York, NY: United Nations 
Information and Communication Technologies Task Force. 
Kleinwächter, W. (2008). Multistakeholderism, civil society, and global diplomacy: The case of 
the World Summit on the Information Society. In W. J. Drake & E. J. Wilson (Eds.), 
Governing global electronic networks (pp. 535-582). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Kleinwächter, W. (2010). Multistakeholderism and the IGF: Laboratory, clearinghouse, 
watchdog. In W. J. Drake (Ed.), Internet governance: Creating opportunities for all (pp. 
76-91). New York, NY: United Nations. 
Kleinwächter, W. (Ed.). (2007). The power of ideas: Internet Governance in a global multi-
stakeholder environment. Berlin, Germany: Marketing für Deutschland GmbH. 236 
 
Krippendorff, K. (1996). Information, information society and some Marxian propositions. In H. 
B. Mokros (Ed.), Between communication and information, Interaction and identity (2nd 
ed., Vol. 5, pp. 487-521). Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 
Kummer, M. (2005). Introduction. In W. J. Drake (Ed.), Reforming internet governance: 
perspectives from the working group on internet governance (p. 107). New York, NY: 
United Nations Information and Communication Technologies Task Force. 
Law, J. (1987). Technology and heterogeneous engineering: The case of the 
Portugueseexpansion. In W. E. Bijker, T. P. Hughes, & T. Pinch (Eds.), The social 
construction of technological systems: New directions in the sociology and history of 
technology (pp. 111-134). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Leeuwis, C. (1993). Towards a sociological conceptualization of communication in extension 
science:: On Giddens, Habermas and computer-based communication technologies in 
Dutch agriculture. Sociologia Ruralis, 33(2), 281-305. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9523.1993.tb00965.x 
Leitch, S., & Palmer, I. (2010). Analysing texts in context: Current practices and new protocols 
for critical discourse analysis in organization studies. Journal of Management Studies, 
47(6), 1194-1212. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2009.00884.x 
Lessig, L. (2006). Code. Version 2.0. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
Lickel, B., Hamilton, D. L., & Sherman, S. J. (2001). Elements of a lay theory of groups: Types of 
groups, relational styles, and the perception of group entitativity. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 5(2), 129-140. doi:10.1207/S15327957PSPR0502_4 237 
 
Lightfoot, C. A. (2007). ICANN and the .xxx top level domain: The tipping point for future 
internet governance independence? Presented at the International Studies Association 
48th Annual Convention, Chicago, IL. 
Lofland, J., & Lofland, L. H. (2006). Analyzing social settings. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Macintosh, N. B., & Scapens, R. W. (1997). Structuration theory in management and accounting. 
In C. G. A. Bryant & D. Jary (Eds.), Anthony Giddens: Critical Assessments (Vol. 15, pp. 
455-77). 
MacLean, D. (2005). A brief history of WGIG. In W. J. Drake (Ed.), Reforming internet 
governance: perspectives from the working group on internet governance (pp. 10-23). 
New York, NY: United Nations Information and Communication Technologies Task Force. 
MacLean, D. (Ed.). (2009). Internet for all: Proceedings of the third Internet Governance Forum. 
New York, NY: United Nations. 
Malcolm, J. (2008). Multi-stakeholder governance and the Internet Governance Forum. Perth, 
Australia: Terminus Press. 
Mansell, R., & Nordenstreng, K. (2007). Great media and communication debates: WSIS and the 
MacBride report. Information Technologies and International Development, 3(4), 15–36. 
doi:10.1162/itid.2007.3.4.15 
Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. B. (2006). Designing qualitative research (4th ed.). Sage 
Publications, Inc. 
Mathiason, J. (2009). Internet Governance: The new frontier of global institutions. New York, 
NY: Routledge. 238 
 
McLennan, G. (1997). Critical or positive theory? A comment on the status of Anthony Giddens’ 
social theory. In C. G. A. Bryant & D. Jary (Eds.), Anthony Giddens: Critical assessments 
(pp. 318-326). New: Routledge. 
Merton, R. K. (1968). The Matthew effect in science: The reward and communication systems of 
science are considered. Science, 159(3810), 56-63. 
Moravcsik, A. (2003). Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics. 
International Organization, 51(04), 513-553. 
Muehlebach, A. (2001). “Making place” at the United Nations: Indigenous cultural politics at the 
U. N. working group on indigenous populations. Cultural Anthropology, 16(3), 415-448. 
Mueller, M. L. (1999). ICANN and Internet governance: sorting through the debris of “self-
regulation". info, 1(6), 497 - 520. doi:10.1108/14636699910801223 
Mueller, M. L. (2002). Ruling the root: Internet governance and the taming of cyberspace. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Mueller, M. L. (2006a). “A funny thing happened on the way to the forum…” 
Multistakeholderism, international institutions and global governance of the internet. 
Presented at the Telecommunication Policy Research Conference, Arlington, VA. 
Retrieved from web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2006/615/Multistakeholdersim.pdf 
Mueller, M. L. (2006b, May 18). The forum MAG: Who are these people? ICANN Watch. 
Retrieved June 27, 2011, b from 
http://www.icannwatch.org/article.pl?sid=06/05/18/226205 239 
 
Mueller, M. L. (2007). The new global politic of internet governance. In W. Kleinwächter (Ed.), 
The Power of Ideas: Internet Governance in a Global Multi-Stakeholder Environment. 
Berlin, Germany: Druckerei J Humburg GmbH. 
Mueller, M. L. (2010). Networks and states: The global politics of internet governance. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Mueller, M. L., & van Eeten, M. (2011). Where is the governance in internet governance? 
Unpublished manuscript, . 
Mueller, M. L., Kuerbis, B. N., & Page, C. (2007). Democratizing global communication? Global 
civil society and the campaign for communication rights in the information society. 
International Journal of Communication, 1, 267-296. 
Mueller, M. L., Mathiason, J., & Klein, H. (2007). The internet and global governance: Principles 
and norms for a new regime. Global Governance, 13(2), 237-254. doi:Article 
Muntigl, P. (2000). The European Union: Policy-making through organizational discursive 
practices. In R. Wodak, P. Muntigl, & G. Weiss (Eds.), European Union discourses on 
un/employment. An interdisciplinary approach to employment policy-making and 
organizational change (pp. 1-25). Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co. Retrieved 
from http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/1651/ 
Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft power: the means to success in world politics. New York, NY: PublicAffairs. 
Oberhuber, F., & Krzyzanowski, M. (2008). Discourse analysis and ethnography. In R. Wodak & 
M. Krzyzanowski (Eds.), Qualitative discourse analysis in the social sciences (First 
Edition., pp. 182-203). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 240 
 
Orlikowski, W. J. (1992). The duality of technology: Rethinking the concept of technology in 
organizations. Organization Science, 3(3), 398-427. 
Orlikowski, W. J. (2000). Using technology and constituting structures: A practice lens for 
studying technology in organizations. Organization Science, 11(4), 404-428. 
Padovani, C., & Nordenstreng, K. (2005). From NWICO to WSIS: Another world information and 
communication order? Global Media and Communication, 1(3), 264-272. 
Padovani, C., & Pavan, E. (2007). Diversity reconsidered in a global multi-stakeholder 
environment: Insights from theonline world. In W. Kleinwächter (Ed.), The power of 
ideas: Internet Governance in a global multi-stakeholder environment (pp. 99-109). 
Berlin, Germany: Marketing für Deutschland GmbH. 
Padovani, C., & Tuzzi, A. (2004). WSIS as a world of words. What can we say about so much 
talking. Journal of Media and Society, 18(3). 
Parsons, W. (1995). Public policy: An introduction to the theory and practice of policy analysis. 
Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative research and evaluation methods (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Phillips, N., & Hardy, C. (2002). Discourse analysis: Investigating processes of social construction. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Pickard, V. (2007). Neoliberal visions and revisions in global communications policy from 
NWICO to WSIS. Journal of Communication Inquiry, 31(2), 118-139. 
doi:10.1177/0196859906298162 241 
 
Pinch, T., & Bijker, W. E. (1987). The social construction of facts and artifacts. In T. P. Hughes & 
T. Pinch (Eds.), The social construction of technological systems (pp. 17-50). Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Przeworski, A. (2004). Economic history and political science. The Political Economist, 12(2), 1-
12. 
Przeworski, A., & Limongi, F. (1997). Modernization: Theories and facts. World Politics, 49(2), 
155-183. 
Rao, A. (1995). The politics of gender and culture in international human rights discourse. In J. 
Peters & A. Wolper (Eds.), Women’s rights, human rights: International feminist 
perspectives (pp. 167-175). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Rawls, A. W. (1996). Durkheim’s Epistemology: The Neglected Argument. The American Journal 
of Sociology, 102(2), 430-482. 
Reisigl, M. (2008). Analyzing political rhetoric. In R. Wodak & M. Krzyzanowski (Eds.), 
Qualitative discourse analysis in the social sciences (First Edition., pp. 96-120). New York, 
NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (2009). The discourse-historical approach (DHA). In R. Wodak & M. 
Meyer (Eds.), Methods of critical discourse analysis (2nd ed., pp. 87-121). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Rochefort, D. A., & Cobb, R. W. (1994). Problem definition: An emerging perspective. In D. A. 
Rochefort & R. W. Cobb (Eds.), The politics of problem definition: Shaping the policy 
agenda (pp. 1-31). Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. 242 
 
Rosenau, J. N., & Czempiel, E. O. (1992). Governance without government: Order and change in 
world politics. New York, NY: Cambridge Univ Press. 
Schmaus, W. (1998). Rawls, Durkheim, and causality: A critical discussion. The American Journal 
of Sociology, 104(3), 872-886. 
Scott, N. (2001). Ambiguity versus precision: The chellanging role of terminology in conference 
diplomacy. In J. Kurbalija & H. Slavik (Eds.), Language and diplomacy (pp. 153-162). 
Geneva, Switzerland: Diplo Foundation. 
Sha’ban, C. (2005). Proposal for establishment of an Internet Governance Forum. In W. J. Drake 
(Ed.), Reforming internet governance: perspectives from the working group on internet 
governance (pp. 235-245). New York, NY: United Nations Information and 
Communication Technologies Task Force. 
Shahin, J. (2007). The reassertion of the state: Governance and the information revolution. In 
M. Dunn, S. F. Krishna-Hensel, & V. Mauer (Eds.), The resurgence of the state: Trend and 
processes in cyberspace governance (pp. 9-34). Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 
Silverstone, R. (2007). Media and morality: On the rise of the mediapolis (1st ed.). Malden, MA: 
Polity. 
Singh, J. P. (2008). Negotiation and the global information economy (1st ed.). Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Stahl, B. C. (2008). Empowerment through ICT: A critical discourse analysis of the Egyptian ICT 
policy. In C. Avgerou, M. L. Smith, & P. Besselaar (Eds.), Social Dimensions Of 
Information And Communication Technology Policy (Vol. 282, pp. 161-177). Boston, MA: 243 
 
Springer US. Retrieved from 
http://www.springerlink.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/content/0410g407633p5071/ 
Strauss, A. C., & Corbin, J. M. (1998). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures 
for developing grounded theory (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Streeter, T. (1996). Selling the air: A critique of the policy of commercial broadcasting in the 
United States. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
The World Summit on Information Society. (2003a). Geneva plan of action ( No. WSIS-
03/GENEVA/DOC/0005). Geneva, Switzerland. Retrieved from 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=2266|2267 
The World Summit on Information Society. (2003b). Geneva declaration of principles ( No. 
WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E). Geneva, Switzerland. Retrieved from 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1161|0 
The World Summit on Information Society. (2005a). Tunis commitment ( No. WSIS-
05/TUNIS/DOC/7 -E). Retrieved from 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=2266|0 
The World Summit on Information Society. (2005b). Tunis agenda for the information society ( 
No. WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev.1)-E). Tunis. Retrieved from 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=2266|2267 
Thompson, M. P. A. (2004a). ICT, power, and developmental discourse: A critical analysis. The 
Electronic Journal on Information Systems in Developing Countries, 20(4), 1-25. 
Thompson, M. P. A. (2004b). Discourse, “development” & the “digital divide”: ICT and the 
World Bank. Review of African Political Economy, 99, 103-123. 244 
 
Throgmorton, J. A. (1991). The rhetoric of policy analysis. Policy Sciences, 24(2), 153-179. 
doi:10.1007/BF00138058 
Uimonen, P. (2003). Networks of global interaction. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 
16(2), 273-286. 
Walt, S. M. (1998). International relations: One world, many theories. Foreign Policy, 110, 29-
32+34-46. 
Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of international politics (1st ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Webster, F. (2006). Theories of the information society. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis. 
Weiss, R. S. (1994). Learning from strangers: The art and method of qualitative interview 
studies. New-York, NY: The Free Press. 
Wendt, A. (1995). Constructing international politics. International Security, 71-81. 
Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics. New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Wodak, R. (1996). Disorders of discourse. Boston, MA: Addison Wesley Publishing Company. 
Wodak, R. (2000). From conflict to consensus? The co-construction of a policy paper. In R. 
Wodak, P. Muntigl, & G. Weiss (Eds.), European Union discourses on un/employment. An 
interdisciplinary approach to employment policy-making and organizational change (pp. 
73-114). Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co. Retrieved from 
http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/1651/ 
Wodak, R. (2008). Introduction: Discourse studies - important concepts and terms. In R. Wodak 
& M. Krzyzanowski (Eds.), Qualitative discourse analysis in the social sciences (First 
Edition., pp. 1-29). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 245 
 
Wodak, R. (2009). The discourse of politics in action: Politics as usual. New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Wodak, R., & Krzyzanowski, M. (Eds.). (2008). Qualitative discourse analysis in the social 
sciences (First Edition.). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Wodak, R., & Meyer, M. (2009a). Critical discourse analysis: History, agenda, theory and 
methodology. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), Methods of critical discourse analysis 
(2nd ed., pp. 1-33). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Wodak, R., & Meyer, M. (Eds.). (2009b). Methods of critical discourse analysis (2nd ed.). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Wodak, R., Muntigl, P., & Weiss, G. (Eds.). (2000). European Union discourses on 
un/employment. An interdisciplinary approach to employment policy-making and 
organizational change. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co. Retrieved from 
http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/1651/ 
Working Group on Internet Governance. (2005). Report of the working group on Internet 
Governance. Château de Bossey. Retrieved from 
http://www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf 
Yanow, D. (1999). Conducting interpretive policy analysis. Qualitative research methods (1st ed., 
Vol. 47). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Yardley, L., & Bishop, F. (2008). Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: A pragmatic 
approach. In C. Willig & W. Stainton-Rogers (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of qualitative 
research in psychology (1st ed., pp. 352-369). Sage Publications Ltd. 
Yin, R. K. (1994). Case study research: Design and methods (Vol. 5). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 246 
 
Zittrain, J. (2009). The future of the internet and how to stop it. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ Press. 
 